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← 8 Va. App. 567 - Duck v. Commonwealth

8 Va. App. 567 - Duck v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

1989

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
January 2002
most recently cited

8 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on North Carolina v. Pearce · Blackledge v. Perry · 4 Va. App. 433 - Mounce v. Commonwealth · Cooper v. Commonwealth

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo in the Superior Court, since such an appeal will clearly require increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources before the defendant’s conviction becomes final, and may even result in a formerly convicted defendant’s going free. And, if the prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such appeals — by “upping the ante” through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy — the State can insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial. si« # s}s * sj: # A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration. We hold, therefore, that it was not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to [the defendant’s] invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “In the case before us, Duck was required to face a more serious charge in the circuit court as a result of exercising his statutory right to a trial de novo. On the charge of DUI (second offense), he faces a range of incarceration from one to twelve months. In contrast, in the general district court on the charge of DUI (first offense), a jail sentence was not required upon conviction. Also, in the district court, the court had the option of imposing a fine in lieu of a jail sentence. We find that this difference in penalty range made the charge “a more serious charge” within the meaning of Blackledge . % * * * ❖ * [W]e find that he faced “a more serious charge” in the circuit court as a direct result of exercising his statutory right to a trial de novo. For this reason, his due process rights were violated and his conviction must be reversed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “An appellate court may ... take cognizance of errors though not assigned when they relate to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, are fundamental, or when such review is essential to avoid grave injustice or prevent the denial of essential rights.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.