Volume 8 — Rhode Island Reports

Assumpsit against the defendant, as the guardian of the person and estate'of Edward Barnes; a lunatic; the declaration, in-the first count, declaring upon a promissory note for $1,572.36, made by Barnes on- the 8th-day of December, 1857, and payable to the plaintiff on demand, with interest; and the- other counts being in indebitatus assumpsit for work and labor, and the money counts.

<p>The act- entitled “An act securing the estates of persons dying, leaving real or personal estate within the State, and leaving no known heirs, or others entitled to distribution within the United States,” found in the digest of 1798, p. 310, being chapter 160 of the Revised Statutes, vests the beneficial interest in estates escheated from the dying intestate and -without heirs of the person last seized of the same, in the towns which take possession and charge of such estates, in conformity with the act; and when thnsvested, such interest cannot he recalled by the General Assembly.</p>

This was an amicable action on tbe casé, brought by the collector of taxes in South Kingstown, against the defendant, to submit to the Court the question, whether the latter was liable to be taxed in South Kingstown for personal property, in the year 1861.

This Bill in Equity is brought by William Peckham and Ann, his wife, for themselves and such of the presumptive heirs of Cyrus Barker as may become parties to it, against Joseph A. Barker and Cyrus Barker.

Assumpsit by an incorporated mutual fire insurance company, to recover of tbe defendant, one of its members, in contribution to its losses, certain assessments made upon bim by tbe directors, under four several policies of fire insurance effected by bim witb tbe company.

This was a bill in equity, filed by the only child and devisee of the late Cyrus Grant, of Providence, for the purpose of obtaining a construction of the will of the said Cyrus, and directions as to the administration of his estate, dependent upon the interest of the complainant in the real estate devised to him by said will.

This was a motion, made by the respondents to a bill in equity, filed to compel the cancellation and discharge of a mortgage as satisfied and paid, that the complainants give to them security for costs of the bill, in the event they should recover the same against them.

This was a bill in equity, filed by tbe plaintiff as tbe owner of tbe Hamlet estate and mills, on tbe Blackstone river, to enjoin tbe defendants, as owners of tbe Manville estate and mills below, on tbe same river, from flowing out an intermediate dam, called tbe “ Mott Dam,” tbrougb wbicb, and under tbe pond raised by wbicb, tbe plaintiff bad drained a watered meadow of about twenty-five acres, wbicb lay along tbe river at tbe lower portion of bis mill estate.

Debt to recover the amount of certain coupons, or interest. warrants, secured by, and attached to, bonds given by the defendants to the plaintiff,- — -the… Held: that the installments of interest, made jaayable by the coupons, being for a sum certain, interest thereon was recoverable from the time the city failed to pay it. Hollingsworth v. Oity of Detroit, 3 McLean, 472. I submit to the court that interest,-purely as interest, never draws interest: — I. The cases show this.

This was an application for a writ of habeas-corftus, to be issued to the keeper of the Providence county jail, for the relief, from imprisonment in said jail, of the applicant.

This was an amicable bill, filed with, the consent of all parties, for the purpose of ascertaining, by the decree of the court, their respective rights to a surplus, out of the sale of mortgaged property, remaining in the hands of the plaintiffs after the satisfaction of their mortgage.

<p>Where a testator created an equitable estate for life for one of his daughters, and provided, that in the event of her death without issue, the remainder should be equally divided between his children and a particular grandchild, whom he named, it was held, that other grandchildren, whose mother was dead at the time he made his will, and who were objects of his bounty under another clause of his will, were not entitled, by construing the word “ children ” to include " grandchildren ” in such a case, to share in the remainder.</p>

