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← 80 ALA 451 - Bolman v. Overall

Bolman v. Overall’s Empirical Analysis

1886

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
17
states following
March 2001
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 48 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently March 2001 · most notably Anderson v. Anderson (1907), Bower v. Daniel (1906)

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 48 state decisions — followed in 17 states

901886189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Jenkins v. Harrison · Taylor v. Kelly · Parsell v. . Stryker · Wright v. Tinsley · Wife v. Dargin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The principle upon-which courts of equity undertake to enforce the execution of such agreements is referable to its jurisdiction over the subject of specific performance. It is not claimed, of course, that any court has the power to compel a person to execute a last will and testament, carrying out his agreement to bequeath a legacy, for this can be done only in the lifetime of the testator, and no 'breach of the agreement can be assumed so long as he lives, and after his death he is no longer capable of doing the tiling agreed' to be done. There can be no doubt but that a person may make a valid agreement binding himself legally to make a particular disposition of his property by last will and testament. The law permits a man to dispose of his property at his pleasure, and no good reason can be assigned why he may not make alegal agreement to dispose of his property to a particular individual or for a particular purpose as well by will as by a conveyance to be made at some specific future period or upon the happening of some future event. It may be unwise for a man in this way to embarrass himself as to the final disposition of his property, but he is the disposer by law of his own fortune and the sole and best judge as to the time and manner of disposing of it. A court of equity will decree the specific performance of such an agreement upon the recognized principles by which it is governed in the exercise of this branch of its jurisdiction.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““The fact that the last will of Mrs. Lohman has been probated by a court having exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills, and that this action of such court is conclusive on the complainants, and all others, is no answer to the purpose and prayer of the bill. No effort is made to disturb or set aside such probate, but to fasten a trust on the property in the hands of the executor and legatees, who are admitted to hold the legal title to such property by virtue of the will, and its probate by the proper court.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““All the authorities agree that one may, for a valuable consideration, renounce the absolute power to dispose of his estate at pleasure, and _ bind himself by contract to dispose of his property by will to a particular person, and that such contract may be enforced in the courts after his decease, either by an action for'its bréach against the personal representative, or, in a proper case, by bill in the nature of specific performance against his heirs, dev-isees, or personal representative. The validity of such agreements, as remarked by Mr. Freeman, in a recent note on this subject to the case of Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. [2 Stock.] 332; s. c., 66 Am. Dec. 773 , 784, ‘is supported by an unbroken current of authorities, both English and American.’ Wright v. Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389 ; Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N. X. 480. This principle does not embrace eases where services are rendered, or other' valuable consideration parted, with, in mere expectation of a legacy, and in reliance only on the testator’s generosity. But there must rbe a contract, express or implied, stipulating for an agreed compensation by way of legacy or devise. Martin v. Wright’s Adm’rs, 13 Wend. 460 , 28 Am. Dec. 468 .””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.