Volume 8 — District of Columbia Reports

<p>I. An attorney or counselor at law who successfully prosecutes a private claim against the United States, for a contingent fee of the amount allowed, has a lien upon the fund which may be enforced against the claimant, even when the money is in the Treasury of the United States.</p> <p>II. A contract to prosecute such claim before Congress is not void as against public policy, when the services are to be rendered in an open and fair presentation of facts, and where no secret or corrupt means are employed to mislead or deceive the members of the legislative body.</p> <p>III. Nor does such an agreement operate as a transfer or assignment of a part, or interest in the claim, so as to make it void by the provisions of the act of Congress of February 26, 1853. It is a method of fixing the compensation in procuring the allowance of the claim.</p>

<p>A lease of real estate in which the lessors are described as “acting as a church-extension committee by authority and on behalf of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, Old School,” parties of the first part, and who executed the lease in their individual names and seals, and which contained reciprocal covenants to be performed by the parties respectively, one of which was to pay rent on the part of the lessee to the lessors, as in their own right, is a nullity. It is a nullity as to the owner, because it is not his contract; and as to the lessors, because they have no estate in the property; and as to the lessee, because it is not binding on the other party. And the rule that a tenant shall not be allowed to dispute his landlord’s title has ' no application to such a case.</p>

<p>I. F. entered into a written agreement, together with others, who were part owners with him, for the sale of their joint property to C.; and it was one of the conditions of the transfer that F. should be employed by C. for one year, at a salary of $2,500 per annum, payable monthly. Held that F. could maintain an action against C. for a month’s wages, as they fell due, if C. refused to pay the same. Held, also, that it was an independent covenant with F., and that he could sue for such-, wages in his own right, without making the other part-owners of the property conveyed, parties to the suit.</p> <p>IX. Where, however, the undisputed facts show that F. absented himself from the duties of such employment for a period of twelve, days, on account of the sickness of a child, but without giving notice or obtaining leave from C., there is a breach of contract on his part, and if C.. refuses to receive him back again into service he cannot maintain an action for salary after such breach.</p> <p>III. Held, also, that it is error, where the fact of absence is undisputed or admitted, to submit the question to the jury whether such facts were or were not a breach of the contract.</p>

<p>A railroad corporation, created by the legislature of Virginia, and also allowed to run its road, by act of Congress, into the District of Columbia, borrowed a sum of money in the city of New York, through the agency of its treasurer, and no part of it having been repaid, suit was commenced in the supreme court of the State of New York, by service of process upon its secretary, who was found there, and judgment rendered for the full amount. Action is brought in'this court upon a transcript of the judgment. Held, that the corporation, having contracted the debt in the State of New York, the court there obtained complete jurisdiction by such service, and that such judgment is entitled to the same conclusiveness here as in the State where it was rendered. Held, also, that it is competent for a State legislature to authorize the commencement of suits by the service of process upon the president, secretary, or treasurer of a foreign corporation having a place of business, or making contracts within that State.</p>

This action is brought upon an agreement, by the terms of which Langdon was to take charge of and conduct, as foreman, the glass-works belonging to the defendant in the city of Washington, and he agreed to pay him fifteen dollars per week, and at the expiration of eight months from the 14th day of February, 1870, the defendant further agreed to assign to the plaintiff an interest in said property equal in amount to $600 ,• or, if plaintiff should prefer, he would pay him the…

The plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants upon the following instrument, claiming it to be a guarantee : Georgetown, D. C., January 14, 1871.

This was an action of ejectment by the plaintiff to recover from the defendant a certain lot of land in the city of Washington. The bill of exceptions shows that on the trial the plaintiff gave in evidence the recorded allotment of square 536 in said city by the United States commissioners to Daniel Carroll, dated November 5, 1796, and which allotment embraced the premises described in plaintiff’s declaration.

<p>A note made in the State of Pennsylvania is not invalidated by the laws of that State, though more than the legal rate of interest is contracted for. The excess over such legal rate is recoverable by the debtor; and, therefore, a note given in this District, in part payment of the principal of such a note, is to be governed by the usury laws of that State, and as such principal is a valid indebtedness in Pennsylvania, the renewal note given for its consideration is equally binding here.</p>

Tlie petition in this case is for a divorce on the ground that the defendant is an habitual drunkard, and is guilty of cruelty toward plaintiff, but no alimony was asked. The defendant answered and filed a cross-bill, charging the plaintiff with having committed adultery on several occasions, and also alleging that plaintiff holds in her own name certain real estate in this city, a description of which and of the improvements thereon is set forth in the cross-bill.

This case was heard upon the pleadings, consisting of a bill and cross-bill and answers thereto.

<p>A policy of life insurance contained a stipulation that it should he void if a certain declaration made by or for the person whose life was insured, “ and upon the faith of which this agreement was made, shall he found in any respect untrue.” The declaration referred to was made for the purpose of procuring the policy, and contained answers to certain inquiries respecting the health of such person, and as to his having had certain diseases therein enumerated.</p> <p>I. Held, that such declaration constituted a part and portion of the contract, and the statements therein were made material by the contract, and the only question of fact respecting the same that can be determined by a jury is whether such statements are true or false, and not whether they are material.</p> <p>II. Held, also, that it was misdirection to instruct the jury that, in order to avoid the policy, it was necessary to show that the assured himself knew that he was misrepresenting in making such statements. The question being upon this subject whether such statements were untrue in point of fact, not whether the assured knew them to be false.</p> <p>III. Held, also, when a policy has lapsed for non-payment of the premium, and is afterward re-instated upon the condition that such re-instatement shall be void if the assured shall not then be in sound health, there can be no doubt that the policy and the representations upon which it is based and the renewal are to be considered together. The renewal of a contract necessarily imports a continuance of its terms.</p>

<p>STATEMENT OP THE CASE.</p> <p>This was a writ of certiorari at common law, to remove a judgment rendered against the defendant before a justice of the peace for a penalty of five dollars.</p> <p>The defendant was arrested in an action of debt for a violation of an ordinance of the late corporation of the city of Washington, which imposes a forfeiture of not less than five dollars upon the owner of a dog of the male kind for the failure to obtain a license for keeping the same. The proceedings upon which the defendant was taken before the magistrate were commenced by a warrant of arrest, whereas it was contended that the first process should be by summons according to the practice of the common law. The writ is sued out here for the purpose of having the judgment reviewed, and the proceeding before the magistrate quashed. The remaining facts necessary to an understanding of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>STATEMENT OP THE CASE.</p> <p>The action was upon a Treasury draft iu favor of the plaintiff on the defendant for the sum of $3,414. The defendant was a Government depositary and paid the draft upon a forged indorsement. The declaration besides the common counts had one in trover. At the trial the counsel for defendant objected to giving any proof under the declaration on account of the misjoinder, but the court permitted the plaintiff to elect any other count, and thereupon she elected to proceed on the one for money had and received. To this ruling the defendant excepted.</p> <p>The second bill of exceptions shows that the plaintiff, who was a witness, swore that she resided near Nashville, Tenn., and that she was the] party named in said draft as payee; and in answer to the defendant she said she was a married woman, living with her husband near Nashville, Tenn., and that she had never been divorced.</p> <p>In answer to the plaintiff’s counsel she said she had transacted all her husband’s business for the last seven or eight years on account of his mental imbecility.</p> <p>The defendant’s counsel then asked her if her husband was not the owner of the property that had been taken by the United States in Tennessee, for which taking said claim had been allowed, and was not the draft in question given in payment thereof?</p> <p>To this question the plaintiff objected, and also that the witness should not answer the same, and the court sustained the objection, and the defendant excepted.</p> <p>The plaintiff, as witness, further said that the draft belonged to her, and that her name on the back of said draft was not written by her, nor had she ever in any way authorized the same, and that she had never in any way parted with her interest in said draft.</p> <p>There were several other bills of exceptions which are not noticed, for the reason that the facts above stated are all that is necessary to an understanding of the decision.</p>

On the 28th of September, 1854, Charles S. Wallach and his wife, Susan L. Wallach, executed a deed to certain lots and parcels of land in the city of Washington to James M. Carlisle, trustee, to secure the payment of five thousand dollars, which said Wallach borrowed of Henry W. Lansdale.

