80 Ill. App. 3d 270 - Evans v. Giles’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““This c.ase concerns title to 320 acres of Macon County farmland. At issue is the construction of the will of Sard Giles who died November 22, 1925. Article Third of his will devised the land to his daughter Leta Timmons for life, **** with remainder over to the heirs of the body of her, the said Leta Timmons, and in the event of the death of the said Leta Timmons without issue, then in that event, the real estate herein *** I give, devise and bequeath to Elmo S. Giles for and during his natural life with remainder over to the heirs of the body of him, the said Elmo S. Giles.’ The parties agree that this devise created a life estate in Leta Timmons followed by alternate contingent remainders. On April 8, 1972, Leta G. Timmons died never having had children. The parties agree that this caused the failure of the first contingent remainder to the heirs of her body. Previously on February 9, 1951, Elmo S. Giles, son of Sard Giles, died leaving Elmo S. Giles, Jr., the only child ever born to him. On February 26, 1968, also prior to Leta’s death, Elmo S. Giles, Jr., died never having had children. The precise question to be decided is whether all estates after the life estate of Leta Timmons failed causing the title to the tract, in the absence of a residuary clause, to revert to the heirs of Sard Giles, thus enabling plaintiffs as devisees of Leta Timmons to take her one-half interest in that reversion, or whether defendants, the devisees of the contingent remainder interest of El”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 83 Ill. 2d 448 - Evans v. Giles

2. ““In cases where, by the common law, any person or persons might hereafter become seized, in fee tail, of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by virtue of any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, hereafter to be made, or by any other means whatsoever, such person or persons, instead of being or becoming seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be, and become seized thereof, for his or her natural life only, and the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute, to the person or persons to whom the estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee, or donee in tail, first pass, according to the course of the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or conveyance.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1925, ch. 30, par. 5.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 83 Ill. 2d 448 - Evans v. Giles

3. ““ Tn any instrument, if a freehold be limited to the ancestor for life, and the inheritance to his heirs, either mediately or immediately, the first taker takes the whole estate; if it be limited to the heirs of his body, he takes a fee tail; if to his heirs, a fee simple.’ 1 Preston on Estates, 263.” (Frazer v. Board of Supervisors (1874), 74 Ill. 282, 287 .)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 83 Ill. 2d 448 - Evans v. Giles