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8 Mass. 527

Coolidge v. Gray

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1812-03-15

<p>Assumpsit on a policy of insurance, dated April 10th, 1810, for 15,000 dollars on Batavia sugars, coffee, and spice on board the schooner Cremer, at and from Boston to her port of discharge in Europe, including blockaded ports, and there until safely landed, and in quiet possession of the consignee thirty days. It was also contained in the policy, that it was understood that all risks of every name and nature (bad debts and illicit trade excepted) were included in the policy; that the vessel, though cleared for Tonningen, was intended for some port in Holland, or wherever else the master should deem proper, in case he could not get into Holland; that by illicit trade in the policy was understood an infraction of the municipal laws ; but the assured was to take the risk of French and Dutch decrees against American commerce; at a premium of twenty-five per cent., to return ten per cent, if from any cause the vessel should not discharge in Holland, or any blockaded port, and there should be no loss on the policy.</p> <p>The declaration contained a second count for 15,000 dollars paid, laid out and expended by the plaintiffs to the use of the defend ant.</p> <p>* The action was tried before the Chief Justice, who reported the following facts as appearing in evidence.</p> <p>The schooner with her said cargo sailed from Boston on the 28th of March, 1810, and proceeded on her said voyage; and having escaped the British blockade of Holland, went so far up the Maese that she might have gone to Botterdam, to which she was then proceeding, secure from capture by any British cruiser or any blockading force. But the master being there informed by his owners’ correspondent in Botterdam, that if he entered that port with his vessel, he would not be permitted to enter or land his cargo there, or in any port in Holland; and that his vessel and cargo would be seized and confiscated, if they were discovered by the French guards or custom-house officers; and there being imminent danger thereof, he immediately proceeded, with said schooner and cargo, for Gottenhurg, to ascertain whether his cargo could be sold there to advantage, and if not, to what market in the north of Europe it would be best to carry it. He arrived at Gottenhurg on the 13th of June, and remained there until the 21st of the same month; when he left Gottenhurg, with the schooner and cargo, to proceed for a market in the Baltic. On the day following he was captured by a Danish privateer, and carried into Copenhagen, where he arrived on the 26th of said month, and where the vessel and cargo were libelled as prize, and after an acquittal at the Lower Court, were condemned on the appeal. Some money was expended by the plaintiffs in claiming the cargo at Copenhagen. The plaintiffs had property on board, in the articles mentioned in the policy, to the amount thereby insured. Those articles were the produce of a Dutch colony, and commanded a higher price in the Boston market, because such property was thought more secure from condemnation in Holland than similar articles not the produce of a Dutch colony.</p> <p>The counsel for the defendant contended on the trial: — First, that by the true construction of the policy upon the * facts proved in the case, the voyage insured terminated in Holland. Secondly, that if the master was authorized to leave the coast of Holland, yet by the true construction of the policy upon the facts proved, the voyage insured terminated in Gottenburg.</p> <p>These points were overruled by the Chief Justice, and a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs for 16,405 dollars 60 cents. Whereupon the defendant’s counsel moved for a new trial for the misdirection of the judge on the points aforesaid.</p> <p>If the direction aforesaid was erroneous, the verdict was to be set aside, and a new trial granted"; otherwise' judgment to be rendered on the verdict for the plaintiffs.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently November 1860

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1812-03-15

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By the Court.

¶1Two objections are made on behalf of the defendant to the right, of the plaintiffs to recover in this action. First, it is said that after the vessel had eluded the blockade, and had gotten safely into Holland, she had no right to leave Holland and go elsewhere at the risk of *the underwriter. But our opinion is, that by getting into Holland, as used in this policy, must be understood getting in for some beneficial purpose, as the sale and delivery of the cargo, which was known to *442be the sole object of the voyage. The master had a right, and it was his duty, after receiving the information which he had from the correspondent of the plaintiffs at Rotterdam, to depart from the Macse, and seek some other port to discharge his cargo, as it would have been his duty to do, in case he had been boarded and warned to depart by a blockading squadron or ship, on his approaching the river. It would have been as wicked as imprudent for him under the circumstances, to have pursued his route to Rotterdam. This objection therefore cannot prevail. The second objection is, that even if the master had a right to leave Holland under the existing circumstances, yet that the policy having limited the voyage to one port only, the vessel must have discharged at Gottenburg, and that the voyage contemplated by the policy must cease there. The determination of this objection depends on the construction to be given to the words “ port of discharge.” As it appears that the policy was made some time after the vessel had sailed, it is presumable that no particular port of destination had been fixed upon previously to her sailing, and that it was left to the discretion of the master or supercargo to what port he should go. If he had broken bulk, or begun to unlade at Gottenburg, that must have been considered he port of discharge, and the voyage would have ended there within the policy. But we think, and in this opinion we are confirmed by that of several eminent underwriters of whom we have inquired, that when property is insured to a port of discharge, the assured has a right to obtain advice at his port of arrival respecting the markets, and having informed himself, has a right to proceed to such port as promises the best sales, and is still protected by the policy ; not being obliged to discharge his cargo at the first port he makes.

¶2 Judgment on the verdict.

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