In the year 1812, one James Clerklee owned a tract of land in the county of Washington, D. C., fronting on the Bladensburg turnpike road, and containing 300 acres.

This is an action of tort, and the plaintiff alleges in the declaration that the defendant, on and after September 17, 1861, was consul-general of the United States in and for the country of Egypt; and that in abuse of his power defendant took cognizance of a certain controversy between plaintiff and Bichard H. and Anthony B. Allen, citizens of, and residing in, the United States, and that neither plaintiff nor the said Allens were then within the Turkish dominions; and that…

This was an. action on a bond. The declaration describes the bond and alleges a breach of its condition, and then concludes, “ Wherefore, the defendants became liable to pay the amount aforesaid,” but it does not show that the defendants neglected to pay the same, or that it was still unpaid. The defendants demurred that the declaration was bad in substance, which was overruled by the court below, whereupon the defendants appealed to the general term.

This was an action, to recover damages against defendant as a common carrier for an injury to a mare, the property of the plaintiff.

<p>I. A deed of trust containing a mistake in having the word west instead of east, contrary to the intention of both parties in the beginning of the description of the premises conveyed, will be corrected on a bill in equity filed for that purpose by the grantees, not only as against the grantors, but against the parties to a prior deed of trust upon the same premises of which said grantees had no knowledge or notice, and which was not recorded for over a year subsequent to the record of their conveyance, and the latter so corrected is decreed to be the first incumbrance upon the property.</p> <p>II. The doctrine that permanent and fixed boundaries or monuments, palpable to observation, control courses and distances, applied to the facts of the case.</p>

<p>L. accepted a bill of exchange for the accommodation of T. H. & C., with the understanding that they would raise money on it with which to pay their indebtedness to plaintiff. They also agreed to take care of the acceptance, and plaintiffs were so informed, but, failing to raise money on it, transferred it to plaintiff in payment of such indebtedness, and also in consideration of further advances and forbearance.</p> <p>Held—</p> <p>I. That this was not a misappropriation of the acceptance.</p> <p>II. That such transfer was for value, and in the usual course of business.</p> <p>III. That plaintiffs were entitled to recover against such accommodation acceptor.</p>

<p>STATEMENT OE THE CASE.</p> <p>The bill is filed to reform a deed of trust from one Hugh D. Sweeney to the plaintiff. It sets forth that the complainant purchased the land fronting 106 feet on Seventh street, in the city of Washington, from said Sweeney in the year 1851, and at once entered into possession of the premises, but the deed was not executed until December 20,1856. That he gave instructions to one Thomas Donn, then a justice of the peace, to prepare an instrument conveying all the property to the plaintiff in his own right, except 25 feet front, purchased by Mrs. Zell, who is the plaintiff’s sister, and which was to be conveyed to the complainant in trust for said MrsZell during her life, and at her death in trust for her children.</p> <p>Thátsaid Donn by mistake sodraughtedtheinstrument that all of said property was conveyed to plaintiff in trust, contrary to the intention of all parties thereto, and was executed in this form by said Sweeney without examination; that complainant has continued in possession of said land, except the 25 feet intended to be conveyed to him in trust as aforesaid, either by himself in person, or by his tenants to the present time. That he has paid the taxes and made valuable improvements thereon, and that said mistake was not discovered by him until recently. The bill concludes with a prayer for reformation of the deed, so as to give effect to the intention of the parties.</p> <p>There was a decree pro confesso as to all the defendants except E. F. Zell, husband of Mrs. Zell, who in a separate answer admits the purchase by the complainant, but he alleges that he requested him to purchase a piece of land for himself? but he did not inquire how much land was purchased, and did not see the deed until five years after it had been recorded, and that he rested under the same, and made improvements. Denies that it was the understanding that only 25 feet were to be conveyed in trust, and he urges the staleness of complainant’s demand. That he has no personal knowledge of instructions to Donn, and does not know when complainant discovered the mistake.</p> <p>No testimony was taken in support of the answer, and Kirk states in his deposition that he employed Donn to prepare the deed from Sweeney, and sustains by his own oath, and that of others, all the allegations in the bill in respect to the mistake in the deed, and as to his having been in possession and control of the property, and paying taxes and making improvements thereon.</p> <p>With regard to laches of the complainant in filing his bill, his testimony shows that he possessed and controlled the property without any claim being set up by the defendants. That the mistake was not discovered until 1861, and that he left the city at that time and did not return until 1865, and that during his absence his brother-in-law, the said Zell, attended to his business as general agent; and that both Zell and his wife knew of the improvements, and admitted Kirk’s individual right to the whole of the remaining 78 feet as his own separate property.</p> <p>At the hearing in the court below, the bill was dismissed, and the cause is here upon an appeal from that decree.</p>

This was a motion to vacate an order allowing a re-argument of the appeals in the above-entitled actions. The decrees in the court below were affirmed at the last general term by a divided court. They were heard by the five justices, but when the decision was announced one of the number declined to participate in the judgment on the ground that he was interested in the question decided.

The justice holding the special term in equity passed a rule for the defendants to show cause why they should not be restrained from proceeding to collect certain assessments upon the property of the complainants, for the cost of improvements upon New York avenue; and the application has been certified to the general term, to be heard in the first instance.

<p>I. Where a widow remains in occupation of the family residence for a, period of forty years after the death of her husband, under a claim of ownership, an adverse possession arises which will bar an action of ejectment by the heirs of the husband.</p> <p>II. The knowledge of the heirs of the exclusive character in which she holds, may be presumed from such continuous possession when combined with other circumstances.</p> <p>III. An ejectment instituted thirty years before the present action by the ancestor and grantors of the present plaintiffs, which was resisted and defeated by the widow, is a sufficient proof that the heirs of the husband knew she was not holding the premises in subordination to their rights.</p>

This was an action in trover for a pair of horses, a buggy, harness, &c., tried before the chief-justice at the last January term of the circuit court.

<p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

The object of this bill is to establish and enforce the lien of a judgment upon an equity of redemption on lot 44, reservation 10, in the city of Washington, and to have two deeds of trust upon the same property declared defective by reason of not being properly stamped. The judgment in favor of the bank was docketed January 24,1871, and that of Skinner & Co., intervening creditors, February 20,1871.

The plaintiff makes a motion to quash the writ of certiorari on the ground that it has been improperly awarded in this case-The defendant alleges in her petition -for the writ that the plaintiff has caused a summons to be issued by one Simon Joseph, a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, against her to recover the sum of $61.65, which the plaintiff alleges to be due her from the said petitioner.

<p>STATEMENT OR THE CASE.</p> <p>The bill was filed by a judgment-creditor, setting forth the judgment at law against the defendant, Virginia Whittlesey, for the sum of $1,545.58, and that execution thereon had been returned unsatisfied. The bill also alleges that one Comfort S. Whittlesey, husband of the said Virginia, departed this life intestate in 1864, seized in fee-simple of á lot of ground in said District which is described; and that his widow, the said Virginia, is entitled to her dower-estate therein, and complainants ask that such interest may be subjected to the payment of their judgment. The other defendants are heirs of the intestate, and the answers admit the material averments of the bill.</p>

The jury having returned a verdict for plaintiffs, the defendant Angus filed his motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law of the case, and also contrary to the evidence given on the trial. The motion was sustained by the court below and a new trial ordered. From this decision the plaintiffs have brought the present appeal.

<p>I. A deed of trust directed tlie trustee to permit the cestui que trust to en joy the rents, issues, and profits arising from the trust-estate during his life, and to hold the same until his children should come of age-The deed afterward contain a provision in these words: “And in the mean time apply the rents, issues, and profits arising therefrom, to the support, maintenance, and education of the said child or children</p> <p>Held, that such cestui ¡rue trust had not an interest in the property,, which equity would apply to the satisfaction of a judgment-debt.</p>

<p>I. Halo citizens only can exorcise tlie elective franchise in the District of Columbia.</p> <p>II. The elective franchise is not a natural right and is made to rest, in the United States, upon the authority of law which defines the qualifications of those citizens who may exercise it.</p> <p>III. By the first clause of the fourteenth amendment the plaintiff and all other persons born in the United States are citizens thereof, and are therefore capable of becoming voters. But the amendment does not execute itself, and it requires legislative action to authorize them to vote. Congress has carried this right into effect in this District, by extending its exercise only to male citizens.</p>

This action is brought by a lessee to recover damages from, his landlord for eviction before the expiration of his lease. The contracts .relied upon are a lease and a renewal, both in writing, and both set up in the declaration, and used in evidence upon the trial.

