Crossman v. Marcoccio’s Empirical Analysis
806 F.2d 329 · 1986
Citation profile
31 federal appellate · 6 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 57 later decisions — most recently January 2020 · most notably Spencer v. General Electric Co. (1990), In re Two Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation (1993)
31 federal appellate · 6 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1920 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Relies on Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · Hughes v. Rowe · Marek v. Chesny · Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August · Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“distorts the law governing the relationship between Rule 68 and [the substantive statute] by ignoring the two crucial words that serve to qualify the holding of the Marek case. Marek states that “the term ‘costs’ in Rule 68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority.” ... The Court stresses the importance of the two emphasized words by repeating them in the next sentence of the opinion: “In other words, all costs properly awardable in an action are to be considered within the scope of Rule 68 ‘costs.’ ””
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“although the district court normally has discretion under Rule 54(d) as to whether to award costs to the prevailing party, where a Rule 68 offer is made and the judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff is not more favorable than the offer, he must pay the costs incurred after the asking of the offer____ Having made a Rule 68 offer identical to the judgment ultimately entered, the state is entitled to the costs incurred after the making of the offer.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[ejssential to the Court’s holding was its determination that the term “costs” in Rule 68 encompasses “all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority.” Marek, [ 473 U.S. at 9 , 105 S.Ct. 3012 ], The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs,” so the Court ruled that “such fees are subject to the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68.” Marek, [ 473 U.S. at 8 , 105 S.Ct. 3012 ], The Marek Court, however, did not reach the precise issue before us today because the defendants in that case failed to appeal the portion of the district court’s order denying their request for post-offer attorney’s fees. Id. at 4, n. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 3012 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.