Volume 80 — Illinois Appellate Court Reports

<p>1. Landlord’s Lien—Where the, Tenant Maltes a Voluntary Assignment,—A landlord has no lien upon the assets of an insolvent tenant, in the hands of an assignee under the insolvent act, in preference to other creditors, by virtue of provisions of his lease granting him a first, lien upon the property belonging to his tenant, as security for the payment of the rent.</p> <p>2. Same—Under the Provisions of a Lease.—A provision in a lease giving a landlord a first lien upon the goods of his tenant, and the right to distrain the same, whether or not exempt by law, as to creditors, is in the nature of a chattel mortgage líen, and is to be governed by the rules of law applicable to chattel mortgages.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a contract for wages. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a subscription to stock. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appellate Court Practice—Failure to Make a Sufficient Abstract. —The failure to abstract material parts of the record is sufficient to justify the court in affirming the judgment, but when the adverse party does not ask for an affirmance, and the record is short, the court will ordinarily consider the case on its merits.</p> <p>2. Injunction Bond—Where Good as a Common Law Obligation.— The fact that an injunction bond was approved by the clerk, and not by the judge of the court, does not, for all purposes, make the bond a nullity; where not executed under compulsion, it is a voluntary obligation given on a good consideration, and as such is good at common law, though not as a statutory obligation.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on the common counts. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. James Goggin, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for stenographer’s services. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.</p>

Assumpsit, for services. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brextano, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant by direction of the court. Appeal by plaintiff.

<p>Indictment, for theatening to accuse another, etc. Tried in the Criminal Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment of- guilty.</p>

Debt, upon an appeal bond. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. James Goggin, Judge, presiding. Judgment for defendant, on demurrer to declaration. Appeal by plaintiff. This is an action of debt upon an appeal bond.

Replevin, for goods distrained for rent. Trial in the County Court of Cook County, on appeal from a justice of the peace; the Hon. Wales W. Wood, Judge, presiding. Finding and judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal by defendant.

<p>Debt, on a judgment of a sister State. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Finding and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>Proceedings Under the Voluntary Assignment Act.—Appeal from the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. John H. Batten, Judge, presiding.</p>

Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligent act. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

<p>Assumpsit, on a written contract. Trial in the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. C. W. Raymond, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

<p>1. Witnesses—Unimpeached Credibility, etc.—It is not true, as a matter of law, that unimpeached witnesses are of equal credibility. Such credibility is always a question of fact.</p> <p>2. Instructions—When to be Accurate.—When the question at issue is one of fact, and close, upon the evidence, the jury should be instructed with care upon the law applicable to the proofs.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Abner Smith, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendants.

Action in Tort, for injuries to a horse. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, on appeal from a justice of the peace; the Hon. George W. Brown, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant by direction of the court. Error by plaintiff.

Assumpsit, to recover money deposited in defendant’s bank. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant by direction of the court. Appeal by plaintiffs.

<p>1. Payment—Acceptance of a Second Note.—The giving of a second note for the same debt does not necessarily extinguish liability upon the first note, and whether such second note was accepted as payment or merely as additional security is a question of fact.</p> <p>2. Same-—Talcing a Second Note for the Same Debt—Whether Payment or Additional Security.—If the giving of a second note extinguishes the liability upon a first note given for the same debt,'it can only be by reason of an express agreement of the parties to that effect, and in the absence of such agreement, the presumption prevails that the second note was for additional security and not a payment.</p>

Action under section 18 of the act concerning corporations to hold directors liable for merchandise sold and delivered, etc. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County. The Hon. Theodore Brent ano, Judge, presiding. Finding and judgment for defendants: appeal by plaintiffs.

<p>1. Garnishment—Joint Judgment Can Not be Rendered upon Several Claims.—Parties can not jointly recover judgment against parties in garnishment proceedings where the indebtedness from the garnishees is to one of the parties only.</p>

Assumpsit.—Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County, on appeal from a justice of the peace; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

<p>In Equity.—Bill of discovery. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. Hearing and decree for complainant. Error by defendants.</p>

Prosecution under the Pharmacy Act.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, on appeal from a justice of the peace; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Verdict of acquittal. Appeal by the people.

