¶1concurring in result.
¶2I concur in the result of the Court’s opinion but believe that the time has come for me to address the question of verification in terms different from those upon which I previously joined the Court.
¶3In recent cases this Court has directly addressed the problem of failure to verify a Rule 29.15 motion. In Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990), no motion had been verified. Movant requested leave of this Court to sign and verify the Rule 29.15 motion. In Malone v. State, 798 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Mo. banc 1990), no motion was verified. One month after evidentiary hearing movant requested leave to verify. In both Kilgoreand Malonethis Court held the motions nullities. The facts of the present case are distinguishable. Vinson filed a verified pro se motion. The trial court plainly had jurisdiction over the parties once movant filed his verified pro se motion. The pro se pleading stated a cause of action. The Court had authority to enter a judgment on the pro se motion. Only the amended motion remains unverified. In this regard Vinson’s case ' resembles State v. Oxford, 791 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Mo. banc 1990), where defendant failed to verify the amended motion.
¶4It is proper to address the question of failure of verification of the amended motion in the context of the purposes of the postconviction proceeding. Rule 29.15(d) provides that the movant “shall verify the motion, declaring that he has listed all grounds for relief known to him and acknowledging his understanding that he waives any ground for relief known to him that is not listed in the motion.” Rule 29.15(e) then requires the Court to appoint counsel who is to prepare and file, when necessary to assert sufficient facts or additional grounds, an amended motion. Presumably for purposes identical to those of Rule 29.15(d), the amended motion is also to be verified by movant. Rule 29.15(f). The verification requirement is an essential element of the postconviction motion. Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d at 395. The purpose of Rule 29.15(d) is to “discover and adjudicate all claims for relief in a single proceeding.” Id. The language of Rule 29.15(h) further supports Kilgore’s statement of purpose by prohibiting successive motions.
¶5Related to the purpose of the verification requirement is another of the postconviction rule’s purposes — to accomplish a timely adjudication of claims. The rule serves to avoid delay in the processing of claims and to prevent litigation of stale claims. Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Mo. banc 1989). The limitations of verification and timeliness place an increased responsibility on movant, counsel, and the courts to *450litigate claims promptly. Sloan v. State, 779 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Mo. banc 1989).
¶6In the context of this case and the purposes of Rule 29.15, the question is thus: At what point should a court be deprived of authority to proceed with a Rule 29.15 motion so as not to undermine the purposes of the rule? The answer must be: At such time as all claims for relief could not be discovered and adjudicated in a timely, single proceeding.
¶7So long as a movant does not also seek to add claims to his amended motion, to permit the movant to verify the amended motion at any time prior to hearing offends neither the purpose of the time requirements nor the purpose of the verification requirements. There is no detriment to the state in preparation for hearing and no delay in the proceedings. Such a line of demarcation would continue to serve to prohibit the Court from countenancing any additional claims that movant might seek to raise after filing of the amended motion, during the hearing, or at any time subsequent. If the state should later seek to raise a claim of perjury against movant upon movant’s attempt to file a successive motion, the state’s claim would not have been thwarted.
¶8I would permit a movant the formality of leave to amend to verify a motion at any time prior to hearing so long as movant seeks only to verify and not to raise additional claims. Vinson did not do so, so I would affirm the judgments of the trial courts.
¶9To the extent I joined in this Court’s earlier opinions where the Court may have invoked an underlying premise to support a holding that a trial court lacks “jurisdiction” ever to hear an unverified motion, I confess error. The question does not appear to me now as it did then. Claiming no equivalence of stature to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, I nevertheless take some solace in his words on one occasion: “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600, 69 S.Ct. 290, 293, 93 L.Ed. 259 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
¶10concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶11I agree with the holding that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. I also agree that the proceedings under the pro se 29.15 motion show no basis for relief, given the trial court’s findings and conclusions. But I cannot agree that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the amended 29.15 motion. I would hold, rather, that when the state provides counsel for a postconviction movant, and that counsel fails to procure the movant’s verification on an amended motion which is otherwise timely, the Court may allow the verification to be supplied at a later time.
¶12Proceedings under Rule 29.15 are civil. It is uncommon in civil proceedings to hold that the filing of defective papers deprives the Court of jurisdiction. The usual remedy is to permit defects to be corrected by amendment. The law has been particularly intolerant of those who make no mention of a pleading defect until the trial court has ruled and then seek to disadvantage their opponents by claims of procedural defect. Rule 55.33(b). Nothing in the text of Rule 29.15 indicates that proceedings under that rule are to be treated in a way different from what is usual in civil actions. Such phrases as “a nullity,” or “failed to invoke the circuit court’s jurisdiction” are simply bootstrapping. The Court could perfectly well allow the verification to be supplied when the defect is pointed out. This would allow the state to enjoy all of the real or imagined benefits of verification.
¶13Judge Covington's opinion is fine so far as it goes but I have trouble seeing the delict the movant was guilty of. The state was willing to proceed with the hearing on the basis of the unverified, amended motion. Rather than holding that the proceedings on the amended motion were a nullity, I would offer the movant the opportunity to supply the missing verification.
¶14Some of the opinions on this subject suggest that the verification requirement serves an expediting purpose. I cannot see *451that it expedites the proceedings in any way. There rather will be procedural hassles and a ping-pong match between state and federal courts, if this movant is obliged to pursue other postconvietion remedies. I believe that any diligent judge who comes upon this record will be offended when the state seeks to default a litigant because of a manifest procedural omission by counsel required to be furnished him by the state, to the point of holding that there was cause for the defendant’s procedural default.
¶15I would affirm the judgment of conviction. If the Court were willing to reach the merits of the 29.15 action, I might very probably vote to affirm the judgment in its entirety. But I have not examined the merits of the points based on the amended motion 29.15, and at this point can only dissent from this Court's failure to review the matters raised in the amended motion.
¶16I again express the hope that I have expressed in other cases, that any other judge who has the occasion to deal with this record will resort to the evidentiary hearing, at which the movant, in the amended motion, had the opportunity to present all points which occurred to him or his counsel. I hope that future judges will defer to the supported findings of Judge Romines, so that duplicating hearings are not necessary.