<p>A devise was made to an executor, his heirs, &c., in trust, to manage and dispose the property in his discretion for the husbanding and increase thereof during the minority of the two grandsons of the testator; one-half to he turned over to the elder coming of age, and the other half to the younger coming of age; and if either died, his share to go to the survivor. The elder attained the age of twenty-one, and died without having been married; and the survivor attained the age of twenty-one, married, and died intestate, leaving a widow. The survivor occupied the property and exercised ownership over the same until his death. No deed of conveyance was ever made by the executor to such survivor, and the said executor is now dead.</p> <p>STATEMENT OF THE CASE.</p> <p>On the 13th day of October, 1847, Eliza Haw, wbo was then the wife of Henry Haw, was the owner of, and seized in fee-simple of, a farm in the District of Columbia, known as “ Mount Pleasant and Pleasant Plains.”</p> <p>Henry Haw had issue by his said wife Eliza, and 'the said Eliza died in the life-time of her husband, who is still living.</p> <p>After the death of the said Eliza, to wit, on the 31st day of July, 1849, said Henry Haw conveyed by deed his right, title, and life-estate, as tenant by the curtesy, to said farm to Eosanna Brown, his mother-in-law.</p> <p>The will of Eosanna Brown, which was admitted to probate June 14,1852, contained the following clause: “ Third. I give and devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my estate, except as in the last aforegoing clause is excepted, unto my executor, hereinafter named, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, in trust, to manage and dispose the same in his discretion for the husbanding and increase thereof while my two grandsons, John Haw and Jesse B. Haw, are under the age of twenty-one years, and to apply the income, or so much thereof as in his discretion he may deem necessary, equally between my said two grandsons, during their minority, for their support, maintenance, and education; and upon the elder of them coming of age to turn over and account to him for one equal half of my estate and property hereby bequeathed in trust, and in like manner upon the younger cóming of cage to turn over and account to him for the other equal half; and if either of my said two grandsons should die before coming of age, leaving no child or children born in lawful wedlock, then my will is that the share of him so dying shall go to and be invested in the ■survivor, and be accounted for to him by my said executor.”</p> <p>This clause devises the said interest in said farm conveyed by said Henry Haw to the testatrix on the 31st day of July, 1849.</p> <p>The will appoints Henry O. Matthews as sole executor.</p> <p>At the time of the conveyance of the estate by the curtesy to said Rosanna Brown two children, the only issue of the marriage of said Eliza Haw and Henry Haw, were living, namely, John Haw and Jesse B. Haw, the devisees referred to in the will. John, the elder, died in February, 1857, having attained the age of 21 years, and was never married. Jesse B. Haw, the survivor, and heir at law of John, attained twenty-one on the 11th of July, 1859, and married the complainant on the 3d of January, 1860, and died intestate on the 14th of April, 1863.</p> <p>Jesse B. Haw, before and after attaining twenty-one years of age, occupied the dwelling-house on the farm, and after his marriage continued' to live there with his wife. In the summer of 1861 they were compelled to leave in consequence of the war. During the aforesaid occupation he cultivated the farm and exercised ownership over the same, and after such occupation he continued in possession by his tenants -and in the exercise of ownership until his death; but no ■deed of conveyance was made by said Henry C. Matthews, sole executor, to said Jesse B. Haw at the time or after he attained the age of twenty-one years, and said Matthews died in May, 1862.</p> <p>Jesse B. Haw, before his death, viz, on the 2d March, 1863, conveyed part of said farm, consisting of the mansion-house and thirty acres, for the use of his wife, who after his death sold this part for $30,000, but this deed was not expressed to be in lieu of dower.</p> <p>Mrs. Haw is now a widow, about twenty-six years of age, and none of her children are now living.</p> <p>At the time of Jesse B. Haw’s death the farm remaining consisted of about ninety-six acres.</p> <p>W. B. Todd and W. S. Cox, who bought the undivided third of G-. B. Prentice, one of the heirs at law of Jesse B Haw, paid Mrs. Haw, complainant, $5,500 for a release of her supposed right of dower in their third.</p> <p>The cause was certified to the -general term to be heard in the first instance, and the question in the case is upon the construction of the clause in the will mentioned in the statement, and whether the executor took the legal title under the devise so as to take away the right of dower in the complainant.</p>

The bill of complaint in this cause was filed to procure construction of the last will and testament of Charles L. Coltman, deceased, and for partition of certain real estate devised by said testator.

A declaration alleging that the defendant by a written agreement was to deliver $100,000 in bonds to the plaintiff on or before a specified day, upon condition that plaintiff should deliver to defendant a bond in the same amount, without also averring that plaintiff executed its bond and tendered it, is bad on demurrer. An allegation that plaintiff was ready and willing to execute such bond is not sufficient. STATEMENT OE THE CASE.

On the 2d of April, 1861, Benjamin F. Slocum executed a deed of trust to James L. Cramer, conveying lot 5, square 516, in the city of Washington, for the purpose of securing payment of his note of the same date for $100, with interest, to the order of said James L. Cramer, one year after date.

<p>I. On. the trial of an action, ex contraetu, if it be shown that all the parties to the contract have not joined in the action as plaintiffs, the defendant may take advantage of the omission either by plea in abatement or as ground of nonsuit at the trial.</p> <p>II. Where there is a conflict of testimony over the question whether all the parties to the contract have joined as plaintiffs in the action, it is proper to request the court to instruct the jury, if they believe from the evidence that a party to the contract has been omitted, then the plaintiff cannot recover. And it is no answer to such a request and instead thereof, for the court to instruct the jury that if they believe from the evidence the debt was due to plaintiff, they must find for the plaintiff.</p>

This action is brought upon five promissory notes, each for the sum of $2,267.38, made on January 8,1872, by S. P. Brown & Son, payable to the order of Austin P. Brown, esq., in one, two, three, four, and five months, respectively, after their date On the same date they were indorsed by the payee to the Philadelphia Coal Company, and were afterwards and before their maturity transferred by said company to the plaintiff.

This suit was brought against the defendants, doing business under the firm-name and style of C. E. Creecy & Co., to recover upon four certain promissory notes made by them to the plaintiff, aggregating in the sum of $1,361.10, with interest. To this suit defendants interposed the pleas of nil debit, usury, cmd never promised as alleged.

<p>I. A corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it was created, and can only be sued in a different State by express legislation authorizing such suits against foreign corporations having agents within the State, conducting the business for which it was organized.</p> <p>II. For the purpose of litigation, a corporation is to be considered an inhabitant of the State under whose laws it exists.</p> <p>III. The act of Congress incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company extended the privilege of certain land-grants and other subsidies to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Eastern Division, upon the same conditions as are imposed on said first-named company, and said act also provided that said first-named company can sue and be sued in all courts of law and equity within the United States. Held, that although the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Eastern Division, accepted the aid of the statute, its cap acity for suing and being sued was not thereby enlarged, and being a corporation of the State of Kansas, could not be sued in this jurisdiction.</p>

<p>I. The jurisdiction of the circuit and criminal courts previously existing in the District of Columbia was transferred to this court by the organic act of March 2,1863; and the relief now granted to a party convicted of crime in the criminal court is an appeal to the general term instead of the writ of error which was the mode of practice under the form er jurisdiction.</p> <p>II. The decision of the justice holding the criminal court, overruling a motion for a new trial, is not a proper subject of review on an appeal to the general term.</p> <p>III. A motion for a new trial is an application to the sound legal discretion of the court in which the trial took place, and is not the subject of error or appeal.</p> <p>IV. Whether in case of abuse of judicial discretion so palpable in its character as to involve corruption or imbecility, the matter would be without remedy quaere.</p> <p>V. Alleged misconduct of a juror considered.</p>

The defendant insured the life of the plaintiff’s intestate, who was her husbaud. The language of the policy is-that the defendant “ does assure the life of Nathaniel H. Campbell, of Lisbon post-office, in the county of Bedford,, and State of Virginia, in the amount of five thousand dollars, for the term of life.

