Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

800 F.3d 1290

Docket No. 14-14993.

United States v. Cunningham

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Sept. 2, 2015.

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 2015-09-02

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently May 2023

2 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“hold[ing], as have each of the circuits that have examined the question, that upon each revocation of supervised release a defendant may be sentenced to the felony class limits contained within § 3583(e)(3) without regard to 3Such statement is dicta because Tapia-Escalera addressed the proper reading of § 3583(e)(3)'s pre-2003 text. See id. at 188. - 7 - imprisonment previously served for revocation of supervised release”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including United States v. Ruiz-Valle, United States v. Ruiz-Valle

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2250 · 18 U.S.C. § 3583

Relies on Johnson v. United States · Johnson v. United States · United States v. Williams

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 2015-09-02

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1R. Brian Tanner, Jeffrey J. Buerstatte, James D. Durham, Joseph D. Newman, Brian T. Rafferty, Edward J. Tarver, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Savannah, GA, PlaintiffAppellee.

¶2Jason Monroe Tate, Roberts Tate, LLC, St. Simons Island, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.

¶3Before ROSENBAUM and FAY, Circuit Judges, and MIDDLEBROOKS,* District Judge.

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6John Cunningham appeals his sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment imposed after the third revocation of his supervised release. He contends that his revocation sentence was illegal because it exceeded the 14 months remaining on his then existing term of supervised release.

¶7I. Background

¶8Cunningham was originally sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release for fail*1291ure to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a Class C felony).

¶9Following his release from prison, Cunningham violated the terms of supervised release and was sentenced in August 2011 to eight months in prison followed by 24 additional months of supervised release.

¶10He violated his second term of supervised release and was sentenced in March 2018 to another 14 months in prison followed by 14 months of supervised release.

¶11After completing his term in prison, he violated supervised release for a third time. At his revocation hearing, Cunningham argued that he could only be sentenced to a maximum of 14 months’ imprisonment, the length of supervised release imposed at his last revocation. After a hearing and additional briefing, the district court sentenced Cunningham to 24 months in prison with no supervision to follow.

¶12Cunningham timely appealed.

¶13II. Standard of Review

¶14We review de novo the legality of a sentence, including a sentence imposed pursuant to revocation of supervised release. United States v. Pla, 345 F.3d 1312, 1313 (11th Cir.2003).

¶15III. Discussion

¶16A sentencing court may impose a term of supervised release following imprisonment as part of the sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). The authorized terms of supervised release are: (1) not more than five years for a Class A or B felony; (2) not more than three years for a Class C or D felony; and (3) not more than one year for a Class E felony or misdemeanor (other than a petty offense). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b).

¶17Revocation of supervised release is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Since 2003, the relevant part of § 3583(e)(3) has read as follows:

The court may ... revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision ... except that a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revocation ... more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony____

¶1818 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In addition to revoking the defendant’s supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment, the district court

may include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment. The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.

¶1918 U.S.C. § 3583(h).

¶20Cunningham contends that § 3583(e)(3) only authorized revocation of his “current term of supervised release” or 14 months. He argues that “the term of supervised release authorized by statute,” which is the actual wording of § 3583(e)(3), must be read in concert with § 3583(h) — that “[o]nce a defendant has his original term of supervised release revoked, then ‘the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release’ is controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).” (Appellant’s Brief at 10). In other words, he reads the aggregate limitation contained in § 3583(h) to constrain the sentence “authorized by statute” in § 3583(e)(3).

¶21While this is an issue of first impression for us, Cunningham concedes that his ar*1292gument has been rejected by several other circuits. See United States v. Spencer, 720 F.3d 363 (D.C.Cir.2013); United States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275 (3d Cir.2012); United States v. Hunt, 673 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir.2012); United States v. Hampton, 633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir.2011). We likewise conclude that his analysis rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language and ignores Congressional intent and the overall statutory framework.

¶22We see no reason to import § 3583(h)’s aggregation requirement into § 3583(e)(3). The “term of supervised release” identified by § 3583(e)(3) is that “authorized by statute for the offense.” (emphasis added). This plainly refers to the underlying criminal offense resulting in conviction. No reference is made to subsection (h) or to any term of supervised release previously imposed.

¶23As the Third Circuit pointed out in rejecting an identical argument, subsection (h) serves different purposes. It expressly authorizes a district court that has revoked supervised release and ordered imprisonment to require additional supervised release after that imprisonment.1Williams, 675 F.3d at 279. Additionally, its aggregation requirement, by acting as a cap on post-revocation supervised release, ensures that a defendant is not at risk for an unlimited cycle of imprisonment and supervised release. See also Hampton, 633 F.3d at 339.

¶24Our plain meaning construction of § 3583(e)(3) is supported by its amendment history. Prior to 1994, § 3583(e)(3) stated, in pertinent pari, that a district court could

revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all' or part of the term of supervised release ... except that a person whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve ... more than 2 years in prison if the offense was a Class C or D felony.

¶2518 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (Supp. V 1993). Revocation was therefore limited by, and could not exceed, the term of supervised release imposed by the original sentencing court.

¶26In 1994, the statute was amended to allow a district court to

revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release____

¶27Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322 § 110505(3), 108 Stat. 1796, 2016-17 (1994) (amendment italicized). Under this version, revocation was no longer limited by the original sentence, but instead by statutory caps. See United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987 (11th Cir.2005), abrogated on other grounds. However, a number of circuits, including the Eleventh, subsequently held that the revocation statutory caps were cumulative limits that allowed credit for time served in previous violations of supervised release. Id.

¶28In 2003, Congress amended § 3583(e)(3) to expressly provide that the statutory caps now apply to each revocation of supervised release. The PROTECT Act added the phrase “on any such revocation” so that it now provides “a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such *1293revocation more than ... 2 years if such offense is a class C or D felony[.]” Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (“PROTECT”) Act, Pub.L. 108-21, § 101, 117 Stat. 650, 651 (April 30, 2003) (amendment italicized).

¶29Nothing in this amendment history supports Cunningham’s arguments. To the contrary, the amendments demonstrate Congress’s intent that (1) subsequent revocations not be dependent on the term of supervised release initially imposed; (2) statutory caps are per-revocation limits not subject to aggregation; and (3) another term of supervised release may be imposed after release following revocation and reimprisonment subject to credit for prior revocation.

¶30In short, § 3583(e)(3) and § 3583(h) operate harmoniously within the overall statutory scheme. While the aggregation requirement of § 3583(h) places an indirect constraint upon the total amount of revocation imprisonment a defendant may receive, it does so by limiting post-imprisonment supervision, not circumscribing the plain language of § 3583(e)(3). We therefore hold, as have each of the circuits that have examined the question, that upon each revocation of supervised release a defendant may be sentenced to the felony class limits contained within § 3583(e)(3) without regard to imprisonment previously served for revocation of supervised release.

¶31IV. Conclusion

¶32We affirm the judgment of the district court revoking Cunningham’s Supervised Release and sentencing him to 24 months’ imprisonment.

¶33AFFIRMED.

/800/f3d/1290 · .json · Public domain