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← 799 F.2d 1115 - United States v. Keefer

United States v. Keefer’s Empirical Analysis

799 F.2d 1115 · 1986

Citation profile

49
cited by 49 later decisions
1
states following
January 2018
most recently cited

34 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions — most recently January 2018 · most notably Cohn Insurance Company of North America v. Cohn (1995), United States v. Mentz (1988)

34 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2301986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990) · 18 U.S.C. § 2 · 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974)

Relies on Pereira v. United States · Hoffa v. United States · B.D. International Discount Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. · Logarusic v. United States · Henderson v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he test for materiality is not whether the agency actually relied on the false statement, but whether the statement was capable of influencing, or had a natural tendency to influence, the agency's decision.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[w]hen dealing with a pervasive, all-encompassing statute, however, the courts must be extremely careful to insure that reasonable limits are observed. This is merely a restatement of the canon of construction that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. [citations omitted] In order to exclude 'trivial' falsehoods from the purview of the statute, the courts have read a requirement of materiality into its second clause....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “requirement. All time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of a hearing on that motion, if there is one, is excluded. 45 The other pretrial-motion exclusion is found in subsection (h)(1)(J), which excludes a maximum of 30 days during which a”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.