¶1dissenting:
¶2I must respectfully dissent to the court’s decision in this case. The court states “[i]n the case before us the appellant had neither actual nor constructive notice that Edwards would introduce statements of the child victim”. In fact, a review of the transcript of preliminary hearing reveals the defense was on constructive notice as has been previously approved in Matter of W.D., 709 P.2d 1037 (Okl.1985). The transcript included the child’s testimony of what had happened. There was also testimony by Cynthia Sullivan, who relayed what had happened to the child. The child told Ms. Sullivan, who then told Ms. Edwards. The testimony given is not substantially different or lacking in any part as compared to the testimony by Ms. Edwards at trial.
¶3The defense was on notice as a result of the preliminary hearing testimony. In addition, the defense was put on notice that Ms. Edwards would testify. Under the Matter of W.D., 709 P.2d at 1043, having actual possession of the content of the statements through the preliminary hearing testimony, Appellant clearly was not prejudiced by the alleged failure of the State to provide the statutory notice, which in this case would have been redundant. This is analogous to our treatment of the notice requirements pursuant to Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771 (Okl.Cr.1979), regarding evidencé of other crimes. See Drew v. State, 771 P.2d 224, 229 (Okl.Cr.1989). In this case the element of surprise is not present and the purpose behind the notice requirement is not served. The preliminary hearing evidence put Appellant on constructive notice that Edward’s testimony would be introduced at trial. See also *684Pickens v. State, 751 P.2d 742, 743 (Okl.Cr.1988).
¶4I must therefore dissent.