<p>I. The testimony showed that the payee named in a promissory note died in 1863, and that his widow acted for some time afterward as sole executrix of his will, and in that character indorsed the note to the plaintiff. Held that in orderto enable plaintiff to maintain an action upon said note, it is necessary to produce and prove a will conferring authority upon such executrix to transfer such note absolutely as the property of the plaintiff.</p> <p>II. The fact that no such proof, when it could have been easily obtained, was produced, might well excite suspicion that there was a purpose in withholding it.</p> <p>III. In order to constitute negotiability, a promissory note ought upon its face to be for the payment of a sum of money certain as to amount, so that an indorsee may maintain an action upon it in his own name.</p> <p>IV. A promissory note, dated at Detroit, in the State of Michigan, and payable there, for-i$3,000, with interest at the rate of eight per cent., with current exchange on A’eir York, is not for a sum certain, and is therefore not a negotiable instrument.</p> <p>V. The executrix indorsed the note in Alabama during the late war, and gave it to a messenger, who conveyed it through the military lines, and delivered it to the plaintiff at Leavenworth, in the State of Kansas, and there was no evidence to show that the indorsement was not of a commercial character. Held that the indorsement and transmission of the note was unlawful under the non-intercourse act of July 13,1861, and passed no title to the plaintiff.</p>

<p>I. A deed of lauds in tlie State of Maryland acknowledged in the District of Columbia, before a justice of the peace of said State of Maryland, but who is not authorized by law to take acknowledgments of deeds in the said District of Columbia, is defective and void.</p> <p>II. If such deeá. has been recorded and all the purchase-money paid, the court will direct the vendor to execute a valid deed of the premises; and, in default of compliance with such decree, that the decree stand for a conveyance of the property.</p> <p>III. When written instruments in the testimony are declared by the opposite party to be forgeries, the court will determine their genuineness by an inspection of the instruments, the preponderance of the evidence, and will also examine the acts and circumstances of the parties.</p> <p>IV. The opinion of experts as to the genuineness of signatures is the most unsatisfactory of any proof admitted by a court.</p>

<p>I. A voluntary conveyance to a wife by a husband of the bulk of his property is void as against existing creditors.</p> <p>II. There is a presumption of law and fact that the grantor in such a deed intends a fraud upon his creditors, and the mere declaration of the parties to such a transaction that they acted in good faith will not be sufficient to repel this inference.</p> <p>III. As respects subsequent creditors, the conveyance is not void unless there is intentional fraud contemplated by the grantor in the creation of future debts.</p> <p>IV. If, however, in a court of equity, a conveyance is set aside as being voluntary and fraudulent against existing creditors, the creditors whose debts have been contracted since the execution of such conveyance may come in and share in the benefit of the fund thus created.</p> <p>V. The statute of 13 Elizabeth in regard to frauds and perjuries is the law of this District, and declares all conveyances void which are made to defraud such creditors as the grantee is indebted to at the time; but in a case of actual fraud as respects subsequent creditors, the deed will also be declared void.</p> <p>VI. If a voluntary conveyance be made with a view of becoming indebted, that fraudulent intent may be inferred from the fact that the grantor contracted debts immediately after he made it and has not paid them.</p> <p>VII. When a person is indebted in a small amount, and has ample means, and is not embarrassed in his circumstances, he may make a gift in favor of his wife and children, and it cannot be impeached, for want of consideration, by his creditors.</p>

The defendant is a Virginia railroad-corporation, and had an agreement with a similar corporation in the District of Columbia, by which the defendant ran its trains over the track of the latter, into said District, and through the city of Washington, said trains being in the charge of the servants and agents of the defendants except the conductor, who was in the employment of the company whose track the defendant so used. STATEMENT OR THE CASE.

<p>I. A final decree passed at a special term of tbe court in equity cannot be opened, set aside, modified, or altered after tbe lapse of several terms of that court upon a mere petition supported by ex-parte affidavits, and upon notice to tbe adverse party.</p> <p>II. A decree is deemed to be enrolled as of tbe term at which it is passed, and a final decree cannot be opened after tbe expiration of sucb term, except upon bill of review. A proceeding by petition and ex-parte affidavit is not equivalent to a bill of review.</p> <p>III. A final decree in a divorce suit in reference to alimony is not subject to alteration or revision on ex-parte affidavits, unless it is provided in sucb decree that either party be at liberty to apply thereafter to tbe court for a modification of sucb decree in respect to alimony.</p>

<p>STATEMENT OR THE CASE.</p> <p>This is an action of slander, and the words alleged in the first count of the declaration to have been spoken by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff are, I saw her in bed with Captain Dentyand in the second count, •“ I looked over the transom-light and. saw her in bed with Captain Denty.” There was no averment that the plaintiff was a married woman, nor was there any statement of special damage, or that the defendant had charged the plaintiff with adultery. At the trial of the case the court charged the jury that they “ ought to find a verdict for the defendant unless they are satisfied from the proof that the defendant used of and concerning the plaintiff the words set out in the declaration, or language substantially identical; and evidence showing that the defendant had spoken the precise language in the declaration, or that he had caught her in bed with Captain Denty, or that she was in bed with Captain Denty, or that he accused her of being in bed with Captain Denty, may properly be considered by the jury for the purpose of sustaining the declaration, as in the opinion of the court such expressions are substantially like those in the declaration. But, on the other hand, evidence to the effect that defendant only-said to the witness that he had caught them together, or caught her with him, or had seen her with him, or had seen her in Denty’s room, are not competent to be considered by the jury as proof of the alleged slander, for they do not conform to the words set out in the declaration.” This instruction was given as a substitute for that ashed for by defendant’s counsel, who excepted to the same. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $10,000. A bill of exceptions was made, and a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the words complained of in the declaration are not actionable, and because the declaration does not state a case entitling the plaintiff to a recovery; and, therefore, judgment cannot properly be entered on the verdict.</p> <p>The case is now here on the bill of exceptions and the motion in arrest of judgment, which was ordered to be heard at the general term in the first instance.</p>

<p>C. executed a deed of trust on real estate to secure a note for $1,000. He afterward conveyed the premises in fee to G., whom he alleges verbally agreed to assume the incumbrance. The plaintiff subsequently purchased the premises at auction without being informed of said agreement, and conveyed to B. with covenants of warranty; and in order to protect the title of his vendee, purchased the note in question and brought this action thereon against C. Held, that the equities between C. and G. furnished no defense against the present plaintiff.</p>

This was an application of Rufus S. Merrill for re-issue of patent No. 28,762, granted January 19,1860, for improvement in lamps. The Commissioner rejected the application on the ground that the alleged improvement had been anticipated by a patent granted to Hale & Chandler March 1, 1859;. The invention is described in the opinion of the court.

The bill is filed in this case to set aside a sale of lands under a deed of trust, for the reason that separate lots were'sold in mass, and without respect to certain improvements and water-privileges, in consequence of which the premises sold for a grossly inadequate price.

The original bill in this cause was filed by the creditors of Elijah Shelton, deceased, in 1855, praying that a certain deed of trust executed by said Elijah Shelton, May 12, 1852, conveying the property therein described to William A. King, in trust for his wife and children, should be declared void upon the ground of fraud against creditors.

The plaintiff Sues’ the District of Columbia for an injury alleged to have been received by him on K street, southeast, in the city of Washington. He claims that while traversing the street in question in the evening, after dark, he fell into au excavation and injured one of his legs.