<p>1. Municipal Indebtedness—Cerdeóte of Comptroller Not Competent Evidence of.—The certificate of the comptroller of the city of Chicago is not competent evidence of the bonded indebtedness of the city.</p> <p>2. Evidence—Of Municipal Matters.—The papers, entries, records and ordinances or parts thereof, of any city, may be proved by d copy thereof certified under the hand of the clerk or the keeper thereof, and the corporate seal, if there be any; if not, under his hand and private seal; and such papers, entries, records and ordinances may be proved by copies examined and sworn to by credible witnesses.</p> <p>3. Municipal Coepoeations—Execution of Leases by.—The statute (Rev. Stat., Ch. 24, Sec. 14) makes the mayor the chief executive officer of the city and he is the proper officer to execute a lease, having the corporate seal of the city properly affixed by the city clerk.</p> <p>4. Inteeest—Municipal Corporations Not Liable for in the Absence of a Contract.—A city is not liable for interest in the absence of a contract to pay interest.</p>

<p>1. Variance—In the Names «/ Jurors Appearing in the Record and Those in the Verdict.—Where the names of the jurors, as signed to the written verdict, vary in some slight particulars from the names as shown in the record, but a comparison shows that the variance is so slight that they would be held identical under the rule of idem sonans, and the record recites that “ the jury impaneled herein finds the issues,” etc., without reciting their names, it is sufficient.</p>

<p>Bill to Set Aside a Judgment.—Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Fablin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Decree pro confesso. Appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>Suit in Chancery, to fix the liability of the officers of a corporation under Section 16, Chapter 32, R. S., concerning corporations. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edmund W. Burke, Judge, presiding. Judgment for defendant on demurrer to hill; appeal by complainants.</p>

<p>Suit to Charge Defendants with a Violation of Sec. 18 of Chap. 32, B. S.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles E. Fuller, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendants.</p>

<p>Intervening Petition.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanect, Judge, presiding. Hearing and decree; appeal by petitioners.</p> <p>Appellant was a stockholder in the Mechanics & Traders Savings, Loan and Building Association, holding five shares in the forty-sixth series, issued January 18, 1887, and five shares in the sixty-fourth series, issued July 6, 1891. In October, 1896, she gave notice of withdrawal for the stock in the sixty-fourth series; on February 15, 1897, the board of directors declared the stock in the forty-sixth series matured; and on June 22, 1897, she assigned and delivered all of her stock to the association, which was canceled, and in payment therefor was given a check for $717.70 on the American Exchange National Bank of Chicago. On July-27, 1897, Jacob Ruble and others filed a bill in the Circuit Court of Cook County against this association, alleging acts of mismanagement on the part of its officers, praying for an investigation, a receiver, etc. On July 31st, four days afterward, the State Auditor appointed a custodian for the association, who immediately took possession of its assets and withdrew the money on deposit, over $4,000, out of the bank. On August 7th appellant’s check was presented for payment at the American Exchange National Bank, but payment was refused because no funds of the drawer were then on deposit. On August 13th, the people, on the relation of the State Auditor, filed a bill in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the association, whereupon three receivers were appointed, and upon the order of the court the money in the hands of the custodian was paid over to the receivers. Having given notice to all parties in the suit and having obtained permission of the court, appellant filed an intervening petition in the cause on August 30th, claiming that $717.70, then in the hands of the receivers, was her property and rightfully belonged to her by reason of the prior assignment thereof by the association, as evidenced by the check, and asking that the receivers be ordered to pay it over to her. The receivers answered that the check was given for stock canceled; that at the time the notice of withdrawal was given, and at the time part of the stock was declared matured, the association was insolvent; that petitioner was not paid in the order of giving withdrawal notice, and that therefore she occupied the position of a stockholder, notwithstanding the giving of the check. The petitioner (appellant) filed exceptions to that part of the answer which alleged insolvency and" also to that part which alleged that petitioner was not paid in order of giving withdrawal notice, claiming those matters to be immaterial and’ impertinent. The court overruled the exceptions and petitioner filed a replication to said answer. The cause was referred to a master in chancery to take evidence and report with conclusions, upon the issues raised. On July 12,1898, the cause came on to be heard by the court upon the master’s report and the exceptions of petitioner thereto, and the court found that petitioner continued to be a stockholder, notwithstanding the giving of the check and the surrender and cancellation of her stock; and that she was only entitled to her pro rata share of the assets of the association. From this decree the appeal here is prosecuted.</p>

