¶2The appellant, Mickey Wayne Burnett, was convicted of three counts of vehicular homicide, violations of § 32-5A-192, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison on each count, but split the sentences and ordered him to serve consecutive terms of one year in prison followed by four years on probation on each count. It further ordered that, as a condition of his probation, he could not drive at any time for any reason. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by operation of law. This appeal followed. *575
¶3Section 13A-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, specifically defines four states of mental culpability: "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "criminal negligence." Although the Alabama Criminal Code does not define "unlawfully" as that term is used in § 32-5A-192, "it seems apparent that those who helped to draft the Alabama Criminal Code were aware of the problems caused when statutes set out a culpable mental state and express it in different words." Ex parte Harper, 594 So.2d 1181,1189 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 330,121 L.Ed.2d 248 (1992). The commentary to § 13A-2-2 points out that the drafters of the Criminal Code recognized states of mental culpability other than those defined in that section:
¶4 "It would be impossible to review, much less reconcile and make clear and uniform, the myriad of Alabama statutes and cases that have employed or discussed some term of mental culpability. Such mental terms and concepts, while necessarily difficult to articulate, sometimes have been vaguely or only partly defined, or otherwise seem imprecise or inconclusive, unclear or ambiguous, even confusing or contradictory, or overrefined with technical, obscure and often subtle, if not dubious, distinctions. These adverbial terms include, e.g.: `intentionally,' `willfully,' `purposely,' `designedly,' `knowingly,' `deliberately,' `maliciously,' `with premeditation,' `recklessly,' `negligently,' `with culpable negligence,' `with gross negligence,' `with criminal negligence,' `without due caution,' `wickedly,' `unlawfully,' `wrongfully' and scores of others."
¶5(Emphasis added.) Based upon this commentary, we conclude that, although "unlawfully" is not one of the terms specifically defined in §13A-2-2, the legislature intended for that term to be recognized as a state of mental culpability when used in a statute defining a criminal offense.
¶6Because the Criminal Code does not define "unlawfully," we must determine where that term falls on the continuum of mental culpability in relation to those terms that are specifically defined in § 13A-2-2. First, we note that "unlawfully" does not convey the same meaning as "intentionally" because the term "unintentionally" is used in §32-5A-192. Second, the Alabama Supreme Court has already determined that "unlawfully" cannot be equated with the culpable mental state of "knowingly" defined in § 13A-2-2. Ex parte Harper, 594 So.2d at 1190-91. Finally, in Ex parte Long, 600 So.2d 982 (Ala. 1992), the Alabama Supreme Court "reinterpret[ed] the relative degrees of culpability of vehicular homicide and criminally negligent homicide," stating that vehicular homicide "will ordinarily be a more culpable offense than criminally negligent homicide." 600 So.2d at 987. Therefore, the culpable mental state of "unlawfully" must fall on the continuum of culpability somewhere between "knowingly" and "criminal negligence."
¶7We must now attempt to discern the meaning of the term "unlawfully" as it appears in § 32-5A-192. Under the "plain meaning" theory of statutory construction, we must accord a term its common and *576 ordinary meaning when that term is not defined in the Code.
R. T. M. v. State, 677 So.2d 801, 803-04 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995).¶8 "When the plain meaning of a statute can be gleaned from its words, it should be so construed. It is well accepted that this court, in interpreting a statute, `will give words used in a statute their "natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning."' Ex parte Etowah County Board ofEducation, 584 So.2d 528, 530 (Ala. 1991); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins.Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So.2d 1219 (Ala. 1984); Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 293 So.2d 830 (Ala. 1974)."
¶9Black's Law Dictionary 1536 (6th ed. 1990) defines the term "unlawful" as follows:
¶10 "That which is contrary to, prohibited, or unauthorized by law. That which is not lawful. The acting contrary to, or in defiance of the law; disobeying or disregarding the law. Term is equivalent to `without excuse orjustification.'"
¶11(Emphasis added.) Consistent with this definition, early caselaw recognized that "unlawful" means without legal excuse or justification.SeeWilliams v. State, 27 Ala. App. 504, 175 So. 335 (1937); Randle v.Payne, 39 Ala. App. 652, 107 So.2d 907 (1958) (Cates, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 268 Ala. 697, 107 So.2d 913 (Ala. 1959); Tatum v. State,66 Ala. 465 (1880). Based on these definitions, we conclude that the term "unlawfully," as it is used in § 32-5A-192, means "without legal excuse or justification." Therefore, a person commits the offense of vehicular homicide when he or she, acting unintentionally and without legal excuse or justification, proximately causes the death of another individual while violating regulatory laws governing the operation of automobiles and traffic control.
¶12For these reasons, we conclude that the term "unlawfully," as it is used in § 32-5A-192, describes the culpable mental state required for vehicular homicide. Therefore, the appellant's argument is without merit.