<p>The case is sufficiently stated in the" opinion of the court.</p>

<p>I. Iu case of tlie sale of real iiropeity under a deed of trust, the purchaser, as matter of law, becomes vested with the title, and if the person who executed the trust-deed remains in possession of the premises without any agreement to that effect, he becomes, by operation of the landlord aud tenant act, tenant by sufferance to such purchaser, and, upon being notified to quit iu thirty days, is liable to be turned out by proceedings under that statute.</p> <p>II. The judgment of the special term in cases of appeal from justices of the peace is final; and it has the same effect in cases arising under the landlord and tenant act as in other cases.</p>

<p>STATEMENT OF THE CASE.</p> <p>Action on tbe following check:</p> <p>"‘No. 40.] “Washington, D. C., July 24,1871.</p> <p>National Metropolitan Bank, pay to J. Browne, jr., or bearer, one bundred dollars, ($100.)</p> <p>W. E. BEOWN.”</p> <p>[Eevenne-stamp, 2 cents.]</p> <p>(Indorsed:) “ J. Browne, jr., J. W. Deener.”</p> <p>On tbe — day of November, A. D. 1873, tbe above cause being called for trial, tbe same was submitted to tbe court to bear tbe evidence and determine tbe cause, whereupon tbe plaintiff proved tbe following facts :</p> <p>1. Tbe signature of Wilson E. Brown on said cbeck to be tbe genuine signature of said defendant Wilson E. Brown. That said cheek was drawn in favor of Jerome Browne, jr.; that tbe signature on back of said cbeck is the genuine signature of said defendant, Jerome Browne, jr.; and that said check was presented for payment at said National Metropolitan Bank on the 4th day of January, 1872, between the hours of 1 and 2 o’clock p. m., and during the business hours of said bank; and that payment thereof was refused by said bank. That said plaintiff received said check from said defendant Jerome Browne, jr., for valuable consideration, on the 26th day of July, 1871. And that said x>laintrff presented said check at said bank for payment on the 4th day of January, 1872, and payment was refused by said bank. That said defendant Wilson E. Brown instructed said bank about the time said cheek was presented for payment not to pay said check. And that said defendant Wilson E. Brown had no funds in said bank with which to pay said check at the time it was presented for payment. That soon after said cheek was transferred to plaintiff he laid it away and forgot all about it, until, looking over his x>apers afterward, he accidentally found it, and immediately afterward presented it to said bank. That said National Metropolitan Bank at the date of said check was solvent, and continued to be solvent from the date of said check to the time of x>resentatiou of said check for payment, and continued solvent to date of trial of said cause, and was then solvent $ and said plaintiff then offered and read in evidence said check. And that x>laintiff was the present owner and holder. And then said plaintiff rested his case.</p> <p>The defendant Wilson E. Brown, to maintain the issue on his part, offered and proved in evidence the following facts, subject to the excex>tious hereinafter mentioned.</p> <p>That said plaintiff presented said check for payment at said bank on the 4th day of January, 1872, and never before that time x>resented said cheek at said bank for payment.</p> <p>That said check was an accommodation-check for ten days 5 that for three or four months from date of said check, said defendant Jerome Browne, jr., was solvent, and that the money could have been made out of him. And that in the month of November preceding the presentation of said check said defendant Jerome Browne, jr., was insolvent, and remained so up to the time of trial; that after the date of said cheek, and ux> to the date of November, said defendant Jerome Browne, jr., carried on business and paid many notes. And if said check had been presented at any time before said date it was presented it would have been paid, as it was for a small amount. And that the said Wilson B. Brown had been a good customer at the bank.</p> <p>To the admissibility of each and every part of said evidence, at the time each and every part was offered, said plaintiff, by his counsel, objected. And yet the court overruled each and every objection, and admitted and heard each and every part of said evidence. And plaintiff, by his counsel, then and there excepted to each ruling. Whereupon said defendant Wilson E. Brown rested his case.</p> <p>No evidence was offered on the part of said defendant Jerome Browne, jr.</p> <p>Judgment was rendered by the court for defendant.</p>

This bill was filed by the complainant in his own right, as well as in behalf of all holders of bonds issued by the defendant, “ The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company,” under and by virtue of an act of the general assembly of Maryland, passed on the 10th day of March, A. D. 1844.

<p>A patentee is not entitled to have his patent re-issued unless he shows by satisfaotory evidence that the error he seeks to have corrected was owing to “ inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention,” and states particularly wherein the inadvertence, accident, or mistake consisted.</p> <p>The decisions of the courts sustaining patents against objections for want of such evidence rest upon the principle that it is the province of the Commissioner to determine whether sufficient evidence to that effect has been produced; and that his granting a re-issue is conclusive on that point, and is not open to revision.</p> <p>The supreme court of the District of Columbia is not governed by this principle in determining an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents refusing a re-issue, but will require the same evid ence of inadvertence, accident, or mistake that should have been produced before him.</p> <p>If a patent is neither inoperative nor invalid, &c., and the patentee has omitted to claim anything which he has described, it is to be presumed that he has abandoned it to the public.</p> <p>It being found that the omission in this case was not owing to inadvertence, accident, or mistake, it was presumed that it was intentional, and with the view of abandoning to the public the devices not claimed in the original.</p> <p>The presumption was held to be materially strengthened because the applicant had waited eighteen years after completing his invention before applying for a patent, and after obtaining it had lived five years without ever intimating that it was defective; had, on the contrary, made several improvements for which patents were obtained under .his direction; and the re-issue was not applied for until four years after his death, and the de viceshad meanwhile gone into extensive use.</p> <p>The presumption was held to be strengthened, also, by evidence that the devices sought to be introduced in the re-issue had been in use before the original application was filed, although the evidence might not be sufficient to show want of novelty.</p> <p>In determining an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents, the supreme court of the District of Columbia will look only into the reasons of appeal, and into the records and proceedings in the case which are applicable to those reasons. (O.LIN, J., dissenting.)</p> <p>STATEMENT OE THE CASE.</p> <p>This is an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents on the application of E. S. Conklin and Joseph Stafford for á re-issue of letters-patent granted to D. S. Stafford January 15,18G1. Stafford, the original inventor, died in 1866, and his widow, who is now Mrs. Conklin, and Joseph Stafford his assignee, file this application for re issue, in which they make seven claims, five of which were allowed by the Commissioner and the other two were disallowed on the ground that Stafford had abandoned them to public use before the original patent Was issued.</p> <p>The reasons of appeal are as follows:</p> <p>1. Because the Commissioner erred in refusing the claims, in absence of any proof of any voluntary act, fact, or declaration of abandonment or intention of abandonment on the part of the inventor, and because there can be no abandonment presumed in force of law which will defeat his right to a patent.</p> <p>2. Because the Commissioner erred in refusing the claims on presumption of abandonment arising from lapse of time; the grant of other patents within two years of the original application, and from defects in the original patent which are now sought to be remedied by the present amended specifications.</p> <p>3. Because the Commissioner erred in refusing the claims by reason of alleged public use between the date of the invention and the application for the patent, without any eAddence to shoAv that such public use was with the knowledge or consent of the inventor.</p> <p>4. Because the evidence cited by the Commissioner in his decision is insufficient to establish the fact of public use with or without the knowledge or consent of the inventor, and should not outweigh the evidence produced on the part of the applicants in this respect.</p> <p>5. Because under the law nothing Avithin the scope of the patentee’s invention, which is described or shown in the specification or drawings of the original patent, though not claimed therein, passes to the public by reason of such defect; hence the legal rep resen tatiA’es of D. S. Stafford are entitled to the re-issued patent for his invention as prayed for, and such protection during the unexpired term of the patent as the law affords, the decision of the Commissioner to the contrary notwithstanding.</p>

The complainant was a stockholder in the Economical Building Association of the city of Washington. Its constitution requires every stockholder to pay one dollar per share a month until the funds thus raised shall divide $200 to each share, less thirty per cent., when the association shall close up. In case the monthly dues are not paid, there is to be charged thereon a fine of ten ceDts a month on every dollar behind for such neglect.

