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← 797 F.2d 1279 - Hutchinson v. Miller

Hutchinson v. Miller’s Empirical Analysis

797 F.2d 1279 · 1986

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
3
states following
August 2024
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently August 2024 · most notably Hutchinson, Rivera-Powell v. New York City Board of Elections (2006)

10 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

8019861990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996) · 18 U.S.C. § 594 · 18 U.S.C. § 600 · 2 U.S.C. § 441A (§ 315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971) · 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Monroe v. Pape · Buckley v. Valeo · Baker v. McCollan · Reynolds v. Sims · Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Our constitution does not contemplate that the federal judiciary routinely will pass judgment on particular elections for federal, state or local office. The conduct of elections is instead a matter committed primarily to the control of states, and legislative bodies are traditionally the final judges of their own membership. The legitimacy of democratic politics would be compromised if the results of elections were regularly to be rehashed in federal court. Federal courts, of course, have actively guarded the electoral process from class-based discrimination and restrictive state election laws.... In this essentially factual dispute, we defer to those primarily responsible for elections and we refuse to authorize yet another avenue for those disgruntled with the political process to keep the contest alive in the courtroom."”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"To do otherwise would be to intrude on the role of the states and the Congress, to raise the possibility of inconsistent judgments concerning elections, to erode the finality of results, to give candidates incentives to bypass the procedures already established, to involve federal courts in the details of state-run elections, and to constitute the jury as well as the electorate as an arbiter of political outcomes. These costs, we believe, would come with very little benefit to the rights fundamentally at issue here—the rights of voters to fair exercise of their franchise."”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “If every state election irregularity were considered a federal constitutional deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate every state election dispute, and the elaborate state election contest procedures ... would be superseded by a section 1983 gloss. ... Section 1983... did not authorize federal courts to be state election monitors.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.