<p>1. Instructions—When Erroneous.—"Where, by an instruction, the jury are told that the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to recover three several items or amounts, and if they find for the plaintiff their verdict will be for a sum equivalent to that claimed in all three items, while both parties agree that plaintiff is entitled to recover on one of the three items, the instruction is erroneous and is not cured by other instructions.</p> <p>2. Same—Construction of General Rule.—As a general rule all the instructions given in a case are to be construed together as one charge.</p> <p>3. Same—Sufficiency of.— It is usually sufficient if the instructions, when considered as a whole, present the law of the case fairly to the jury.</p> <p>4. Same—Exception to the General Rule.—As an exception to the general rule, it is stated that in a close case, the instructions should all state the law accurately. The jury, not being judges of the law, are as likely to follow a bad instruction as a good one.</p>

Probate Proceedings—Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County on appeal from an order of the Probate Court; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Application for letters of administration denied. Appeal by petitioner.

Assumpsit, for moneys misappropriated. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Judgment for defendant on demurrer to plea of the statute of limitations. Appeal by plaintiff.

Trespass on the' Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

' Replevin.—Trial in the County Court of Cook County on appeal from a justice of the peace; the Hon. Wales W. Wood, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

<p>Assumpsit, to recover deposits. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>Attachment.—Interpleader. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edmund W. Bubke, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; error by defendant.</p>

<p>1. Exception—Musi Be Shown by the Abstract.— It is the duty of plaintiffs in error to show by their abstract any error of the trial court of which they complain.</p> <p>2. Appellate Court Practice—Failure to Preserve Exceptions.— This court can not review the action of the trial court as to any of the evidence offered where parties fail to preserve an exception to the ruling of the court in refusing their .offers.</p>

<p>Probate Proceedings.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County on appeal from-the Probate Court; the Hon. Abner Smith, Judge, presiding. Verdict for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for' defendant. Error by plaintiff.

Attachment.—Trial in the County Court of Cook County, on appeal from a justice of the peace; the Hon, Wales W. Wood, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

Action on the Case, for personal tort. Trial in the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. John H. Batten, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

<p>1. Attorneys—Inexcusable Negligence—Negligence of His Client.— Attorneys who are served with notice by opposing counsel of his intention to make certain motions in court at a certain time, when their client’s interest demands their presence, and who ignore such notice, are inexcusably negligent, and their negligence is the negligence of their client.</p> <p>2. Stockholders—Any One May be Made Party to Creditor's Bill.— In the case of a creditor’s bill against a corporation, the stock liability of any one or more stockholders may be enforced without making the other stockholders, parties.</p> <p>3. Receivers—When Not a Necessary Party to a Creditor's Bill.—The mere appointment of a receiver in a prior creditor’s bill without a conveyance to him of the company’s assets, does not vest him with any such interest as will make him a necessary party to a subsequent creditor’s bill filed by another creditor.</p>