<p>The law favors the vesting of estates; and when a gift is made to a person in me, it passes to the legatee, as a vested interest, immediately on the death of the testator; and if there be a prior gift created, determinable upon an event certain to take place, and there be a gift over upon such determination, the last gift will vest with the first, and it will be held that the possession and enjoyment of the gift is postponed, but not the gift itself.</p> <p>It is a question of intent, to be gathered from the whole will, and the construction would be varied, if, from other parts of the wiU, it appeared that the testator intended that the gift itself should not take effect until the happening of some event in the future; and the question is, always, is futurity annexed to the substance of the gift? if so, the vesting is postponed; or, is it annexed to the time of payment only? if so, the legacy vests immediately.</p> <p>The gift of a residue will be construed to be vested; and a, very clear intent must •be shown to postpone the vesting of it, since intestacy would often be the consequence of the lapse of such a gift, and always may be.</p> <p>A circumstance from which an intent to vest a legacy may be implied, notwithstanding the only gift is in the direction to pay in the future, is, that the intermediate interest of the legacy is given to the same person.</p> <p>J. D’W., after making sundry large bequests and devises to his children, disposed of the residue of his property by the following, being the twelfth clause of his will: — “ Twelfth. All the rest, residue and remainder of my whole estate, both real and personal, and of every kind and nature whatsoever and wheresoever the same may be situated, lying or being, not herein before disposed of, I give and devise to my executors hereinafter named, in trust, for my aforesaid children, namely, J. D’W., the children of my late daughter, Mary Ann S., taken collectively and not separately, so that the children of my said daughter, Mary Ann, may have their mother’s portion were she alive, and no more, Mark Anthony D’ W., William Henry D’ W., HarrietteH., Catharine D’W. D., Nancy B. H., William Bradford D’W. and Josephine M. D’W. L., and to my aforesaid grandson, J. D’W., and their heirs, for the term of twenty years, the rents, issues, incomes and profits or dividends to be paid to my aforesaid children, grandson, and the children of my said daughter, Mary Ann S., in manner aforesaid, and their respective heirs, for said term of twenty years, and to be paid annually; and at the end of said twenty years, the aforesaid property or estate to be divided equally between my said children and grandson, and the children of my said daughter, Mary Ann, taken collectively and not separately, so that they shall have their Mother’s portion, were she alive, and no more, or their respective heirs, should any of them be dead, share and share alike. And it is farther, my will, that my executors, hereafter named, do, and I hereby empower them, to sell and dispose of and convey all my real and personal estate wheresoever situated, which shall form a part of the said rest and residue of my estate, at such time ortimes, andbypublie auction or at private sale, for cash or upon credit, as to them shall seem best and most expedient, and until they shall deem expedient to sell the same, to let, lease or demise the same, from time to time, upon such terms, covenants and conditions, and for siich times, as they may judge expedient, and to divide and pay the rents, incomes and profits of such real and personal estate, so long as the same shall remain unsold, in the same manner as I have herein before directed with regard to the shares of my aforesaid children and grandson; and Ialso will and direct that the sixty thousand dollars of stock in the Bank of Bristol, herein before appropriated to raise the semi-annual payment to my said wife, shall, on the death of my said wife, fall into and make part of my residuary estate, and be appropriated as herein directed in relation to such residuary estate. So, also, in case my said wife shall elect to take her dower in my estate, instead of the. provision herein before made for her.” He further directed as to the residue, by the following, being the sixteenth clause of his will: — “Sixteenth. And whereas, in relation to the residue of my estate mentioned in the twelfth clause of this my will, I have prescribed an appropriation of said residue in such a way as that the rents, issues, profits and interests of said residue shall be divided equally and among my children, my grandson, and the children of my late daughter, Mary Ann, taken collectively, and to their heirs, as will appear on reference to said clause: now my intention is, and I therefore will, that the children of my said children, and of any one of my said children, and the heirs of my said children, and any one of my said children, shall only take the share of his, her or their parent or parents, and such portion'of said residue, and the rents, issues, profits and interest thereof, as such parent or parents would have taken if alive, it being my intention that my grand-children and the heirs of my said children, and each of my children, shall only take the portion of him, her or them, from whom he, she or they may take, receive or inherit, the division to be made per stirpes and not per capita.” Held, that the several shares in the residuary estate vested in the several legatees, on the death of the testator, absolutely, in fee simple, — to be paid out and divided amongst them at the end of twenty years; and that the children of the legatees were not entitled, in any event, to claim any portion of the residue as purchasers under the will.</p>

<p>An action on the case for unlawfully erecting a large stable so near a hotel as to become a nuisance thereto, survives, by force of the tenth section of Oh. 176 of the Revised Statutes, the death of the defendant pending the same; and may he prosecuted against his executor, cited in to defend the same.</p>

<p>It is not competent for the members of a mutual insurance company to avoid . payment of their just ratable assessments, by objections to the organization of the corporation or to the due election of its officers, so that they have fairly acted as a corporation and officers, defacto, with the acquiescence of the mem bers, and of the General Assembly as representing the public.</p>

<p>When arbitrators are constituted by the parties the judges of the law, the facts, and the equity of a case, their award will not be annulled, if it appear that it is within the terms of the submission, fairly construed, and furnishes a rule sufficiently certain to define and limit the rights of the parties, and under which those rights may be enforced: — no mistake of law or of any material fact appearing on the face of the award, or by admission of the arbitrators, nor any partiality or corrupt conduct on their part, or misbehavior in the parties, being pretended.</p>

Demurrer to a bill in equity to obtain an account. The material facts upon which the decision of the case turned are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court.

