807 F. Supp. 765 - Resolution Trust Corp. v. Youngblood’s Empirical Analysis
1992
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 12 U.S.C. § 1821 · 28 U.S.C. § 2680
Relies on D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance · California State Board of Equalization v. Western Marina Corp. · Baskett v. United States · ITT Continental Baking Co. v. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. · Gunter v. Hutcheson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In cases of the failure of a [bank], it is important to the public that the receiver rapidly and efficiently convert the assets of that institution to cash to repay the losses incurred by the insurance fund and the depositors for deposits not covered. Suits by the [corporations] as a receiver to recover assets, or to recover damages for wrongdoing, should not be encumbered by an examination in court of the correctness of any specific act of the [corporation] in its receivership. The rule that there is no duty owed to the institution or wrongdoers by the [corporation]/Receiver is simply a means of expressing the broad public policy that the banking laws creating the [corporation] and prescribing its duties are directed to the public good.... If there is no wrongdoing by the officer or director, there can be no liability, but if wrongdoing is established, the officer or director should not be allowed to set up as a defense a claim that would permit the detailed examination of the [corporation’s] actions.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“In light of the unambiguous language mandating the exhaustion requirement and in light of Congress’ express fear that the costs of litigation would exacerbate an already catastrophic situation, it is patently clear that the jurisdictional bar of section 1821(d)(13)(D) reaches all claims seeking payment from the assets of the affected institution, all claims seeking satisfaction from those assets, and all claims relating to any act or omission of either the institution or the receiver regardless of whether the action is framed as a claim, counterclaim, or affirmative defense. Therefore, we find that the various counterclaims and affirmative defenses asserted by the defendants in this case are “claims” subject to the exhaustion requirement mandated by FIRREA because they seek a determination of rights with respect to the assets of [the failed institution] and they relate to acts of both the institution and the receiver.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“under the 'no-duty' rule, the RTC's conduct is not on trial, whether under the label of proximate cause or affirmative defense.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.