Chavez-Solis v. Lynch’s Empirical Analysis
803 F.3d 1004 · 2015
Citation profile
10 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2252 · 18 U.S.C. § 2256 · 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (§ 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (§ 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (§ 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Taylor v. United States · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura · United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. · Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez · Descamps v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]he state statute's greater breadth is evident from its text.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he jury instructions for section 211 of the California Penal Code require as an element that the defendant take property from another 'against that person's will.' " (citation omitted) ). II Considering the statutory text discussed above, the majority rightly concludes that, on its face, section 164.395 defines third-degree robbery more broadly than a generic theft offense under the INA. Under our case law, that should have been enough. "Where ... a state statute explicitly defines a crime more broadly than the generic definition, no 'legal imagination' is required to hold that a realistic probability exists that the state will apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of the crime.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]o find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute's language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.