Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

8 N.C. App. 583

174 S.E.2d 609

State v. Hickman

Court of Appeals of North Carolina · decided 1970-06-24

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently July 1980

8 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““This period of time which the law recognizes is the period of time during which the child could have been conceived is a period of time sometimes referred to in the law as normal period of gestation. May be anywhere from seven, eight, nine, nine and a half or ten months from the date of birth of the child, and the only way the assumption (presumption) of legitimacy may be rebutted is by evidence tending to show the husband could not have had access to the wife during the period of time referred to.” [Emphasis added.]”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. White

““It is presumed that a child born in wedlock is the legitimate child of that marriage unless it is shown that the husband could not have had access to the spouse at a time when the child could have been conceived or that the husband was impotent or that other circumstances would prevent the husband from being the father of the child.” See 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 3b. (1938).”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. White

Relies on State v. Key · 3 N.C. App. 114 - State v. Snyder

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1970-06-24

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Campbell, J.

¶1 It is presumed that a child born in wedlock is the legitimate child of that marriage unless it is shown that the husband could not have had access to the spouse at a time when the child could have been conceived or that the husband was impotent or that other circumstances would prevent the husband from being the father of the child. See State v. Key, 248 N.C. 246, 102 S.E. 2d 844 (1958). Hickman admitted that he dated Joan on 15 March 1968 and that he knew she was pregnant when he married her. It would be anomalous for him to try to prove after that admission that he, in effect, did not have access. As has been succinctly said under those circumstances, he “takes whatever is in the gum.” He may not complain that medical evidence and other testimony tending to show a different gestation period was excluded. His assignments of error in this regard are without merit.

¶2 The defendant also challenges the charge of the trial judge as follows:

“'. . . under the law, when a child is born in wedlock, that *585 is, when a child is born during the marriage of the mother, the law presumes that this child is the child of the husband of the mother at the time the child was born. Now, this presumption of legitimacy of the child cannot be rebutted except by evidence tending to show that the husband could not have access to the mother during the period of time which the law recognizes as the period of time that the child could have been conceived. This period of time which the law recognizes as the period of time during which the child could have been conceived is a period of time sometimes referred to in the law as the normal period of gestation, and this period may be anywhere from seven, eight, or nine or nine and a half, or ten months from the date of the birth of the child, and the only way the presumption of legitimacy of the child born during the marriage of the man and wife may be rebutted is by evidence tending to show that the husband could not have had access to the wife during the period of time that I have referred to.’ ”

¶3 This assignment of error is without merit. State v. Snyder, 3 N.C.

¶4 App. 114, 164 S.E. 2d 42 (1968).

¶5 We find in law

¶6 No error.

PARKER and VaughN, JJ., concur.
/8/ncapp/583 · .json · Public domain