<p>In a plea for justification, to a libel, great certainty of averment is requisite, and the defendant, while he is not bound to justify any forced construction made by way of innuendo upon the language of the publication, must justify the substance of the publication, its character and its imputations, and must justify in the sense in which the innuendoes explain it, if they explain it fairly.</p>

This was a complaint and warrant, carried by appeal from a Justice of tbe Peace to tbe Court of Common Pleas, and brought to the consideration of this Court, by exceptions to the instructions of the Common Pleas Judge, in his charge to the jury.

This* was a suit in equity, heard upon bill, answer and an agreed statement of facts.

This was an action in which the demandant claimed dower in a certain tract of land, containing about seven acres, situate in South Kingstown, of which, as alleged, her deceased husband, James P. Peckham, was seized at his decease.

These were suits in equity, differing only in unimportant respects, heard by the Court upon bills, answers and evidence.

This was a suit in equity, brought by the executors and devisees of William Bradford D’Wolf, deceased, against William R. Staples and Edward D. Pearce, trustees of the residuary estate of James D’Wolf, deceased, under the twelfth clause of his will, and James D’Wolf Perry, administrator, with the will annexed, on the estate of the said James D’Wolf, deceased.

<p>The violations of its charter on the part of a corporation, which will work a forfeiture of its franchises, must be something more than accidental negligence, or excess of power, or mere mistake in the mode of exercising an acknowledged power; and, though a single act of willful misfeasance may be a ground of forfeiture, yet a specific act of nonfeasance, not contrary to particular requisitions of the charter, nor committed willfully, nor producing, nor tending- to produce mischievious consequences to any one, will not he.</p> <p>A sale and conveyance by an incorporated turnpike company of a portion of its road to a municipal corporation, and neglect thereafter to repair that portion, is a willful, deliberate act violative of its plain duty, which warrants a judicial decree of forfeiture of its charter.</p>

Petition for a writ of mandamus, commanding the respondent to show canse why a peremptory writ of mandamus should not issue, requiring respondent to release the petitioner from… Held: viz.: that for which we here contend. Then there is just one other case, where the question did come directly before the court, i. e., The State v. The Governor, 5th of Ohio, 528. In that case, the court held, that in a matter purely ministerial, they might direct the Governor by a mandamus.

This was an action of trespass, for assault and battery and false imprisonment, alleged to have been committed at Providence on the 23d of Arigust, 1864.

This was an action on tbe case, in wbicb tbe plaintiff charged defendant with a breach of contract, respecting tbe sale of a quantity of rags, setting forth in bis declaration a claim for special damages.

This was an action of trover, commenced in a Justice’s Court, carried by appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, where it was heard upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts, and now brought to this court upon exceptions to rulings.

<p>Though a deed he martificially drawn, yet if its purposes are clearly expressed, and are of a kind proper to be carried into effect, it may be a good conveyance to charitable uses, under the ruling of this court, in Potter v. Thornton, 7 R. I. 252; and-if unambiguous in its terms, no practice under it can materially modify its construction, or destroy the trust which it directs.</p> <p>That the grantees or “feoffees’ in trust,” named in a conveyance to charitable uses, have deceased, is an immaterial fact; for if the uses prescribed are such as require a fee to support them, the grant of a fee will be implied, and equity will not suffer the trust to fail for want of a proper trustee.</p>

Assumpsit, in which the defendant pleaded, firstly, that he never promised, and, secondly, that he did not promise within six years. The case was submitted on both issues, to a jury, who returned a verdict that the defendant did promise, as alleged by the plaintiff, and assessed damages in the sum of $250.