<p>1. Garnishment—When Garnishee Must Answer as to Indebtedness to Judgment Debtor.—Section 5 of the Garnishment act, as judicially construed, requires the garnishee to answer as to his indebtedness to the judgment debtor, first, when the debt is owing and due at the date of service; second, when it is owing at the date of service and becomes due thereafter; and third, when it is owing and due at any time after the service of the writ, up to the date of the answer.</p> <p>2. Same—What Wages are Exempt from.—The wages for services of a defendant, who is the head of a family and residing with the same, to the amount of eight dollars per week, is exempt from garnishment.</p> <p>3. Same—Act of 1872—Unearned Wages.—The act of 1872 does not contemplate the garnishment of unearned wages.</p> <p>4. Same—Act of 1872—Requirements—Judgment and Return of Execution.—By section 1 of the Garnishment act, there must be a judgment, the issuance of the execution, and a return “ No property found,” in order to maintain proceedings in garnishment.</p> <p>5. Construction of Statutes—The Garnishment Act of 1872 to be' liberally Construed.—The Garnishment act of 1872 was enacted for the benefit of the debtor’s family as well as himself, and should receive a fair and liberal construction so that it may effectuate the object the legislature had in view.</p>

Petition for Rents and Profits, pending foreclosure. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edward F. Dunne, Judge, presiding. Hearing and decree for petitioner; appeal by respondent.

<p>1. Delivery—Of a Deed—What is a Sufficient.—Any disposition made of a deed by the grantor, with the intention thereby to make delivery of it, so that it shall become presently effective, will, if accepted by the grantee, constitute a sufficient delivery.</p> <p>2. Same—Of Release Deed—Intentions of Parties, Hoxo Shoxvn.—The intention to deliver on the one hand, and of acceptance on the other, may be shown by direct evidence of the intention, or may be presumed from acts or declarations-, or both acts and declarations of the parties, constituting parts of the res gestee, which manifest such intention.</p> <p>3. Principal and Agent—When the Agexxt’s Knowledge is Not Constructive Notice to His Principal.—An agent’s knowledge is not constructive notice to the principal when the agent is dealing in his own interest with his principal and against the interest of such principal.</p> <p>4. Release—Of Trust Deed—Unauthorized, Has no Effect upon Subsequent Purchasers, vAth Notice.—An unauthorized release has no effect upon a trust deed as to subsequent purchasers with notice.</p> <p>5. Same—Before Maturity of Mortgage—Ordinary Care in Paying Note.—It is not such care as ordinarily prudent persons observe in the transaction of business, to pay off a note secured by mortgage, and take a release from the mortgage before its maturity without seeing or taking up the note or making inquiry as to whether the mortgagee is still the holder of the note.</p> <p>6. Records—Of Wx'itten Instruments—Talce Effect When.—All deeds, mortgages- and other instruments of writing which are authorized to be recorded, take effect from the time of filing the same for record, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice; and all such deeds and title papers are adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice,- until the same are so filed for record.</p>

<p>1. Negligence—Of Person in Charge of a Child Not to he Imputed to the Child.—Where the negligence of a man standing upon a street car platform with a child contributed to the child’s injury, his negligence can not be imputed to the child to bar her a recovery, based upon the negligence of the railway company.</p> <p>2. Damages—When $3,000 is Not Excessive.—Where a five-year-old child received an injury consisting of a simple fracture of"the thigh bone, and the limb, after being kept in a plaster cast and held by stirrup and weights for f.our or five weeks, was permanently shortened to a slight extent, and after two years still caused pain and weakness in the limb, $3,000 is not excessive.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior ■Court'of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant; appeal by plaintiff.

<p>1. Consideration—Note Given by a Son at His Father's Request.— A note given by a son at his father’s request, for the father’s existing debt, and made payable at a future day, is not void for want of consideration.</p> <p>2. Same—Extension of Time, etc.—An extension of time for the payment of a debt or the performance of an agreement is a sufficient consideration to support a contract.</p> <p>3. Same—Suspension of the Right to Enforce Payment.—A suspension of the creditor’s right to enforce payment of his debt is a sufficient consideration for the promise of a third person to pay it.</p>

