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8 Tex. 306

Dooley v. McEwing

Texas Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1852

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1852-07-01

This suit was brought by the appellee to recover from the appellant a negro and his hire. The defendant claimed the negro as the administrator of Thomas IV. Bell, deceased.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1852-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently May 1965

7 state decisions

20185218601870188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Wiibelbr, J.

¶1We have heretofore decided that writing is not necessary to convey tillo to a slave, and that tiro ownership of this species of property may be established by parol evidence. (Davis v. Loftin, 6 Tex. R., 489.)

¶2The only question to be determined in this case, therefore, is whether the oral declaration or admission of a party of his having sold a slave, when that sale was evidenced by writing, is admissible as primary evidence of the fact.

¶3It is the well-settled general rule that ‘‘oral proof cannot be substituted for the written evidence of any contract which the parties have put in writing.” (1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 87.)

¶4There are cases, however, in which the verbal admission of the contents of a writing by the party himself will supersede the necessity to produce or account for the non-production of the writing; that is, may bo used as primary evidence of the contents of the writing against the party making the admission and those claiming under him.

¶5A distinction is to be observed (says Greenleaf) “between a confessio jurie and a confessio facti. If the confession is of the former nature, it falls within the rule already considered, and is not received, for the party may not know the legal effect of the instrument, and his admission of its legal effect may be exceedingly erroneous; but where the existence and not the formal execution of the instrument is the subject of inquiry, or where the writing is collateral to the principal parts, and it is on these facts that the claim is founded, the better opinion seems to be that the confession of the party precisely identified is admissible as primary evidence of the facts recited in the writing.” (1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 96.)

¶6The admission of the party in the present case was evidently of the latter character, and as such was admissible in evidence.

¶7Where the terms of a written contract are in controversy the writing must be produced. But that was not the case in this instance. The writing was collateral to the principal fact, which was the sale, and which it was competent to prove bv the oral admission of the party as primary evidence of the fact. (Id., secs. 07, 203.)

¶8The defendant, claiming under the party who made the admissions, is bound by it.

¶9We are of opinion that the court did not err in the admission of the evidence or in the instructions to the jury, and that the judgment be affirmed.

¶10Judgment affirmed.

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