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80 F.2d 162

Docket No. 3916.

Benton v. United States

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Nov. 12, 1935.

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1935-11-12

Cited by 5 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 1946

4 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 281 · 26 U.S.C. § 306 · 27 U.S.C. § 101 (Prohibition Reorganization Act of 1930)

Relies on United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile · United States v. Stafoff · Rossi v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Morris Ames Soper · Decided 1935-11-12

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¶1T. C. Bowie, of Jefferson, N. C. (Bowie & Bowie, of Jefferson, N. C., and R. C. Jennings, of .Salisbury, N. C., on the brief), for appellant.

¶2Carlisle W. Higgins, U. S. Atty., of Greensboro, N. C., for the United States.

¶3Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT, and SOPER, Circuit Judges.

¶5SOPER, Circuit Judge.

¶6Branson Benton was convicted in the District Court under an indictment in two counts, the first of which charged that he willfully, knowingly, and feloniously had in his possession and under his control a 300-gallon still without having registered the same with the collector of internal revenue as required by law (see R.S. § 3258, 26 U.S.C.A. § 281), and the second of which charged that he willfully, knowingly, and feloniously did engage in and carry on the business of a distiller of spir*163its without having given bond (see R.S. § 3281, 26 U.S.C.A. § 306). He was sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and a penaty of $500 and to he imprisoned for a period of two years under the first count, and to pay a fine of $1,000 and to be imprisoned for a period of two years under the second count, the sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment imposed under the first count.

¶7An appeal was taken from this judgment on the ground, first, that the evidence was insufficient to justify the submission of the issues to the jury. The defendant did not move for a directed verdict in his favor during the trial, raising the point for the first time upon a motion for a new trial. This motion the District Judge denied, and from such action, no appeal lies. We have, nevertheless, examined the record and are satisfied that there was substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt, so that no error would have been committed if the motion - for a directed verdict had been seasonably made and overruled.

¶8The defendant also complains of the action of the District Court in overruling his motion in arrest of judgment whereby he questioned the sufficiency of the two counts of the indictment. As to the first count, he made the point that at the ’time of the alleged offense, to wit, on April 23, 1934, it was no longer incumbent xxpon a person having a still in his possession or under his control to register it with the collector of internal revenue of the district in which it was, as reqtxired by R.S. § 3258 (26 U.S.C.A. § 281). We are of the opinion that this point was well taken. That section was re-enacted by the act of November 23, 1921, 42 Stat. 222 (page 223, section 5 [27 U.S.C.A. § 3]), supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 43 S.Ct. 197, 67 L.Ed. 358; but it has been modified by subsequent legislation with the result that between April 1, 1927, and July 1, 1930, stills were registerable with the District Prohibition Administrators, and between Jxily 1, 1930, and May 10, 1934, with the District Supervisor of Permits in the Bureau of Industrial Alcohol, and since May 10, 1934, with the District Supervisor of the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.1 It follows, that on the date charged in the first count of the indict*164ment in the pending case, a distiller was not required to register with the collector of internal revenue as charged, and that count must fall, since it stated no offense. See United States v. Dibella (C.C.A.) 28 F.(2d) 805; United States v. Lecato (C.C.A.) 29 F.(2d) 694; Silva v. United States (C.C.A.) 35 F.(2d) 598; Connley v. United States (C.C.A.) 46 F.(2d) 53; Stork Restaurant Corporation v. McCampbell (D.C.) 55 F.(2d) 687.

¶9The defendant also contends that the motion in arrest of judgment, with reference to the second count of the indictment, should have been sustained for the reason that R.S. § 3281, 26 U.S.C.A. § 306, requiring any person who carries on the business of distiller to give bond, was repealed by the National Prohibition Act and was not revived by the supplemental act of November 23, 1921, 42 Stat. 222. The contention is that the giving of bond for the operation of a distillery would have been in direct conflict with the Prohibition Act, and that the requirement was not revived by the later act, since it merely re-enacted all laws in regard to the taxation of intoxicating liquor not directly in conflict with the prohibitory legislation. It is, however, firmly established by the decisions of the Supreme Court that this contention is without merit. United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 43 S.Ct. 197, 67 L.Ed. 358; United States v. One Ford Coupé, 272 U.S. 321, 47 S.Ct. 154, 71 L.Ed. 279, 47 A.L.R. 1025; Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89, 53 S.Ct. 532, 77 L.Ed. 1051. See, also, Case v. Alderson (C.C.A.) 76 F.(2d) 25.

¶10The judgment of the District Court on *165tile first count of the indictment is therefore reversed, and the judgment on the second count affirmed.

¶11Reversed as to count one, and affirmed as to count two.

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