¶1 Defendant contends that this is an action under G.S. 50-16 and that in the absence of allegations and proof that plaintiff wife is the *63 dependent spouse the requirement in the order appealed from that defendant pay plaintiff’s counsel for services rendered subsequent to 4 September 1969 is invalid. We disagree with this contention primarily for the reason that the action is supported by statutes other than G.S. 50-16; in fact, that statute was repealed by Chapter 1152 of the 1967 Session Laws.
¶2 In her complaint plaintiff prayed for alimony, temporary and permanent, without divorce as authorized by G.S. 50-16.1, et seq., and for custody and support of the minor child born to the marriage as authorized by G.S. 50-13.1, et seq.; she alleged sufficient facts to support the relief sought. G.S. 50-13.5 (a) provides that “[t]he procedure in actions for custody and support of minor children shall be as in civil actions … G.S. 50-13.5 (b) (3) provides that an action for custody and support may be joined with an action for alimony without divorce. The effect of the 4 September 1969 order was to grant plaintiff no alimony under G.S. 50-16.1, et seq., but to grant her custody and support for the child under G.S. 50-13.1, et seq.
¶3 It is true, as defendant argues, that G.S. 50-16.4 authorizes the court, upon application of a dependent spouse entitled to alimony pendente lite pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3, to enter an order for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of the dependent spouse to be paid by the supporting spouse; but G.S. 50-13.4(f) (9) provides that “[t]he wilful disobedience of an order for the payment of child support shall be punishable as for contempt as provided by G.S. 5-8 and G.S. 5-9.”
¶4 The . court is vested with broad power when it is authorized to punish “as for contempt.” Rose’s Stores v. Tarrytown Center, 270 N.C. 206, 154 S.E. 2d 313 (1967); Blue Jeans Corp. v. Clothing Workers of America, 4 N.C. App. 245, 166 S.E. 2d 698 (1969), affirmed by Supreme Court in 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E. 2d 867 (1969). We hold that this power includes the authority for a district court judge to require one whom he has found in wilful contempt of court for failure to comply with a child support order entered pursuant, to G.S. 50-13.1, et seq., to pay reasonable counsel fees to opposing counsel as a condition to' being purged of contempt. In the order appealed from, the district court judge did not exceed that authority, therefore, the order is
¶5 Affirmed.