<p>STATEMENT OP THE CASE.</p> <p>This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff to recover the north half of lot No. 7, square 15, in the city of Washington. The bill of exceptions shows that the will of David Peter, who died seized of the lot in question, was probated and filed in 1812, and by it he directed that the proceeds of all his estate should be vested in his wife, Sarah Peter, for the maintenance and education of his children, that his debts should be paid as speedily as possible, and 4; hat his said children should receive a suitable education, for which purpose he desired that a designated tract of land, with all his personal property thereon, should be sold and applied to that purpose, aud so much of his city-property as might be necessary to effect that object, and he appointed his wife, Sarah Peter, his brother, George Peter, and his brother-in-law, Leonard U. Johns, the executrix and executors of his will.</p> <p>The plaintiff then offered in evidence a deed from George Peter, one of said executors, to Jared L. Elliot, bearing date January 22, 1842, conveying said lot. To the introduction of this deed the defendant objected on the ground that it did not show on its face that said George Peter was surviving executor, nor did it recite the power or authority under which he executed the conveyance. The objection was overruled, and the deed allowed to go to the jury, and the defendant excepted. The plaintiffs thereupon introduced other deeds to trace their title to the premises from said Elliot, and also offered evidence tending to show that Mrs. Sarah Peter and Leonard H. Jones were both dead at the date of the conveyances to Elliot, and there rested the case.</p> <p>The defendant then prayed the court to instruct the jury that upon the evidence they must find for the defendant which prayer the court refused to give, to which refusal the defendant excepted. The defendant then offered a tax-deed from the authorities of the city of Washington and the proceedings preliminary thereto ; to the introduction of this evidence plaintiff objected. The objection was sustained by the court, and defendant excepted.</p> <p>The defendant here rested, and no further evidence being offered, the court charged the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the co-executors of Peter were dead at the time of the execution of the deed to Jared L. Elliot, that then the plaintiff had shown a legal chain of title and they must find for the plaintiff. To which charge the defendant excepted.</p>

<p>I. A claim for the combination of an advertisement, not described, with an anchored balloon, refused.</p> <p>II. The novel organization of co-operative elements or devices into a useful mechanism is invention within the meaning of the statute, whether the elements be individually old or new.</p> <p>III. The novelty and utility of a combination in its entirety as a unit are to be regarded, and it must necessarily, therefore, be a fixed and definite organism.</p> <p>IV. The mere discovery that it would be a good thing to attach advertisements permanently to balloons does not come within the law protecting a new and useful apparatus.</p>

<p>I. Where a draft was issued from the United States Treasury upon the First National Bank of Washington, which was a depository and financial agent of the Government, payable to the order of Kimbro, who was a married woman then living in Tennessee with her husband, and the draft was delivered by the Government to the agents of the payee, who hadbeen employed to prosecute the claim against the United States, and the draft was cashed by a bank in Nashville, on a forged indorsement of the payee’s name, and by it sent for collection to a bank in New York, by -whom it was forwarded to the drawee in Washington, who paid it: Held, that such drawee was liable to the payee, although payment had not been demanded on her behalf until after said drawee had paid it, relying upon the indorsement as genuine. Held, also, that the liability of the drawee was not released by the circumstance that, on paying the draft, it was transmitted to the Treasurer of the United States, who acted upon the indorsement as genuine, and gave full credit for the amount of such draft in the account of the bank. Held, further, that the action would lie, notwithstanding the fact that the payee never had possession of the draft, and that it was on file in the Treasury Department when the demand of payment was made on behalf of said payee, and notwithstanding the fact that defendant, in paying said draft, upon such payee’s indorsement, acted as the agent of the United States Government.</p> <p>EC. Where evidence is introduced impeaching the genuineness of the supposed indorsement, it is competent to submit the paper to the jury to show that it had been issued by the Treasury Department, and to determine if the indorsement was a forgery.</p> <p>IH. The acknowledgment of a power of attorney before the clerk of a county court, with the seal of the court affixed, does not raise a presumption of law that the instrument was executed by the person mentioned in the certificate of said clerk. Where there is evidence tend" ing to prove and disprove a valid execution, the question must be submitted to the jury upon all the facts.</p> <p>IV. If there is a valid execution of a power of attorney, it is a sufficient authority to the attorney to place the name of the payee on the back of the draft, and to receive the money thereon. Or, if the power of attorney was left in the hands of the attorney, to be used by him and he filled the blanks therein, and by that means placed the indorsement on the draft, it would be a good and valid utterance of the draft as against the payee, or those claiming under her.</p> <p>V. If the husband, during his life-time, never reduced the draft to his possession, then, upon his death, it became absolutely the wife’s property by survivorship; and if she has not waived her right thereto, the representative of the husband’s estate has no interest iu the cause , of action.</p> <p>VI. Where several instructions are refused, but the same points are fully given in other prayers that are allowed, there is no ground for exceptions.</p>

The question involved in this case arises out of the provisions contained in section twenty-six of an act of Congress passed February 21, 1871, to provide for a government for the District of Columbia, which section is as follows: “ That there shall be appointed by tbe President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a board of health, to consist of five persons, whose duty it shall be to declare what shall be deemed nuisances injurious to…

<p>The House of Representatives lias power to commit for contempt, and when a party is found guilty of a contempt the order of the House directing his commitment is a complete protection to the Speaker who orders him into custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms.</p> <p>STATEMENT OF THE CASE.</p> <p>This is an action of trespass for assault and false imprisonment. The declaration contains four counts, the first of which alleges that the defendant on the 29th of January, 1873, in the District of Columbia, caused the plaintiff to be assaulted and seized, and forced and compelled to go to a room in the Capitol building, and to be there imprisoned, &c.; and the same allegations are in substance repeated in each of the remaining counts.</p> <p>To this declaration the defendant pleads the general issue, and also pleads in justification that during all the time mentioned in the declaration a session of Congress was holden in said District, and the defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and the Speaker thereof; that at the said session, and before the said time, a committee of the House was duly appointed under a resolution thereby adopted, and was instructed to inquire into and report to the House upon certain matters of great importance to the United States, and was also given authority to send for persons and papers; that the plaintiff was afterward called and sworn as a witness before said committee to testify concerning the matters aforesaid, and upon being asked by the committee certain questions of and respecting the same matters, did wholly decline and refuse to answer them; and that the said committee then submitted to the House a report setting forth, among other things, the refusal of the plaintiff to answer the said questions, and charging him with a contempt of the House.</p> <p>That thereupon it was ordered by the House that the Speaker issue his warrant, directed to the Sergeant-at-Arms, commanding the latter to take the plaintiff into custody and bring him to the bar of the House to show canse why he should not be punished for a contempt, and in the mean time to keep him in custody to await the further direction of the House.</p> <p>That in pursuance of said order the defendant, being such Speaker, issued his warrant directed to the Sergeant-at-Arms, whereby, after reciting the said order, the latter was commanded to execute the order therein recited, and the said warrant was delivered by the defendant to the Sergeant-at-Arms to be executed in due form of law; and that by virtue and in execution of said warrant, the Sergeant-at-Arms afterward arrested the plaintiff and took him in custody, and, as soon as he conveniently could do so, brought him before the bar of the House.</p> <p>That thereupon (the plaintiff first being heard by the House concerning the premises) it was in and by the House resolved that the plaintiff had failed to show sufficient cause why he should not answer the said questions, and that he be “ considered in contempt of the House for failure to make answer thereto f a,nd it was furthermore in and by the House resolved as follows, to wit: “That, in purging himself of the contempt for which the plaintiff was then in custody, he should be required to state to the House forthwith, or as soon as the House should be ready to hear him, whether he was then willing to appear before the said committee to whom he had thitherto declined to make answers, and make answer to the questions for the refusal to answer which he had been ordered into custody; that if he answer that he is ready to appear before the said committee and make answer, then he should have the privilege to so appear and answer forthwith, or so soon as the committee could be convened, and that in the mean time he remain in custody; that in the event that he should answer that he is not ready so to appear before said committee and make answer to the said questions so refused to be answered, then that he be recommitted to the said custody for continuance of such contempt, and that such custody should continue until he should communicate to the House, through the Speaker, that he is ready to appear-before the said committee and make such answers, and until further order of the House in the premiseswhereupon the defendant, in the discharge of his duty as Speaker under the last-mentioned resolution of the House, and while the plaintiff was still before the bar of the House, asked the latter whether he was then willing to appear before the said committee and answer the questions for the refusal to answer which he had been ordered into custody; and that the plaintiff declared that he was not then willing or ready to appear before the said committee and answer the said questions.</p> <p>That in pursuance and for the execution of the said last-mentioned resolution of the House, and in discharge of his duty thereunder as Speaker, the defendant did then and there recommit the plaintiff to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, by whom he was thenceforth kept in custody until discharged therefrom by order of the House.</p> <p>The third plea contains the same allegations substantially as the second, being pleaded in bar of all the counts of the declaration.</p> <p>1. The plaintiff joined issue on defendant’s first plea.</p> <p>2. The plaintiff demurs to the defendant’s second and third pleas, and says the same are bad in substance.</p> <p>3. One of the matters of law intended to be argued on each of said pleas is, that neither of them does set forth specifically, nor in substance, the questions which said pleas allege_that the plaintiff declined to answer, and for which the plaintiff is alleged to have been in contempt of the authority of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States.</p> <p>The court orders the demurrers in this case to be heard at the general term in the first instance.</p>

<p>Where two patents have been granted for articles which resemble each other, a presumption arises from the action of the Office that there is such a difference between them that the use of one constitutes no infringement of the patent for the other.</p> <p>If one paper-file holds the paper better than another which is patented, and has driven it out of market, that isjmma-facie evidence that the mechanism is different, and is a new invention, and that the use of it does not violate the patentee’s monojioly.</p> <p>A patented combination may be used without infringing the patent, if one of the elements of the combination is omitted, although another is substituted in its place which is new, or performs a substantially different function, or if it was not known as a proper substitute when the patent issued.</p>

The bill is filed to enforce a mechanic’s lien. The plaintiffs contracted with the defendant Holden on the 1st of October, 1871, to put up the walls of the building’, and to furnish the necessary brick and labor at certain prices which were agreed upon. The plaintiffs under this arrangement performed their contract until their claim amounted to 81,226, upon which there is a balance due of $S76.6S. A notice of lien was filed March 28, 1872.

