¶1specially concurring:
¶2I concur in the decision reached by the majority, but I do so on the basis of McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okl. Cr.1988), wherein we stated:
Bolstering the credibility of complaining witnesses through expert testimony usurps the jury’s fact-finding function, because it is the sole responsibility of the jurors to assess the credibility of wit*1178nesses in light of their own experience, and no expert assistance is necessary. [United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir.1985)]. Expert testimony should not be permitted if it invades the province of the trier of fact. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1973).
¶3specially concurring:
¶4I concur in the result reached by the majority and the theory upon which the result is based. However, I think that it should be made clear that my decision is based on the fact that the testimony complained of by the majority directly reflects upon the witness’ belief that the victim is telling the truth. I do not think that our ruling today should be considered to exclude all expert testimony concerning behavioral patterns of child victims to molestation and other sexual offenses. I perceive that such testimony may be admissible under certain circumstances where it could reflect on truthfulness of children in general but not be a direct comment on the truthfulness of a particular victim.