Wylie v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 39 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1a: an event or condition occurring by chance or arising from unknown or remote causes ... [1]c: an unforeseen unplanned event or condition ... 2a: a [usually] sudden event or change occurring without intent or volition through carelessness, unawareness, ignorance, or a combination of causes and producing an unfortunate result.... [9]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Silva · State v. Silva

2. “Before a second or third felony offender can receive a sentence in excess of the appropriate presumptive term, the state must give notice of aggravating factors and present clear and convincing evidence to establish them. AS 12.55.155(f). In evaluating the Austin rule in the past, we have not been as strict in reviewing aggravating factors as in cases where presumptive sentencing applies. On reflection, we are satisfied that unless a first felony offender is given advance notice of proposed aggravating factors, there is a substantial risk that the Austin rule will be undermined. In such a case, a first felony offender may in fact receive a more serious sentence than the same person with the same background committing the same offense would receive as a second felony offender. Henceforth, we will require prior notice to the defendant before approving deviations from the Austin rule.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Buoy v. State

3. “We construe section 321.263 [the duty to render assistance statute] to express the legislative intent that where no other vehicle is involved and the person struck is rendered unconscious or instantly killed a duty is imposed on the offending driver to render to the person struck assistance which would reasonably appear to him, as an ordinary person, at the time to be necessary. Ordinarily, it will be for the trier of fact to say whether the driver has fulfilled this duty. ... [Although the evidence showed defendant stopped or returned to the scene, the State's case does not fail where it generates a jury question of the issue of his failure to render reasonable assistance, a separate and distinct requirement of 321.263.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 178 Wis. 2d 1 - State v. Swatek