Neal v. Ahitow’s Empirical Analysis
1998
Citation profile
2 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Lovasz v. Vaughn · 6 F. Supp. 2d 780 - United States Ex Rel. Gonzalez v. DeTella · 2 F. Supp. 2d 961 - Lott v. Coyle
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D)the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Hudson v. Jones“[A]lthough Petitioner allowed over nine months to elapse after the Illinois Appellate Court reviewed his post-conviction relief petition before he sought leave to [file an untimely] appeal [with] the Illinois Supreme Court, his petition was still 'pending' within the meaning of section 2244(d)(2) since the Illinois Supreme Court ultimately granted Petitioner leave to appeal.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[A] petitioner's untimely petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was not transformed into a 'properly filed' application for post-conviction relief simply because the Illinois Supreme Court ultimately permitted the late petition.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.