<p>1. Personal Injuries—In Elevators—Prima Facie Case.— In an action for personal injuries received in an elevator, evidence that the injury was caused by the careless and negligent operation of the elevator, the plaintiff being lawfully in it, is sufficient to sustain a recovery.</p> <p>2. Pleading—Special Damages, Special Averments Not Necessary.— Damages resulting from an accident to a passenger in an elevator, such as injuries to an arm or leg, are not special; they are the direct and natural result of the injuries and such as the law implies, and therefore need not be specially averred.</p> <p>3. Damages—Under the Allegation Alia Enormia.—In trespass, under the allegation alia enormia, damages which naturally arise from the act complained of, or which can not be decently stated, may be given in evidence in aggravation of damages, though not specified in the declaration.</p> <p>4. Pleadings and Proofs.—The court is of the opinion that, under the allegations of the declaration in this case, it was competent to prove any physical injuries, mental impairment or suffering, which were the direct result of the negligence charged.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

<p>1. Contribution—Cosureties, at Common Law.—A co-surety, who has been obliged to satisfy the joint liability of the several sureties, may recover at common law, and under the common counts, the amount due by way of contribution front each co-surety.</p> <p>2. Bill of Particulars—Its Purpose.—The bill of particulars operates in practice merely to give a proper notification to the adverse party of _ the nature and grounds of the claim to be presented, and must not be made the instrument of the injustice which it is intended to prevent.</p> <p>3. Same—Limits the Right of Recovery.—A bill of particulars limits the right of recovery to the grounds therein specified.</p>

<p>Attachment, and garnishee proceedings. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbbidge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Finding and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Rehearing on remanding order from the Supreme Court.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for damages to real estate. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>Brewing Co. v. Ahlgren, 63 Ill. App. 475.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brent ano, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.

Trespass on the Case, for seizure of personal property. Trial in the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. R. O. Marshall, Judge, pre- siding; finding and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>1. Gifts—What Constitutes an Effective Gift of an Insurance Policy. —It is not essential to an effective gift that the custody of the policy itself be delivered into the hands of the assignee. The declared intent of the donor, the execution and acknowledgment of the deed of assignment, the delivery of a duplicate thereof to the insurance company, with notice to the donee that it had been done, are sufficient to constitute a complete and effective gift.</p> <p>2. Insurance—Gift of a Policy—Actual Delivery Not Necessary.— Actual delivery of the writing into the hands of the donee is not essential to constitute an effective gift of insurance.</p> <p>3. Delivery—Of Deed—No Set Form Necessary.—There is no precise or set form in which a delivery must be made. A deed may be delivered by words Without acts, or by acts without words, or by both acts and words. After the writing has been signed and sealed, an intent, coupled with acts or words evincing such intent, to consummate and complete it, and to part absolutely and unconditionally with it and the right over it, is sufficient to give it legal existence as a deed.</p>

Assumpsit, upon written contract. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>1. Insurance—False Statements in Applications. —A statement which is merely a copy of the application to another company previously made, and which was true when made, no one being deceived thereby, can not be treated as a false statement made to deceive the insurance company.</p> <p>2. Same—Cancellation of Policies—Fraudulent Statement in Application.—Where matter in an application for insurance can be imputed to the insured as statements fraudulently made by him, the policy is subject to cancellation at the election of the insurer.</p> <p>3. Same— The Examining Physician the Agent of the Company.—The physician who examines the applicant for life insurance is the agent of the company, and if he makes misstatements or induces the applicant to do so the company will be estopped to set them up as a defense.</p>

<p>1. Abstracts—Defective.—Where the abstract is, not sufficiently full to present the errors upon which the plaintiff in error or appellant relies, the court will not, as a general rule, go to the record for such information.</p> <p>2. Bill op Exceptions—Sealing and, Signing Ministerial.—The sealing and signing of a bill of exceptions is merely a ministerial act.</p> <p>3. Same—May be Signed and Sealed by the Judge after he Enters upon a New Term, as His Own Successor.—The fact that the judge had entered upon a new term of office as his own successor at the time he signed and sealed the bill of exceptions, is immaterial.</p> <p>4. Collateral Attack—Justice's Judgment—Grammatical objections.—A justice’s judgment rendered in a proceeding which was repeatedly continued by agreement, until it was finally heard, all parties appearing, and in which the justice had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, can not be questioned collaterally for grammatical objections.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>Voluntary Assignments—Proceeding in the County Court of Cook County; the Hon, John H. Batten, Judge, presiding. Hearing and petition dismissed. Appeal by petitioners.</p>

Assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant by direction of the court; appeal by plaintiff.

