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← 798 F.2d 1509 - Mudd v. United States

Mudd v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

798 F.2d 1509 · 1986

Citation profile

37
cited by 37 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
6
states following
August 2023
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 3 district · 11 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2023 · most notably Perry v. Leeke (1989), United States v. Cobb (1990)

18 federal appellate · 3 district · 11 state decisions

11019861990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Livestock Fraud Protection Act)

Relies on Chapman v. State of California · Glasser v. United States · Delaware v. Van Arsdall · Powell v. State of Alabama Patterson · United States v. Cronic

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We find that a per se rule best vindicates the right to the effective assistance of counsel. To require a showing of prejudice would not only burden one of the fundamental rights enjoyed by the accused [citation], but also would create an unacceptable risk of infringing on the attorney-client privilege. [Citation.] The only way that a defendant could show prejudice would be to present evidence of what he and counsel discussed, what they were prevented from discussing, and how the order altered the preparation of his defense.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[A]n order [limited to certain subjects] can have a chilling effect on cautious attorneys, who might avoid [discussion on non-restricted] matters for fear of violating the court's directive.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “I therefore join in the majority's holding that a prohibition on attorney-defendant discussion during substantial recesses, even if limited to testimony, violates the Sixth Amendment. . . . (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1515 . [I] do not reach the issues discussed in the majority opinion not presented by the facts of this case — in particular, the rule of law applicable to total or partial bans on attorney-defendant discussion during brief recesses. Id. at 1515 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.