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8 Colo. 113

Turck v. Marshall Silver Mining Co.

Supreme Court of Colorado

Decided December 15, 1884

Supreme Court of Colorado · decided 1884-12-15

The bond discussed in the opinion was as follows: “Know all men by these presents, that the Marshall Silver Mining Company of Georgetown, Clear Creek county, Colorado, a corporation duly organized under the laws of Colorado territory, is held and firmly bound unto John Turck, of said county and territory, in the sum of $5,000, lawful money of the United States, for payment of which said sum, well and truly to be made, the said Marshall Silver Mining Company binds itself, its…

Cited in Black's (1910)’s definition of “Bond”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1884-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently April 1988

1 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

3018841890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Helm, J.

¶1Action at law upon a bond executed by the defendant company, conditioned for the reconveyance to plaintiff of certain property therein described, upon issuance of patent therefor to the company.

¶2We deem it sufficient for the purposes of this case to say that the sum named in this bond must be viewed as penalty, and not as liquidated damages. There is nothing in the instrument itself, or in the evidence extraneous thereto, which justifies the conclusion that the parties intended to make $5,000 the exact measure of damages in case of failure to perform. There was no contract of sale; the conveyance to defendant by plaintiff was simply a matter of mutual convenience to both in obtaining patent to the premises; the evidence discloses no change of possession; plaintiff remained the equitable owner notwithstanding the transfer of the legal title; and the latter title was to be reconveyed upon issuing of the patent; plaintiff introduced no proof that this amount was considered by himself and defendant as liquidated damages.

¶3A bond is said to be “prima facie a penal obligation; ” and the sum mentioned therein is not treated as liquidated damages unless other language used in the instrument, or accompanying circumstances, show that such was the'intention of the contracting parties.

¶4The sum named in the bond being penalty, plaintiff was only entitled to recover such damages as he might suffer from breach of the condition specified. He neither proved, nor offered to prove, the extent of his injury, if any there were, under the contract; in view of the fact that defendant offered, and stood ready, to make the deed called for by the bond, it may be that no actual damages were sustained on account of the delay. Therefore, conceding that a technical breach of the bond occurred, *116plaintiff was only entitled to nominal damages; he recovered $1, and that recovery carried the costs; hence, he cannot now be heard to complain.

¶5The clause in the judgment concerning the deeds deposited by defendant as a continuing tender imposes upon plaintiff no burden; it compels no action on his part; from it he can suffer no possible injury; the court would certainly not undertake to coerce his acceptance of these deeds .against his will. There would seem to be no good reason why we should reverse the judgment on this account, and direct a new one. This provision, if improper and irregular, may be regarded as surplusage. The judgment is affirmed.

¶6Affirmed.

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