<p>Voluntary Assignments.—Petition for exemptions. Trial in the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. W. S. Wheatley, Judge, presiding. Hearing and judgment for respondents; appeal by petitioners.</p>

Assumpsit, for services, etc. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendants.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hori. George W. Brown, Judge, presiding. Judgment for defendant by direction of the Court. Appeal by plaintiff.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jonas Hutchinson, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

Mandamus, to compel an express company to receipt for carriage and transportation of packages. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. Hearing and decree for relator; appeal by respondent.

<p>Motion to Vacate Judgment.—Heard in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. .Motion denied; appeal by the movers.</p>

<p>1. Building and Loan Associations—Judgments in Favor of Withdrawing Stockholders.—The collection of a judgment against a building- and loan association in favor of a withdrawing stockholder may be controlled by a court of equity, and may be stayed permanently where it turns out that the association was insolvent at the time of withdrawal, because such a stockholder is not entitled to priority of payment over his fellow stockholders.</p> <p>3. Same—When the Association May Invoke the Aid of a Court of Equity.—The attempt to collect such a judgment against a building and loan association by levy and sale is an injury to the body corporate as well as to the stockholders, and the corporation may invoke the protection of a court of equity.</p> <p>3. Same—Are Trustees for the Stockholders.—A building and loan association is the trustee and representative of all its stockholders, and is bound to protect them against withdrawing members seeking a priority to which they are not entitled.</p> <p>4. Same—Withdrawing Members—Not Required to Show Solvency.— As the solvency of the association is not required, under the statute, to be proved by the plaintiff suing at law as a withdrawing member, in order to make out a prima facie case, it is not the duty of the association to interpose the defense of insolvency at least unless it appears that such insolvency not only existed but was then known or should have been known to exist by the association and its officers.</p> <p>5. Parties—In Equity Proceedings.—It is an elementary rule that in equity proceedings all persons whose rights may be injuriously affected by the proposed decree are to be made parties.</p> <p>6. Res Adjudioata—As to Insolvency.—A judgment at law against a building and loan association establishes no. presumption “ res adjudicata” in respect to the solvency of such association.</p>

<p>Motion to Set Aside a Judgment.—Heard in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jonas Hutchinson, Judge, presiding. Motion denied; appeal by defendant.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Judgment for defendant by direction of the court; error by plaintiff.

<p>1. Equity Practice—Effect of Sworn Answers.—So far as a sworn answer, when called for, is responsive to the allegations of the bill, it must be taken as true, unless it is overcome by evidence equivalent to the testimony of two witnesses.</p>

<p>Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>1. Words and Phrases — Immediate Notice.—The term “ immediate notice” means notice within a reasonable time, and whether such notice was given is a question for the jury.</p> <p>2. Instructions—Insanity and Suicide—Precedents.—The court recites the instruction in this case upon the questions of insanity and suicide, in the opinion, and approves the same, “ finding no substantial error in any of them.”</p> <p>3. Presumptions—In Favor of Sanity and Against Suicide.—The legal presumption is always in favor of sanity and against suicide.</p> <p>4. Burden of Proof—Upon the Party Alleging Insanity.—The law presumes the fact of sanity, and the burden is cast upon the party alleging insanity to establish it, by a preponderance of proof.</p> <p>5. Insurance—Presumption Against Suicide.—Where the plaintiff makes a prima fade case that the death of the assured was occasioned by violent and external means, the legal presumption arises that it was accidental and not suicidal.</p> <p>6. Suicide—An Affirmative Defense.—Suicide is an affirmative, defense, and must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>7. Practice—Offers of Proof.—Counsel have the right to make an offer of proof, for the two-fold purpose of informing the court of what is expected to be proved, and of preserving an exception to the exclusion of the offered evidence.</p> <p>8. Ad Damnum—Objections that a Verdict Exceeds It, Must be Made in the Court Below.—Objection that verdict exceeds the ad damnum must be made in the trial court; it can not be urged for the first time in the Appellate Court.</p>

Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligent act. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant; appeal by plaintiff.

