Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

8 Johns. 64

Foot v. Brown

New York Supreme Court

Decided May 15, 1811

New York Supreme Court · decided 1811-05-15

THIS was an action of. slander. The declaration stated that the plaintiff was an attorney and counsellor at law, and conducted himselt with great tairness, skill and integrity, &c. and had been' employed by E. Wilson an The j'ury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, a motion was made in arrest of judgment.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1811-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently April 1994

13 state decisions

301811182018301840185018601870188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Per Curiam.

¶1The words, as laid, only go to charge the plaintiff with ignorance or want of skill in the particular ejectment suit mentioned; and such charge is not actionable without laying and proving special damages. If a suit would lie for these words, it would lie for saying that a physician did not understand the nature of the disease of a particular patient. Such a charge does not affect the party generally in his profession, and therefore the law will not give a remedy. In the case of Poe v. Mendford, (Cro. Eliz. 620 ) the defendant charged the plaintiff with h ving Piled a patient iwith physic, and the court held that the words were not actionable, for the plaintiff might have done it involuntarily, in not knowing the disease; and that a physician might mistake a disease and apply wrong medicines, without discredit. The law only gives an action for words that affect a man’s credit in his profession, as charging him with ignorance or want of skill in general, or a want of integrity either in general, or in particular. The cases cited by the defendant’s counsel all proceed upon this principle. There is not an instance in the books, which we have met with, of a suit sustained for words charging a professional man with ignorance in a particular case. To carry the right of action so far would be unnecessary for the protection of any profession, and would be an unreasonable check upon the freedom of discussion. There is no physician, however eminent, who is not liable to mistake the symptoms of a particular disease; nor any attorney who may not misunderstand the complicated nature and legal consequences of a particular litigation. The additional words added in this case, that u the plaintiff tvould lead the party on to ruin,” were a consequence of his ignorance of that particular case, and a deduction *69from that assumed fact. Taken in connection with the preceding words, they were equally inoffensive. There being no special damages averred in this case, the judgment ought to be arrested.

¶2Judgment arrested.

/8/johns/64 · .json · Public domain