Tbe plaintiff in bis action claimed damages from tbe defendant, upon tbe grounds, — tbat a livery stable, owned by tbe defendant and used and occupied by bis tenants, was a nuisance — tbe plaintiff’s dwelling bouse (erected prior to tbe erection of tbe stable) being situate on tbe lot adj oining tbe stable.

On the trial of the appeal in this Court, the appellants requested the Court to instruct the jury that it was incumbent upon the executor to prove that said instrument was signed by said Childs, in the presence of the three subscribing witnesses, or acknowledged by him as his last will and testament, in their presence; and that each of said witnesses saw it so signed, or. heard said Childs so acknowledge it; and, further, that even if the said Childs did sign said instrument…

<p>It is the aim of a court of equity, in giving relief for a mistake, to put the parties, as nearly as possible, in the situation they would have been in but for the mistake.</p> <p>Where it was shown, that in computing the purchase price of a platted and bounded lot of land, purchased at auction for 5i cents per foot, the number of feet was, by mutual mistake, assumed to be less by about twelve thousand feet than it really was,- and payment therefor and conveyance were made accordingly; Held, that the sale be wholly rescinded, unless the purchaser fully compensate the seller in conformity with the terms of sale, for the whole number of feet actually bought and conveyed.</p> <p>A motion by a defendant for leave to make oath to an Answer, which he had omitted to swear to by reason of a waiver of the oath in the complainant’sbill, (whether grantable or notj if earlier made,) cannot be entertained after the cause has once been fully tried and determined, and a rehearing thereof been ordered.</p> <p>Though a motion placed on file reflect unnecessarily upon the motives of a party, and portions thereof might properly he ordered to he expunged, it nevertheless may not he so grossly scandalous as to warrant an imposition of costs upon the solicitor in fault, especially if the motion, for another reason, shall have heen dismissed with costs.</p>

Motion to quash an indictment, heard and determined under-the agreement following :— “ It is agreed that this motion may be tried on the following agreed statement, without further pleadings :• — ■ “August 31st, 1860, George B. Hazard appeared and was sworn in the trial of an indictment against one Matilda McCoy, before the Supreme Court at Newport, and, in the testimony he then and there gave, it is alleged, in the indictment against Hazard, he committed perjury. “ At the…

Assumpsit upon a policy of fire insurance, effected by tbe plaintiffs witb tbe defendant company, by wbicb tbe company insured $5,000 upon tbe plaintiffs’s stock of dry goods in tbeir store, in Providence. Tbe original policy was dated November 12tb, 1859, but by renewals was continued in force until tbe 15tb of November, 1862. Tbe goods having been damaged by fire on tbe 22d of April, 1862, tbis action was brought.

<p>A building, occupied as a dwelling house, one-fourth of a mile from any other dwelling, is described, in an application for insurance, as a dwelling house, and is insured as such, hut, for more than a year prior to its destruction by fire, is, in fact, untenanted; Held, that such non-occupation was not a change in the condition and circumstances of the property within the meaning of a by-law of the insurance company, prescribing that “ when the condition or circumstances of the property insured shall be, by tbe act of the assured, his agent or tenant, (in any wise) so changed as materially to increase the risk, the policy shall become void, and the premium be forfeited, unless the insured shall obtain the consent of the board of directors thereto, endorsed on the policy.”</p> <p>An applicant for insurance, to an interrogatory, “ What are the facilities for ex- ■ tinguishing fires? ” made answer in writing, “Force pump, and abundance of water;” Held, that herein was no promise or guarantee that the force pump should be kept, at all times thereafter and under all circumstances, in good order for use, it being sufficient that, at the date of the application or of the policy, the pump was in good order.</p> <p>On the 4th of August, 1857, Gilliat procures a policy of insurance, for six years, upon his dwelling house; in June, 1858, mortgages the estate to Duncan, the insurers then inserting in the body of the policy the words, “In case of loss, payable to A. Duncan,” and on the 10th of November, 1860, conveys the estate in fee to said Duncan; in August, 1861, Duncan conveys the estate in fee to Bradley, assigning to him, by separate instrument, his interest in the said policy; and Bradley, on the 1st of August, 1862, conveyed the estate in fee to Greene, assigning to him, by separate instrument, his interest iu the policy; Held, that the insurance company, though it received no notice whatever of said conveyances or assignments until August, 1862, by then endorsing their assent upon the said assignments, had precluded themselves from denying the right of said Greene, after the destruction of the property insured, to recover its value, in an action brought in the name of Gilliat, trustee; and this notwithstanding one by-law of the company was, “ The interest of the insured in this policy, or in the property insured, is not assignable, unless by consent of the company, expressed in writing; and in case of any transfer, or termination of such interest of the insured, either by sale or otherwise, without such consent, this policy shall from thenceforth be void.”</p>

