Astran v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1990
Citation profile
15 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently January 2019
15 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Woodward v. State · United States v. Pitt · Moreno-Vallejo v. United States · Beverly v. State · Willis v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“After carefully reconsidering whether Willis v. State, 669 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), upon which the majority opinion in this cause so heavily relies, was correctly decided, I have now concluded that it was wrongly decided, and should be expressly overruled. Other cases, such as Beverly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), which adhere to the extremely flawed principle of law enunciated in Willis, supra, should also be expressly overruled. Chapter Fourteen of the Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates the only exceptions when a peace officer is authorized to arrest another individual without a warrant. Art. 14.01(b), V.A.C.C.P., the only statute that was implicated in Willis, supra, and the only statute that is implicated in this cause, expressly provides: “A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in the presence or within his view.” As plainly seen, the statute is clearly written. It provides that a peace officer may arrest without a warrant if, in his presence or within his view, he witnesses the commission of any criminal offense. There is nothing within that statute that allows one or more third parties to make an arrest on the basis of information supplied by the officer in whose presence or within whose view the offense was committed. This Court clearly erred in Willis in applying the informant analogy to the statute. See, however, Art. 14.04, V.A.C.C.P. Art. 14.01(b), supra, which by its very wording obviously places t”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Coleman v. State“Black found appellant in two minutes and arrested him. Wilson was parked two blocks away during the arrest and maintained radio contact with Black throughout the sighting and arrest. Within thirty minutes of the arrest Wilson identified appellant at the police station as the person who sold the drugs. During the arrest, Black found a small matchbox with five capsules of heroin on [Astran's] person which [Astran] sought to have suppressed [as the fruit of an illegal arrest and search]. Id. at 762 . On those facts, we held that Astran's arrest was lawful under Article 14.01(b) because”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Armendariz v. State“although the statute states that the offense must be one that is committed within the officer’s presence or view, an officer can make a warrantless arrest based on an offense that was committed at an earlier time and further, the officer does not even have to personally see the offense committed before the war-rantless arrest is justified under article 14.01(b).”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Woodard
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.