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← 800 SW2D 292 - State v. Sanchez

State v. Sanchez’s Empirical Analysis

1990

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
January 1997
most recently cited

7 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Katz v. United States · Delaware v. Prouse · United States v. Brignoni-Ponce · South Dakota v. Opperman · United States v. Sharpe

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “On the other hand, appellee contends that since a driver's license check was not the sole reason for his detention, his detention is illegal under Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). In Meeks , officers established a roadblock for the purpose of "enforcing all the laws.” In particular, the officers checked for driver's licenses, equipment, overweight vehicles, fugitives, stolen vehicles, sobriety, controlled substances, game violations, and illegal immigrants. The State sought to justify the roadblock under TexRev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6687b, § 13 which states, in pertinent part, that ‘any peace officer may stop and detain any motor vehicle operator for the purpose of determining whether such person has a driver's license as required by this section.' Using an analysis akin to a pretext theory, the court found that article 6687b did not justify the initial stop of Meek's vehicle. The court stated that article 6687b, § 13 does not authorize a detention unless the license check was the sole reason for the stop. That a stopped driver was first asked for his license will not validate the stop under the statute if it is clear the driver's license check was not the reason for the detention. By so interpreting article 6687b, the Meeks Court resolved the legality of the checkpoint on a statutory basis. Since Meeks' 1977 stop, Texas law has changed. Beginning January 1, 1982, Texas law has required every operator, as a condition of driving, to furnish, upon request, evidenc”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “The U.S. Supreme Court does not require the State to present any evidence concerning the effectiveness of a temporary checkpoint. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court never said that the State had to establish guidelines concerning the checkpoint’s time, frequency or location. There is virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists from the brief stops occurring in the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz and the stop involved in this case. The intrusion resulting from the brief stop is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “(d) The prosecuting attorney may not make an appeal under ... this article later than the 15th day after the date on which the order, ruling, or sentence to be appealed is entered by the court ... (i) In this article, “prosecuting attorney” means the county attorney, district attorney, or criminal district attorney who has the primary responsibility of prosecuting cases in the court hearing the case and does not include an assistant prosecuting attorney.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.