<p>Under the provisions of chapter 359 of the Public Laws, a right of entry entitles one to a special court action for possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments.</p> <p>Section 2 of chapter 167 of the Revised Statutes, and chapter 332 of the Public Laws, referred to and expounded, and the decision in Siman v. Arnold et al. 2 R. I. 398, cited and affirmed.</p>

This was an action of trespass and ejectment, for possession of a certain lot of land, with buildings and improvements, situate on Chestnut street, in the city of Providence. It was submitted to the Court upon facts evidenced by documents filed, and the oral admissions of parties, at the hearing.

Action of assumpsit by tbe collector of taxes in tbe town of Johnston, to recover a tax alleged to have been assessed upon property of tbe defendants, located in said town. Plea, tbe general issue.

Assumpsit, for the recovery of the amount of dividends, at ten per cent, per annum, for eight years, upon four hundred and two shares of the capital stock of the defendant corporation, (as the plaintiff argues,) “not as arrears of dividends unpaid, but as their equivalent, as damages, for the non-performance of the defendants’ contract that they should be paid.” 'The plaintiff’s declaration contained, besides a general count, a special count upon each of some fourteen…

Petition in equity for an interlocutory order. The complainant, haying filed his bill in equity against the defendant, on the first of May, obtained, on the 19th of May, an interlocutory order of the Court, enjoining the defendant from prosecuting, until the further order of this Court, an action then pending in a special Court of Common Pleas, against the complainant, for recovery of possession of a certain farm in Cumberland, particularly described and bounded in the said…

Action of debt, on an administrator's bond, brought by a creditor for himself and all interested, in conformity with the statute. Held: either that they could not be maintained, or that merely nominal damages could be recovered. See Rev. Stats, ch. 162, §§ 1, 2, 3, p. 382 ; 11 Piclc 496. The plaintiffs’ replication is sufficient. (See condition of the bond). Rev. Stats, ch. 163, §§ 5, 6 and 15.

<p>This was an action on the case, brought by the collector of taxes of the town of Warwick against the defendant, described as of Cranston, for recovery of the amount ($637.52) of a tax assessed against him, in and by the town of Warwick, on the 8th day of December, 1865. The tax was ordered on the 7th of November, 1865, to be paid and collected by the 4th of April, 1856. The issue made was to the jury; but, by agreement, the case was submitted to the Court, upon both fact and law. The grounds of claim and of defence are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>The directors of a mutual fire insurance company, in assessing for losses upon its members, must not overlook the jilain provisions of their charter, in a search for some rule of action more purely equitable.</p> <p>The effect, in contemplation of law, of certain sections of a charter of a mutual insurance company declared.</p>

The action was for injury suffered by the plaintiff, from the falling upon him of a large show-board, placed near or upon the sidewalk of a much-travelled highway in the city of Providence.

In equity. The points determined by the Court, in these causes, arose upon a state of facts substantially as follows :— In 1816, Thomas P. Ives and others, owners in trust of a large tract of land in the city of Providence, bounding on the west and south by the public waters, caused a plat thereof to be made and recorded in the land records of the city, on and by which the said tract was divided into lots, streets, public squares and gangways, designating the lots (upwards…

J., with, a jury. The declaration, was in common form, charging that the defendant, with malice and without probable cause, had-caused the plaintiff to be arrested for theft. The general issue was pleaded.

•Petition for a new trial of an action of assumpsit, for recovery of the sum of $1,000, deposited with the defendant as a stakeholder.

