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8 Conn. 369

Marshall v. Niles

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Decided June 15, 1831

Supreme Court of Connecticut · decided 1831-06-15

Tuts was an action of ejectment for a small piece of land, being the site of a building occupied for a carding machine, on the South side of Farmington river, in the parish of Poquonnock in Windsor. The cause came on for trial, on the general issue, at an adjourned term in Hartford, in May 1831, before Daggett, J., when a case, embracing the following facts, was agreed to, by the parties, and reserved for the advice of this Court, as to what judgment ought to be rendered.

Cited in Cyclopedic (1922)’s definition of “Exceptio Quae Firmat Legem”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1831-06-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently April 1908

6 state decisions

2018311840185018601870188018901900decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Peters, J.

¶1This case presents two questions: 1. Was the land demanded conveyed to Marshall and Latham, by the deed of the Sopers? 2. Or was it included in the reservation to William Soper?

¶2The grant was of a grist-mill and the bank whereon it stood, with the appurtenances thereof, on the South side of the river. West of and adjoining to the bridge, which crosseth the river. The grant is of land and buildings. The reservation is of a building only. By a grant of land, the superstructure passes. By a grant of the superstructure, that only passes. 2 Bla. Comm. 18. The defendants admit, that by the term bank, land passes; yet they claim, that by this deed, that only passed, which was covered by the buildings. The grant of the appurtenances conveyed to the grantees a right of way to the premises, and every thing else necessary to the enjoyment of the grant. The land conveyed is under the buildings and adjoining to the bridge; and the building reserved is between the mill and the bridge, and upon the land in question. The intention of the parties is obvious; and the terms of the grant are too plain to admit of doubt. Were they otherwise, they are to be taken most strongly against the grantors. As the defendants have no estate in the land, and their interest in the building is limited to its existence, they have no right to incumber the land beyond that period; and having voluntarily destroyed it, their interest is terminated; and by continuing in possession under a claim of right, they have become disseisors.

¶3The plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to judgment according to the agreement of the parties.

The other Judges were of the same opinion.

¶4Judgment for plaintiffs.

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