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802 F.2d 1106

Docket No. 85-2502.

Walker v. United States

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted July 14, 1986.*

Decided Oct. 14, 1986.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1986-10-14

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently October 1986

1 federal appellate ·

3 counsel of record

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 10 · 18 U.S.C. § 2314 · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 48 U.S.C. § 644A

Relies on Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. City of Chicago · Walker v. United States · United States v. Fullard-Leo

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Anthony McLeod Kennedy · Decided 1986-10-14

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Earle Partington, Honolulu, Hawaii, for petitioner-appellant.

¶2Elliott Enoki, Asst. U.S. Atty., Honolulu, Hawaii, for respondent-appellee.

¶3Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

¶4Before KENNEDY, FARRIS and HALL, Circuit Judges.

¶6KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:

¶7Appellant Walker was convicted, among other offenses, of the interstate transportation of stolen property from Palmyra Island to the state of Hawaii, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. We affirmed Walker’s conviction in United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 320, 58 L.Ed.2d 325 (1978). Walker was later indicted for murder, and we rejected his attempt to bar trial under the doctrines of double jeopardy and res judicata. United States v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047, 104 S.Ct. 720, 79 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984).

¶8The present appeal is from denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which Walker makes a collateral attack on his earlier conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2314. His contention is that Palmyra Island is not a possession of the United States within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We disagree and affirm the district court’s denial of his petition.

¶9One of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is that the stolen property was transported in “interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 10 defines “interstate commerce” as “commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.” Palmyra Island is a possession of the United States. See 48 U.S.C. § 644a (placing Palmyra and seven other American Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of the District of Hawaii); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947) (recognizing that Palmyra is under United States sovereignty); cf. Yandell v. Trans-ocean Air Lines, 253 F.2d 622, 623 (9th *1107Cir.1957) (describing Wake Island, which is also listed in 48 U.S.C. § 644a, as a United States possession). As a result, Walker’s transportation of a stolen boat from Palmyra to Hawaii falls squarely within the prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. There is no reason to suppose that Congress intended a silent exception in the statute where the transportation is in interstate commerce wholly within the confines of a single judicial district. The jurisdictional lines of the district court are irrelevant for purposes of the interpretation and implementation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 2314.

¶10The denial of the petition by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

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