Charles R. Christianson, and International Trade Services, Inc., a Massachusetts Corporation v. Colt Industries Operating Corporation’s Empirical Analysis
798 F.2d 1051 · 1986
Citation profile
32 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 54 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2024 · most notably Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988), Lashawn A. v. Barry (1996)
32 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 4 (§ 4 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1292 · 28 U.S.C. § 1295 · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) · 28 U.S.C. § 1338
Relies on Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California · Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. · Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian · Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. · Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Examination of the complaint reveals that the monopolization theory that Colt singles out (and on which the petitioners ultimately prevailed in the District Court) is only one of several, and the only one for which the patent law is even arguably essential. So far as appears from the complaint, for example, petitioners might have attempted to prove that Colt’s accusations of trade-secret infringement were false not because Colt had no trade secrets, but because Colt authorized petitioners to use them.... In fact, most of the conduct alleged in the complaint could be deemed wrongful quite apart from the truth or falsity of Colt’s accusations [against Christianson in the letters sent to suppliers]. According to the complaint, Colt’s letters also (1) contained “copies of inapplicable court orders” and “suggested] that these court orders prohibited [the recipients] from doing business with” petitioners; and (2) “falsely stat[ed] that ‘Colt’s right’ to proprietary data had been ‘consistently upheld in various courts.’ ” Similarly the complaint alleges that [Colt pursued the Springfield case against Christian-son for] “reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes” of federal patent law.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Because [Christianson’s] only theory for the invalidation of the trade secrets was Colt’s failure to comply with § 112, Christianson’s argument that [it] expected Colt to assert that its patents were valid cannot mean that he was anticipating a defense. 14 Thus, we find that Christianson’s argument that patent validity was a “defense” only serves to confirm that [it] was relying on Colt’s alleged noncompliance with § 112 as the basis for [its] own cause of action.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ... copyrights.... Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ... copyright cases.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.