Galas v. McKee’s Empirical Analysis
801 F.2d 200 · 1986
Citation profile
32 federal appellate · 5 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 71 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2022 · most notably Brower v. County of Inyo (1989), Ewolski v. City of Brunswick (2002)
32 federal appellate · 5 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Bell v. Wolfish · Roe v. Wade · Paul v. Davis · Baker v. McCollan
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he reasonableness of a seizure or method of seizure cannot be challenged under the Fourth Amendment unless there was a completed seizure....”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Cameron was not seized by [officer defendants]. Cameron elected to flee, not to be restrained. The officers’ show of authority by firing their weapons, while designed to apprehend Cameron, did not stop or in any way restrain him. “Just as clearly, when the pursuit terminated in an accident [causing the death of] the minor plaintiff, he was not restrained by, or as a result of, the officer’s show of authority.” Cameron’s freedom of movement was restrained only because he killed himself by electing to run onto a heavily traveled, high speed freeway. The use of deadly force standing alone does not constitute a seizure, and absent an actual physical restraint or physical seizure, the alleged unreasonableness of the officers’ conduct cannot serve as a basis for a § 1983 cause of action anchored in the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the reasonableness of the officers’ use of their weapons in attempting to apprehend Cameron cannot be challenged under § 1983.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[W]e conclude that the minimal intrusion on a traffic offender's Fourth Amendment right occasioned by the officer's participation in a high-speed pursuit does not outweigh a longstanding police practice which we consider "essential to a coherent scheme of police powers."”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.