<p>1. Practice—Waiving of a Ruling on Demurrer.—Taking leave to file an additional plea, without electing to stand by the plea to which the demurrer was sustained, is a waiver of all right of exception to the ruling of the court on the demurrer.</p> <p>2. Statute of Frauds—Must be Specially Pleaded.—The question as to whether a promise is within the statute of frauds can be raised only by special plea.</p> <p>3. Same—Discharge of the Original Debtor Unnecessary.—It is not necessary to the validity of a promise made for the benefit of a third person that the original debtor should be discharged.</p> <p>4. Consideration—Agreement for Forbearance.—An agreement of forbearance to sue is a sufficient consideration to support a promise.</p> <p>5. Parties—Who May Sue.—The party for whose benefit a promise is made, may sue for its breach.</p>

<p>1. Appellate Court. Practice—Duty to Consider Exceptions.— Under Section 60 of the Practice Act it is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider exceptions which relate to the receiving of improper or rejecting proper evidence, or to the final judgment of the court, the trial being before the court without a jury.</p> <p>2. Parties— IVho Are Not Necessary in Insurance Cases.—In a proceeding under the insurance act for the purpose of declaring the charter of a mutual insurance company forfeited, for its dissolution, the appointment of a receiver, winding up its business, etc., a policy holder in the company is not a necessary party.</p> <p>3. Practice— Winding up the Affairs of a Mutual Insurance Company—Parties.—In a-proceeding under Chap. 73 R. S. entitled “Insurance” to wind up the affairs of a mutual insurance company, members of such company are not necessary parties.</p>

Debt, to recover penalty for violation of an ordinance. Trial in the Circuit Court of Clark County; the Hon, Henry Van Sellar, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Appeal by plaintiff.

<p>Bill to Foreclose Mortgage.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Owen P. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Finding and decree for defendant; appeal by complainant.</p>

<p>Attachment.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Greene County; the Hon. Owen P. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>1. Usury—Where Grantee of Mortgagor May Not Interpose Defense of, in Foreclosure Proceedings.■—Where a party accepts a deed conveying mortgaged premises for the express consideration of §3,500 and “subject to a certain mortgage indebtedness of $3,000, and interest thereon, dated,” etc., he affirms such indebtedness and is estopped from making the defense of usury in a proceeding for the foreclosure of the mortgage.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for non-delivery of goods sold. Trial in the Circuit Court of Vermilion County; the Hon. Ferdinand Bookwalter, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a contract of insurance. Trial in the Circuit Court of Pike County; the Hon. Thomas N. Mehan, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>Scire Facias, to revive a decree for alimony. , Heard in the Circuit Court of Logan County; the Hon. George W. Patton, Judge, presiding. Judgment for plaintiff; appeal by plaintiff.</p>

<p>1. Specific Performance— Tender, When Unnecessary.—It is not necessary to make a tender of performance on a day fixed where the opposite party abandons the contract or refuses to perform it on his part before such date.</p>

<p>1. • Admissions—Of Third Persons, When Admissible.—In some cases the admissions of third persons, strangers to the suit, are admissible, but this is so when the issue is substantially upon the mutual rights of such persons at a particular time; in which case the practice is, to let in such evidence in general as would be legally admissible in an action between the parties themselves.</p> <p>2. Accidents—Death by—Questions of Pact.—The question as to whether a person died from accidental causes is one of fact, to be determined the same as other questions of fact.</p> <p>8. Insurance—Contracts of—Construction.—All contracts of insurance are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured so as not to defeat, without a plain necessity, his claim to the indemnity which, in making the insurance, it was his object to secure; and when the words used are without violence, susceptible of two interpretations, that which will sustain his claim and cover the loss must in preference be adopted.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Pike County; the Hon. Thomas N. Mehan, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Error by defendant. Reversed and judgment in this court with a statement of facts.

