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← 797 F.2d 656 - United States v. Garrett

United States v. Garrett’s Empirical Analysis

797 F.2d 656 · 1986

Citation profile

29
cited by 29 later decisions
3
states following
July 2012
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently July 2012 · most notably United States v. North (1990), United States v. McGuire (1995)

18 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

1801986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1623 · 18 U.S.C. § 6002 · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on United States v. Calandra · Kastigar v. United States · Vandygriff v. Phillips · Costello v. United States · United States v. Hasting

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “for example, where the witness' immunized testimony is relatively brief, or where events before or after the witness testifies are undeniably the source for the evidence presented to the [indicting] grand jury.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the practice of securing an indictment from the same grand jury which heard a witness’s immunized testimony does not in itself constitute a violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Kasti-gar held that a witness who provides immunized testimony to a grand jury can claim no violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination unless he can demonstrate that a grand jury subsequently indicted him on the basis of evidence not wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Although Kastigar clearly contemplated that the indicting grand jury would be different from the grand jury which heard the testimony, there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the scope of the self-incrimination provision or the protections of the use immunity statute would change where the compelling and indicting grand juries are one and the same. It may prove more difficult to identify a constitutional violation where only one grand jury has. acted, but the inquiry remains the same.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]o enforce the statutory prohibition on any use if the immunized testimony and adequately protect the witness's fifth amendment privilege, an immunized witness subsequently prosecuted need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. This burden, the Court explained, provides a very substantial protection; it is not limited to a negation of taint, rather it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.