<p>I. An information in a criminal case charged the defendant with keeping a tippling-house “at house No. 1601 Q street,” in the city of Washington, and, on the trial of the cause before a jury, it was proven by the witnesses for the prosecution that defendant committed the offense at No. 1601 Twelfth street. The attorney for the District then asked permisión of the court to amend the information, by striking out the house, number, and street laid in such information, which was allowed} the defendant excepting. Held, that such amendment could not be made at the trial of the cause.</p> <p>II. Where a criminal information is required by statute to be under oath it cannot be amended at the trial of the cause in any manner affecting the charge against the defendant.</p> <p>III. The act of assembly providing that technical or clerical errors may be amended at the trial, extends only to formal or ministerial mistakes.</p>

<p>A person obtaining a policy of life-insurance may agree that the surgeon-in-chief of the company shall decide whether one of the conditions upon which the policy issued has been complied with, and his decision will be binding.</p> <p>Where one of the conditions in the policy is that the insurance-money is to be paid, if, in the opinion of the surgeon-in-ehief of the company, the party insured did not die of intemperance, nor by any disease produced or aggravated by intemperance, it was held that this was a valid condition-precedent, and that its performance must be averred or its non-performance accounted for.</p> <p>If, however, the surgeon is also a stockholder whose dividends are affected by the payment of claims, and the fact of such interest was concealed by the company from the party insuring at the time the policy was made and accepted, it is a sufficient excuse for the nonperformance of such condition.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

The bill sets out an agreement in writing in which the plaintiff is party of the first part, and the defendants parties of the. second part, dated August 15, 1866, the material clauses of which are expressed as follows: “ That whereas the party of the first part is agent for a large number of persons having claims against the United States, with power to employ attorneys for the prosecution of said claims,- now the said party of the first part agrees to employ the said…

This is a judgment-creditor’s bill, filed November 6,1872, by Mitchell, surviving partner of Harper and Mitchell, against George Seitz and Mary E. Seitz, his wife, principal defendants^ and certain other defendants whose rights are not affected by the decree passed in the cause. The bill alleges judgments obtained by plaintiff against George Seitz in 18C8, and in full force from that time to date of filing of bill, and that execution has been issued and returned nulla bona.

This is an action for $6,000 damages for breach of contracts.

<p>I. A bill of exchange on three months drawn in New York, upon S. in the city of Washington, and by him accepted for the accommodation of the drawer, and returned to such drawer in New York, where he negotiated it, upon an agreement that the person making the discount should retain a sum greatly beyond the rate of interest allowed by the laws of that State; it was held that the validity of the contract was to be determined by reference to the statute of New York, which declared a contract void when usurious, and that consequently the bill now in suit was void for that reason.</p> <p>II. An acceptance is to be deemed a contract of the place where it is made; but where it is solely for the accommodation of the drawer, it is not a contract capable of being enforced until the paper is transferred to a holder for a valuable consideration, and the place of such transfer is to be regarded as the place of the contract, especially when no other place of performance is mentioned.</p>

<p>I. Where a through-line for transportation of passengers and freight is established by the owners of different railroads, the first carrier who receives fare for the whole route, and gives a through-check for baggage, becomes liable for any loss or injury, not only on its own line, but on any other road in the connecting line throughout the entire distance.</p> <p>II. Where three companies constitute a through-line, and the fare received for through-tickets is accounted for by the first company to the other companies, according to a tariff established by each company for itself, and there is no division of profits or losses, such an arrangement is not a partnership involving joint liability.</p> <p>III. No other company can be sued for a loss unless such occurred on its own line.</p>

This is an action on account, commenced in October, 1872. The issues were closed in the case, and in February, 1873, the the same were ordered on the then calendar (for January terra, 1873) by the court.

This is a joint action brought against William Albert King, as principal, and Z. M. P. King and John D. McGill, as sureties, upon the administration bond given by William Albert King, in the late orphans’ court of the District of Columbia, the condition of which bond was that the said “William Albert King shall well and truly perform the office of administrator of Thomas Halloran, deceased, according to law, and shall in all respects discharge the duties of him required by…

This was a prosecution in the police court by way of information charging the defendant with libel. On the defendant’s petition, filed in this court, a writ of certiorari was issued to said police court, in obedience to which the case was certified to the circuit court. There a motion was made by-the district attorney to quash the writ; and the circuit court ordered that motion to be heard at the general term-in first instance.

The plaintiff filed a bill in this case for a divorce from the defendant, his wife, on the ground of desertion.

The act of March 3,18G5, providing “that in actions hy or against executors, &c:, neither party shall he allowed to testify against the other, as to any transactions with, or statements hy, the testator,” &c., applies to actions in the supreme court of the District of Columbia. The principle is again announced, that this is a court of the United States. STATEMENT OE THE CASE.

The plaintiffs in this cause filed their bill against the-Freedman’s Savings and Trust Company, and Beall & Baker, and alleged that, by virtue of several deeds of trust and a written agreement of the tenant, they sold on the 15th, 16th, and 17th days of April, 1872, the goods, chattels, and personal property in the “ St. James Hotel, ” in the city of' Washington, for the gross sum of $5,713.80; that the defendants Beall & Baker, and the Freedman’s Savings and Trust Company,…

1. An expert cannot give Ms opinion whether upon the face of a conveyance of real estate it covers the premises in controversy. STATEMENT OE THE CASE.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents. The patent was refused in this case for the want of sufficient invention in the improvement. The invention consists of a peculiar manner of constructing the stands or supports of portable furnaces, with a view to the attainment of lightness, durability, and stability.

This is an action of replevin to recover the possession of a claim consisting of .an evidence of indebtedness due the plaintiff from the corporation of Washington, and commonly called a voucher. On the trial the plaintiff proved that the voucher had been replevied and delivered to him, and that on January 6, 1872, he owned it. The bill of exceptions sets it out in the words and figures following: “ Surveyor’s Office of the District of Columbia, Washington, D. C., Deo. 9,1871.

<p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This is an action of ejectment brought to recover possession of several lots or pieces of ground in the city of Washington, which the plaintiffs claim as heirs at law of Joshua Peirce, deceased, late of the District of Columbia. The defendant claims title to said lots by virtue of a devise contained in the fourteenth item of the last will and testament of the said Peirce, set out in the statement.

<p>Tlie case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

The bill in this case is brought for the purpose of enforcing the specific performance of a contract, which is. expressed in the following words: “We have employed A. J. Rogers and F. P. Stanton to institute a suit in chancery for us against Wm. Durr, of' Washington City, for the recovery of 78-1 acres of land in Prince George’s County, Md., under a contract of said Durrwith Jane Hasltin dated 3d September, 1869.

A demurrer whieli sets up matter of proof which would he a defense on the merits, is irregular iu form and will he set aside. STATEMENT OE THE CASE. This is assumpsit upon a promissory note for $1,600, dated February 28,1873, indorsed by the defendants to the plaintiff. The declaration contains two counts.