<p>Monies received by an assignee under a voluntary assignment, for goods purchased by the assignor under fraudulent representations and with intent not to pay therefor, may be recovered of the assignee by the original vendor, in an action for money had and received to bis ttse. Nor is it necessary, before commencing srrit, to make demand of such goods or of such monies, nor to restore or to offer to restore any promissory notes given for such goods, it being sufficient to produce them at the trial, to be impounded, as ruled in Duval & Inglehart v. Mowry, 6 K. X. 479.</p> <p>In an action of assumpsit for the proceeds of goods obtained by fraud, brought by the vendor against the assignee of the fraudulent vendee, it not appearing that the defendant had been at all prejudiced by the plaintiff’s delaying suit for nearly a year after the obtaining of the goods, it cannot be adjudged error on the part of the judge trying the cause, that he refused to charge, as matter of law, that the plaintiff Was estopped, by such delay, from prosecuting his suit.</p>

<p>It is settled by the current of American authorities, that a coupon-bond is negotiable, and that its coupons may be detached and negotiated separately by simple delivery, and sued on separately from the bond, and this after the bond itself has been paid and satisfied, as well as before.</p> <p>A coupon, once detached and negotiated, ceases to be a mere incident of the bond, and becomes an independent claim, and its amount, with interest after demand of payment, is recoverable under a general count in debt.</p>

Assumpsit for monies due on promissory notes and for goods sold and delivered. To the declaration, which was in common form, the defendants pleaded specially in bar, and to their plea the plaintiff demurred.

This was an action of trespass and ejectment to determine the title to a farm originally the property of Martin Arnold, who, in his last will and testament, made disposition of it in and by the third clause of that instrument, as quoted in the Court’s opinion. The plea to the action was the general issue; but the parties, waiving trial by jury, submitted the case to the Court upon law and fact.

Action for partition of lands and tenements, in which judgment for partition was rendered at the March term, 1866, when, also, commissioners to make partition were appointed, who, at the same term, made report of their proceedings. To this report the plaintiffs filed objections, viz.:— 1.

<p>The rule which forbids the introduction of parole evidence to contradict, add to, or vary a written instrument, does not extend to evidence offered to show that a contract was made in furtherance of objects forbidden by statute, by common law, or by the general policy of the law.</p> <p>Champerty is an offence against the law, whether regard be had to the ancient common law, the English statutes upon the subject, or to the legislative acts of Rhode Island, and therefore avoids every contract into which it enters.</p> <p>A contract between an attorney and counsellor at law and a client, that the attorney shall prosecute a claim at his own cost and charge, for a part of the subject in litigation, is champertous, illegal and void.</p>

Exceptions to rulings of a special Court, as to the necessity or sufficiency of a notice to quit the premises, for possession of which suit was brought.

This was an action of the case, in which service of the writ was made by the arrest of one of the copartners defendant, and, as to the absent defendants, by an attachment of certain personal property.

This action was brought to collect a subscription by tbe defendants to tbe capital stock of the plaintiff corporation. Tbe contract for subscription contained many conditions.

This is a bill in equity to compel the specific performance of a contract for the purchase of land. The case was stated in the bill and heard upon demurrer. The bill states the objections made by the defendant to the title in the following terms:— “ Firstly.

Action of debt on bond, conditioned for the performance of all the obligations of the Arcade Bank, given pursuant to statute by the president and. directors of the bank to the General Treasurer of the State, upon the organization of the bank under the act of Congress as a national bank. The parties in interest in certain stock of the bank bring suit on the bond.

Bill in equity, brought by certain tax payers in the city of Newport against the treasurer of said city .and the mayor of said city, to enjoin the payment by the treasurer to the mayor of monies appropriated by the city council of said city to‘defray the expenses of a suit against 'the mayor.

This bill in equity is brought to obtain the opinion of the court upon the construction of the trust provisions of the will of Ebenezer Kelly. The terms of these provisions are set forth in full in the brief of the complainants. BRIEF AND POINTS FOR COMPLAINANTS. The complainants are the widow and surviving children (and a son-in-law) of Ebenezer Kelly, deceased. The respondents are his executors and trustees under his will. Ebenezer Kelly died in 1852.

<p>The privilege from arrest of a member of Congress under tbe provisions of the Constitution, does not extend to forty days and more before and after a session, but is limited to a reasonable time for going and returning.</p>

Objections to the report of commissioners of assessment upon the widening of College street. Held: occupied and used for, and the rents and profits thereof are applied to religious or educational purposes.’ ” The provisions in the charter of Brown University relied upon were: “ That the college estate, the estates, persons and families of the president and professors for the time being, lying and being within the colony, with the…

<p>The passage of the Bankrupt Law of the United States of 1867 suspended the operation of the State Insolvent law of Rhode Island, so far as the provisions of the former applied to the subject matter of the latter.</p>

