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8 Vt. 402

Gray v. Sheldon

Supreme Court of Vermont

Decided March 15, 1836

Supreme Court of Vermont · decided 1836-03-15

This was an action of trespass on the case, to recover of defendant, as prudential committee of district No. 14, in the town of Calais, on- the alleged ground that the plaintiff not being an inhabitant of the district, and having no property liable to be taxed there, was aggrieved by being taxed by defendant.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1836-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently July 1926

3 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1*403The opinion of the court was delivered by

Redfield, J.

¶2The decision of this question depends upon the construction the court give to the statute authorizing the subdivision of towns into school districts. Towns are required to “ define and determine the limits of such school districts.” And a description of the same, and any alteration made therein, is required to be recorded in the town clerk’s office. From the language of this statute, it cannot be doubted the legislature intended that school districts should be defined by geographical limits; — otherwise, it would not amount to a subdivision of the town. If it were attempted to describe school districts by the names of the inhabitants, and as is frequently the case, the same person owned real estate in different sections of the town, it must lead to endless uncertainty and confusion. We believe such has been the contemporaneous construction of the earlier statutes upon this subject, which contained similar provisions. We are not aware that any different practical construction of the act to any considerable extent has obtained.— And as the contrary doctrine must leave the limits of school districts to be determined by oral testimony, we are not inclined to adopt it. After the subdivision of a town into school districts, and years of acquiscence, the division should be held sufficient, notwithstanding any formality in the vote or record. But when school districts have been long established within known boundaries, every reason would seem to require that those boundaries should not be changed except in conformity with the existing laws.

¶3The same rule of construction has been adopted in some of the neighboring states in relation to similar statutes. — 7 Pick. 106 — 13 do. 206 — 4 N. H. R. 478.

¶4The same doctrine was held by this court in the case of Dow vs. Smith, 7 Vt. R. 465, in relation to the mode of setting out the limits of a village.

¶5Whether the action should have been trespass or case, it is not necessary to be here decided. It is very certain that trespass is the most usual remedy, and by far the most appropriate form of action. For the abuse of legal process, case will lie ; but for any act. done under void process, the appropriate remedy is trespass. If this plaintiff had not been liable to taxation in district No. 14, the whole proceeding would have been coram nonjudice. But as wTe hold he was liable to be there taxed, the form of action is not material.

¶6The judgment of the county court is therefore reversed, and the plaintiff become non suit.

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