<p>I. A landlord can claim tlie lien conferred by the act of Congress of February 22, 1867, for rent due and in arrear, and also for any installment of rent, although the tenant has occupied the premises only for a part of the time during which said installment is accruing.</p> <p>II. Where the lease is for a period of several years, and the rent is payable monthly, and the tenant is about to remove his goods and chattels from the leased promises, the landlord may issue his attachment under said act, and serve it on said chattels for rent in arrear, and for rent which will be due and payable for the month,during a part of which the tenant occupied the premises.</p> <p>III. The lease was for a term of five years, at the annual rent of §1,200 payable in monthly installments of f>100. The tenaut threatened to quit the premises after being in possession a few months, having paid all the rent due for the portion of time he occupied the premises, and it was held that a hill in equity to enforce the landlord’s lien by attaching all the goods and chattels of the tenant in order to secure or pay the whole of the rent for the entire term of the lease, could not he maintained.</p>

The bill alleges that the defendant Strong contracted with the board of public works of the District of Columbia to construct a sewer and to do certain work in Georgetown, in said District; and that, for the purpose of enabling him to carry on said work, he entered into an agreement with, complainant and the defendants Dodge & Darneille, of which the following is a copy: “ Memorandum of an agreement made and entered into by and between Samuel Strong, of the first part, and…

<p>The act of the legislative assembly of the District of Columbia, passed June 23, A. D. 1873, and entitled “An act to regulate shows and exhibitions in the sale and disposal of seats,” is a vexatious and unlawful interference with the rights of private property, and as such the legislative assembly was incompetent to enact it.</p>

<p>STATEMENT OR THE CASE.</p> <p>This is a suit upon a promissory note, dated Washington, D. O., March 25,1873, made by M. Porter Snell, payable to the order of George Burgess, ninety days after date, with interest at the race of ten per cent, per annum, and indorsed by the defendants Burgess, Ormes, and Hitch.</p> <p>The defendants plead, in substance, that the note was made by Snell and indorsed by the other defendants for the accommodation and benefit of Ormes, that neither Snell nor Burgess had any benefit from it; that only $415 was paid as a consideration for the note at the time it was first passed for value, and that it was first negotiated for value to the plaintiff; on which pleas issue ivas joined, a trial had, and a verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff for $460, with interest from March 25, 1873, at the rate of ten per cent, per annum.</p> <p>On this trial, evidence was given for the defendants tending to prove that the note was made by the defendant Snell, and indorsed by the defendant Burgess for the benefit and accommodation of defendant Ormes; that neither Snell nor Burgess received any part of the proceeds, but that the same ivas received by Ormes and Kitch ; that the note was first passed for value to the plaintiff through one Clark, a broker, and that only $415 was received upon it. And evidence was given on behalf of the plaintiff tending to show that said Clark brought the note to the plaintiff, stating that he had a good note which the parties wanted to raise money upon, and that the plaintiff said if the defendant Kitch would give him a writing that the note should be paid at maturity he would advance the money upon it, and that the plaintiff took the note at about its date and advanced $460 for it.</p> <p>The testimony being closed, the counsel for the defendants requested the court to instruct the jury that if they should find from the evidence that the first time the note was passed for value was when it was passed to the plaintiff, and that he advanced for it a less sum than the face of the note, then the plaintiff is only entitled to recover the amount which he advanced, without interest; which instruction the court refused to grant; to which ruling of the court the counsel for the defendants then and there excepted. The court then instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover what he advanced for the note, with interest thereon from the date of the note at the rate of ten per cent, per annum ; to which instruction the counsel for the defendants then and there excepted. The verdict was for the plaintiff.</p>

<p>I. A plea that the defendant is a petitioner in bankruptcy does not, in itself, operate as a stay of proceedings.</p> <p>II. A judgment in such case was recorded by the plaintiff April 6, 1871, and an attachment issued thereon the 2d day of March, 1874. It was held that a motion to discharge such attachment on the ground that defendant had been adjudged a bankrupt came too late, the defendant having neglected to obtain a stay of proceedings, and having waited more than three years after the entry of the judgment.</p>

The bill in this case is filed by complainants, who have sold and conveyed the property mentioned in the bill to defendant, to enforce a vendor’s lien for purchase-money alleged to be unpaid. The bill does not allege that the complainants have-exhausted their remedy at law, or that the defendant is insolvent, or that the complainants have not a full, complete, and adequate remedy at law; nor does it set forth such facts as will show that they cannot have such remedy at law.

<p>I. In an action on a policy of life-insurance the plaintiff, who is the wife of the person insured, is not absolutely concluded by the statement of another party in an affidavit that accompanied the preliminary proofs as to the cause of her husband’s death, it appearing doubtful whether she was aware of the contents of said affidavit, and no such evidence being required by the terms of the policy.</p> <p>II. The annual premium not having been paid on the 16th of July, 1870 when it became due, the assured applied to the agent of the company on the 1st of October to have the policy re-instated; he paid the pre" mium at the same time and furnished certificates of his health, made by himself and the physician of the company. A renewal receipt was delivered to him on the 14th of the said month of October, and it was held that the assured was under no obligation to furnish the company with further statements of any variation in his physical condition; intermediate the 1st of October and the date of the delivery of the renewed receipt.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, brought by the heirs at law of Ezra Yarden, to recover certain lots of ground in the city of Washington. From the bill of exceptions, it appears that the plaintiffs gave in evidence at the trial a continuous chain of deeds, showing that the property in question was vested in said Ezra Yarden on the 5th day of July, 1814. Plaintiffs further proved the death of said Ezra Yarden, and that they were his heirs at law.

The declaration in this case contained eight counts, each upon a promissory note for $500, except the third, which was-for the sum of $2,000. The defendant Elvans made these notes, payable to the order of his codefendant, Clark, at the bank of Lewis Johnson & Co., which discounted them for said Elvans, after being indorsed by Clark and then by the plaintiff.

This case was before the general term in April, 1873, upon a bill of exceptions, and a new trial was ordered.

<p>I. The Washington Gas-Light Company is authorized to usp the streets of the city for the purpose of laying gas-pipes, hut it is the duty of the company to perform the work so that other persons may receive no injury through the negligence of the company, or of its agents, in. such use of the public streets.</p> <p>II. Where an individual has received an injury by falling into a trench dug in a traveled street and imperfectly filled up, the company will not be relieved from liability therefor, although the work has been approved of and accepted by the officers of the District government.</p> <p>III. It is the duty of the company to put the street in as good condition as it had previously been, and also to exercise a careful foresight so as to prevent any injury afterward which might be occasioned to the work by storms and rain-falls, and which would render the work dangerous to persons traveling on the street.</p>

Petition by the husband for a divorce a vinculo. The complainant sets forth in his petition that, he was married to the defendant in October, 1841. He also states the birth and names of three children, who are now living, and all of whom have arrived at the age of maturity.

Action on a policy of life-insurance for $5,000, issued by tbe defendant to the plaintiff, on the life of her son, Edward N. Jacobs, and bearing date on the 27th day of November, 1871. The only consideration stated in the declaration for the contract is the payment by plaintiff to defendant, quarterly, of the sum of fifty-seven dollars and forty cents.

Bill of interpleader exhibited by Adams Express Company to determine which of the defendants were entitled to the amount of a draft which had been sent to them from California. The complainants have no interest in the fund aside .from paying it to whom it belongs. The claim of the defendant Jackson arises under the following circumstances: .

<p>I. A. bill in equity which seeks to set aside a conveyance of real property by which one of the defendants became possessed of an estate per autre vie, and which also seeks to charge the same defendant with the taxes assessed upon the property, is not multifarious, but a proper form of pleading for the purpose of economy in litigation.</p> <p>II. It is the duty of the person who owns the estate per autre vie to keep the property in repair and pay the taxes as they fall due, and if he fails to perform this obligation the court will decree the taxes due and unpaid a lien upon the life-estate, and will order the sale thereof in case of his default to pay such taxes within a specified period.</p>

The complainants, Tucker & Sherman, filed notice of a mechanic’s lien on the 20th day of January, 1872, and in the following August commenced this suit to enforce the same, and in December a decree was passed under which the trustees sold lot 235, in Gilbert’s subdivision of square 675, in the city of Washington, to said Tucker & Sherman.

A bill was filed by the complainant for a divorce from the bond of matrimony; an answer was interposed and proofs were taken, and after the cause was heard upon bill, answer, and proofs, the justice made the following order: “ This cause comes on to be heard on this the 25th day of June, 1874, on the bill, answer, replication, and proofs, and thereupon it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the bill be dismissed and the complainant pay the costs.” On the 25th day of July,…