Trespass, for assault and battery. Trial in the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. Henry Van Seller, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant. Heard in this court at the November term, 1898.

<p>1. Equity Practice—Finding of the Master.—The finding of the master is entitled in this court to the same eonsideration and weight as are to be attributed to the verdict of a jury.</p>

<p>Bill of Discovery and Creditor’s Bill.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Clark County; the Hon. Henry Van Seller," Judge, presiding. Hearing and decree for complainants; appeal by defendants.</p>

Petition for Mandamus.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, on demurrer to answer; the Hon. Samuel L. Dwight, Judge, presiding. Finding and judgment for respondents; appeal by relator.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff: appeal by defendant.

Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligent act. Trial in the Circuit Court of Champaign County; the Hon. Francis M. Wright, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>Administration of Estates.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Fulton County, on appeal from the County Court; the Hon. John A. Gray, Judge, presiding. Finding for petitioner; appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>Prohate Proceedings.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Fulton County, on appeal from the County Court of said County; the Hon. John A. Gray, Judge, presiding. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.</p>

Certiorari, to quash proceedings of supervisors in highway matters. Trial in the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. Frank K. Dunn, Judge, presiding. Judgment for petitioner; appeal by respondents.

Trespass on the Case, for negligently spreading fire. Trial in the Circuit Court .of Ford County; the Hon. John H. Moffett, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

Trespass oil the Case, for damages caused by raising the grade of -a street. Trial in tile Circuit Court of Douglas County; the Hon. William G. Cochean, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>Debt, on an appeal bond. Trial in the County Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Charles A. Barnes, Judge, presiding. Judgment for plaintiffs on demurrer; appeal by defendants.</p>

<p>Action for Slander,—Trial in the Circuit Court of Calhoun County; the Hon. Thomas N. Mehan, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Macon County; the Hon. Edward P. Vail, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>Assumpsit, on grain contract. Trial in the Circuit Court of Champaign County; the Hon. Francis M. Wright, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs; appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>1. Former Adjudication—Judgment on Promissory Note, Conclusive on Parties in Interest, etc.—Where a notéis prosecuted in the name of one at the instance or for the benefit of another, person, the adjudication resulting from such prosecution will be conclusive as to such other person, not only as to what was determined in the prosecution, but also as to all other matters involved or which could have been raised and determined in it.</p>

<p>1. Fraudulent Conveyances—WZiere to be. Set Aside—A. conveyance in fraud of the complainant’s rights as a creditor will be set aside.</p>

<p>Bill for an Injunction.—Trial in the Circuit Court of Edgar County; the Hon. Frank K. Dunne, Judge, presiding. Hearing and decree on demurrer to bill, appeal, etc.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on promissory note. Trial in the Circuit Court of Champaign County; the Hon. Francis M. Wright, Judge, presiding. Finding and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendants.</p>

Assumpsit, to recover damages for failure to deliver com. Trial in the County Court of DeWitt County; the Hon. George K. Ingham, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant; appeal by plaintiff.

Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligent act. Trial in the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. John H. Moffett, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.

<p>Action for Personal Injuries.—Trial in the Circuit Court of McLean County: the Hon. Colostin D. Myers, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant.</p>

<p>1. Bridges—County Aid in Building.—Under Section 19 of the act in regard to roads and bridges in counties under township organization, it is not discretionary with the county board to grant or refuse aid when the highway commissioners have done all that the statute requires of them.</p> <p>S. Same—When the Bight to Such Aid is Not Waived—The right to such aid is not waived by the commissioners entering into the contract for construction of the bridge with a construction company.</p> <p>3. Same—Amount of Aid Entitled.—The amount of the appropriation to which they are entitled is one-half of the estimated cost, and not one-half of the contract price with the company</p>