Auvil v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"As demonstrated, four of these eight post- Gray cases according a nonsignatory agent the right to compel arbitration either rely or may rely on express inclusive language in the arbitration agreements; the other four rely entirely on the rule in Ex parte Gray, which relies on [ Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.] McNeal, [ 143 Ga.App. 579 , 239 S.E.2d 401 (1977)], the 1977 Georgia Court of Appeals decision, which premised its rationale on the nonsignatory agent's status as a joint tortfeasor with a signatory and on the signatory's success in compelling arbitration. The rationale of McNeal, supra, and Ex parte Gray, supra , and their progeny — Ex parte Isbell, [ 708 So.2d 571 (Ala.1997),] Georgia Power [Co. v. Partin, 727 So.2d 2 (Ala.1998),], McDougle [v. Silvernell, 738 So.2d 806 (Ala.1999),] and Ex parte Rush [, 730 So.2d 1175 (Ala.1999),] is essentially a part of the doctrine of equitable estoppel intertwining, which has been developed and refined by Ex parte Isbell, supra ; Ex parte Dyess, 709 So.2d 447 (Ala.1997); Ex parte Napier, [ 723 So.2d 49 (Ala.1998)]; First Family Financial Services, Inc. v. Rogers, 736 So.2d 553 (Ala.1999); and Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Kennedy, 774 So.2d 540 (Ala.2000). Thus the holding in Ex parte Gray is subject to the restrictions imposed by the intertwining cases. "In First Family Financial Services, this Court held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel intertwining `is not applicable in cases such as this one, where the arbitr”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 895 So. 2d 882 - Brown v. Denson

2. “"As we will explain, we conclude that the denial of Auvil's motion to compel arbitration was valid for the first reason cited by the trial court: that Amy's [the wife's] not signing the arbitration agreement precludes Auvil from compelling her to arbitrate her claims. As we will further explain, we further conclude that the denial of Auvil's motion to compel arbitration was valid for a reason not cited by the trial court but fully supported by the materials considered by the trial court: that Auvil, as a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement, was without standing to enforce it under the circumstances of this case."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 895 So. 2d 882 - Brown v. Denson

3. “We hold that the application did not incorporate by reference the form containing the arbitration agreement previously signed by Duane [the husband] and that the arbitration agreement does not bind Amy [the wife], who did not sign the document containing it and who does not base her claims or her damages on that document. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Auvil's motion to compel Amy to arbitrate her claims.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 895 So. 2d 882 - Brown v. Denson