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804 F.3d 198

Docket No. 14-3404-cv.

Cadle Co. v. Fletcher

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued: Sept. 25, 2015.

Decided: Oct. 14, 2015.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 2015-10-14

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently February 2017

1 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[e]xecution may be granted pursuant to this section against any debts due from any financial institution to a judgment debtor who is a natural person, except to the extent such debts are protected from execution by ... section 52-361a,”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cadle Co. v. Fletcher

“Do [General Statutes] §§ 52-361a and 52-367b, read together, exempt [postgarnishment] residual wages held in a third party's bank account from further execution, so that they become freely transferable under [CUFTA] ... ?”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cadle Co. v. Fletcher

Applies CT 51 § 51-199b

Relies on State v. Donald Young · In re Darlene C. · Wiseman v. Armstrong

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 2015-10-14

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*199Paul N. Gilmore, Updike, Kelly & Spel-lacy, P.C., Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.

¶2John W. Larson (Nicholas J. Harding, on the brief), Reid & Riege, P.C., Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellants.

¶3Before: CABRANES and POOLER, Circuit Judges, and GARDEPHE, District Judge.*

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6This appeal presents an unsettled question of Connecticut law regarding the interpretation of Conn. GemStat. §§ 52-361a and 52-367b1 — specifically, whether those sections exempt a judgment debtor’s post-garnishment, residual wages held in a third party’s bank account from further execu*200tion, so that they are freely transferable under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-552a et seq. We believe it is more appropriate for the Connecticut Supreme Court to address this matter in the first instance, because it is in a better position than this Court to determine how to interpret these sections in light of Connecticut’s overall statutory scheme. Accordingly, we CERTIFY this question to the Connecticut Supreme Court.

¶7BACKGROUND

¶8Plaintiff-Appellee The Cadle Co. (“Ca-dle”) is a judgment creditor of Defendant-Appellant Terry B. Fletcher (“Fletcher”) with respect to two state court judgments amounting to more than $8 million, which remain unsatisfied. The parties have stipulated that since at least 2005, Fletcher has transferred to his wife, Defendanfi-Appellant Marguerite Fletcher, more than $800,000 by depositing, or causing her to deposit, his wages into her bank account. During part of this period, Cadle and another judgment creditor garnished Fletcher’s wages.

¶9In 2011, Cadle sued the Fletchers in the District Court to recover those transfers, bringing three claims under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“CUFTA”), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-552a et seq.2(Cadle also brought an alternative *201equitable claim, not at issue here.) Both parties moved for partial summary judgment, and the District Court granted partial summary judgment for Cadle on one of its claims. The Fletchers appealed. The District Court subsequently entered final judgment after dismissing Cadle’s equitable claim as moot and dismissing its remaining claims without prejudice.

¶10DISCUSSION

¶11I. Exemption of Post-Garnishment Residual Wages

¶12This case presents a question of Connecticut law that no appellate court has answered: whether Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 52-361a and 52-367b, read together, exempt post-garnishment residual wages held in a third party’s bank account from further execution, so that they become freely transferable under CUFTA.-

¶13The District Court answered that question in the negative. Although its well-reasoned opinion accords with an earlier District of Connecticut decision3 and one Superior Court opinion,4 the weight of state authority — including two Superior Court cases,5 an opinion of the state Attorney General,6 and a Judicial Branch form7 —has adopted the contrary view.

¶14*202II. Certification

¶15We are permitted to certify a question to the Supreme Court of Connecticut “if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and if there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or statute of this state.” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 51 — 199b(d); see also 2d Cir. Local R. 27.2(a). “We have long recognized that state courts should be accorded the first opportunity to decide significant issues of state law through the certification process, and that, especially where the issues implicate the weighing of policy concerns, principles of comity and federalism strongly support certification.” Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir.2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶16Certification is appropriate here for three reasons. First, this question is determinative of the pending appeal, and no prior case is controlling. Second, the divergence between federal and state interpretation counsels in favor of certification. Third, postjudgment execution is a deeply sensitive policy matter for Connecticut, whose legislature recently revised § 52-367b. We believe it is more appropriate for the Connecticut Supreme Court to address this matter in the first instance because it is in a better position than this Court to determine how to interpret these sections in light of Connecticut’s overall statutory scheme.

¶17CONCLUSION

¶18For the foregoing reasons and pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 51-199b and Local Rule 27.2 of this Court, we respectfully CERTIFY to the Connecticut Supreme Court the following question:

¶19“Do Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 52-361a and 52-367b, read together, exempt post-garnishment residual wages held in a third party’s bank account from further execution, so that they become freely transferable under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-552a et seq.r

¶20“The Connecticut Supreme Court may modify [this] question[ ] as it sees fit and, should it choose, may direct the parties to address other questions it deems relevant.” Munn, 795 F.3d at 337.

¶21It is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court transmit to the Clerk of the Connecticut Supreme Court a copy of this opinion as our certificate, together with a complete set of the briefs, the appendix, and the record filed in this Court by the parties. The parties shall bear equally all fees and costs that may be imposed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in connection with this certification. This panel retains jurisdiction over this case and will resume its consideration of this appeal after the disposition of this certification by the Connecticut Supreme Court.

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