Ramos v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Warhawk v. State · Rands v. State

2. “words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ramos v. Shillinger · Wells v. State

3. “Appellant contends that the elements of an attempt and second-degree murder are mutually exelusive and/or logically impossible, because an attempt requires that one act with a specific intent, while second-degree murder only requires that one act with a general intent.... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-801 states, in pertinent part: (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if; (i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission of the erime. A "substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the commission of the crime{.] According to Wyo. Stat, Ann. § 6-2-104, "[wlhoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second degree...." - Appellant's claimed "logical impossibility" arises from the "intent" elements of these respective statutes. In the past, crimes have commonly been categorized by whether they require a "specific intent" or a "general intent." For many years, Wyoming had several pattern jury instructions defining and explaining the two terms, and yet, the differences between the concepts were not always readily discernible. Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particul”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bloomfield v. State · Brian J. Noel v. The State of Wyoming