<p>The amount of loss and damage, over and above the amount of benefit and advantage to real estate, by the opening of a street, being in question before a jury, witnesses qualified to testify as experts may give opinions as to the value of the real estate in question before and after the opening of such street, but cannot be asked if the loss and damage exceed the benefit and advantage, and will not be permitted to state the amount of damage. ’</p> <p>A public plat-showing the location of a street, and evidence that no taxes had been assessed upon land within such location, admissible under Sec. 4, Chap. 38, of the Revised Statutes, without requiring proof of knowledge on the part of adjacent land owners of the existence of such plat, or of such exemption from taxation. ,</p> <p>Evidence of such exemption from taxation admissible, .whenever there are circumstances in proof from which the jury may properly infer knowledge of such exemption by the adjacent land owner.</p> <p>A deed describing lots of land only by numbers, on a plat, conveys no rights in land embraced in a street laid down on such plat adjoining the lots, except as the same is subject to the public easement. Whether the boundary of such lots extends to the middle of the street, qumre.</p> <p>In ascertaining the damage caused by opening a street, the jury may properly consider the benefit derived by the claimant from that portion of the street adjoining his land, as platted, which is not included in the new street, as located, and which may subsequently be abandoned as a highway.</p>

This was an action upon an administrator’s bond; and tbe motion for a new trial was for alleged errors in tbe rulings of tbe judge upon tbe trial before tbe jury of certain issues in tbe action.

This was an application by the defendants for a rehearing upon an information in the nature of a quo warranto, and to set aside the judgment of forfeiture rendered at the former hearing. I. The proceeding was not instituted in behalf of the State until after a lapse of over six years, and this is held by the English Courts to be a good bar to a prosecution for a forfeiture. Angelí and Ames on Corporations, Sec. 743, p. 718-19. (7th Edit.) and cases there cited.

This was a bill in equity, to determine whethei the legacies were to be paid out of both the real and personal estate devised in the will of Sarah J. Monroe. The questions raised upon the bill, and the answers of the various parties interested, were certified by the Chief justice for hearing before the full bench. The provisions of the will, containing many special legacies, are sufficiently quoted in the briefs and in the opinion of the court.

This was a bill brought by the administrator of Sarah Crock-er, setting forth that one of her sisters claimed certain money deposited in a savings bank as a donatio causa mortis to them. That the other next of kin, and the administrator of the bus-band, also claimed tbe money, and asking tbe instruction of tbe court.

Indictment for adultery, and motion for new trial, upon two grounds. 1st. That the judge who presided at the trial erred in admitting as evidence the statements of defendant that he was a married man. 2d. That his statements in this regard were not sufficient evidence of the fact to sustain the verdict of guilty.

<p>A mortgage'debt is not released, nor a mortgage discharged, by a release from tie mortgagee to a purchaser of the mortgaged estate, (in whose deed is contained an agreement that the grantee shall assume and pay the mortgage debt,) of all claims and demands arising by virtue of that agreement.</p> <p>A covenant Of indemnity to the purchaser and his assigns, contained in such release, does not extend to a grantee of that purchaser, he not being a party to said agreement.</p> <p>Such a release does not operate by way of estoppel for the protection of a subsequent purchaser, who takes the estate subject to the mortgage.</p> <p>Rule re-affirmed, that when a mortgago and an equity of redemption become vested in the same party, the mortgage will he extinguished or not according to the intention of the party, and in the absence of other evidence, this will be presumed to correspond with his interest.</p> <p>This rule not varied in its application by the fact, that the mortgage includes other estates,, of which the mortgagee is not the owner of the equity of redemption.</p>

<p>A railroad company, or any contractor employed by them to build a railroad-may use any material removed by them in grading the road, either in the adjacent or, it seems, in other localities, but they have no right to sell such material to third parties.</p>

This was a petition for divorce. The case is fully stated in the opinion. The ground upon which the divorce is claimed is single, i. e., “ gross misbehavior and wickedness repugnant to and inconsistent with the marriage contract.” The specification is in substance : That the respondent and another woman have formed an attachment for each other, and communicated this fact to the petitioner. This other woman immediately proceeded thereupon to procure a divorce from her husband.

Assumpsit against the defendant to recover certain instalments due from him as a subscriber for fifteen shares in the capital stock of the Woonsocket Union Railroad Company.