¶14To prove the corpus delicti of a homicide, the State must establish the death of the victim named in the indictment and that the death was caused by the defendant. SeePotter v. State661 So.2d 255, 259 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); Scanland v. State, 473 So.2d 1182 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied,474 U.S. 1035, 106 S.Ct. 602, 88 L.Ed.2d 581 (1985). "[A] homicide victim's identity can be established by circumstantial evidence. Toddv. State, 472 So.2d 707 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985); Dolvin v. State, 391 So.2d 666 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), aff'd, 391 So.2d 677 (Ala. 1980)." Bui v. State,551 So.2d 1094, 1099 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988). Finally,
Hollis v. State, 399 So.2d 935, 938 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981).¶15 "[e]xpert testimony . . . is not always necessary to establish the cause of death. Dismukes v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 346 So.2d 1170, reversed on rehearing, 346 So.2d 1170, cert. den. 346 So.2d 1177 (1977). The question whether, under all the circumstances, death was the result of the defendant's assault on the deceased, is one of fact for the jury. Dismukes, supra; Gurley v. State, *57736 Ala. App. 606, 61 So.2d 137 (1952); Hall v. State, 34 Ala. App. 246, 38 So.2d 612 (1949). If there is any proof, direct or circumstantial, to establish the corpus delicti, the issue is one of fact for the jury and not one of law for the court. McCall v. State, 262 Ala. 414, 79 So.2d 51 (1955); McDonald v. State, 56 Ala. App. 147, 320 So.2d 80 (1975); Cook v. State, 43 Ala. App. 304, 189 So.2d 595 (1966)."
¶16In this case, the indictment charged the appellant with vehicular homicide in connection with the deaths of Lisa Williams Lewis, Marissa Lewis, and Nicholas Lewis. The evidence showed that Lisa Williams Lewis was driving south on Highway 195 in Winston County when her Chevrolet Beretta automobile was struck by a Chevrolet Corvette automobile driven by the appellant. Nicholas Lewis, Marissa Lewis, and Victoria Gravitt were passengers in the Beretta. Officer Tommy Elliott and State Trooper Mark McCormick testified that Lisa Williams Lewis and Marissa Lewis were dead when they arrived at the scene. Elliott, a certified emergency medical technician, performed CPR on Nicholas Lewis at the scene until an ambulance arrived to take him to the hospital. Elliott testified that, after he placed Lisa Williams Lewis and Marissa Lewis in the hearse and secured the scene of the accident, he went to the hospital and learned that Nicholas Lewis was dead when the ambulance arrived at the hospital.
¶17McCormick, who had experience investigating traffic homicides, testified that, based on his observations of the skid marks at the scene, he concluded that the appellant's vehicle ran off of the roadway, reentered the highway, and started spinning. It spun into the southbound lane and hit the Beretta Lisa Williams Lewis was driving. According to McCormick, at the point of impact, the appellant "was nearly sideways in the southbound lane, traveling north in the southbound lane." (R. 73.) He also estimated that the appellant was traveling at a speed of at least 63 mph and that Lewis was traveling at a speed of 55 mph when the accident occurred. (R. 61-62.)
¶18Based on the above-referenced testimony, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that the victims named in the indictment were dead and that the collision with the appellant's vehicle caused their deaths. Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit.
¶20 "[Defense counsel]: I object. I don't think there is sufficient evidence for this test as to the reliability of it, common use of it.
¶21"The Court: Do you want to qualify him any further?
¶22"[Prosecutor]: Yes."
¶23(R. 56.) The prosecutor then elicited further testimony to show the reliability of the test. When the prosecutor again questioned McCormick about the results of the test, the appellant did not *578 renew his objection. Accordingly, the appellant did not obtain an adverse ruling from which to appeal. Therefore, he did not properly preserve the issue of the reliability of the "drag-sled test" for our review. SeeWright v. State, 740 So.2d 1147 (Ala.Cr.App. 1999).
¶24The appellant also challenges the relevance of the "drag-sled test." However, he raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Therefore, it is not properly before this court. SeeFinch v. State, 715 So.2d 906 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997).
¶26For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶27AFFIRMED.
¶28LONG, P.J., concurs; McMILLAN, J., concurs in the result; COBB and FRY, JJ., dissent.
¶30I concur in the result reached in the main opinion. I do not believe that the statute defining the offense of vehicular homicide is unconstitutional because there is no requirement of a culpable mental state. However, I do not believe that the mere inclusion of the word "unlawfully" in the statute supplies the requisite mental state. I believe that the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Long, 600 So.2d 982 (Ala. 1992), and in Ex parte Jordan, 486 So.2d 485 (Ala. 1986), was correct in determining where the culpability necessary for a finding of vehicular homicide lies within the range of homicide statutes in Alabama; specifically, that it is less than criminal recklessness as in manslaughter, but more than criminal negligence as in criminally negligent homicide. Moreover, the court in Ex parte Long, citing Ex parteJordan, supra, determined that "`the range of statutes and ordinances that might support a conviction of vehicular homicide includes offenses that are more culpable than criminal negligence, such as §32-5A-191, driving under the influence of alcohol as in Jordan, or §32-5A-190, reckless driving, as the jury could have found [in Long.]'" Exparte Long, supra, at 987.
¶31I believe the Alabama Legislature intended to designate vehicular homicide as a Class C felony because it never involves merely simple negligence. Rather, a factual situation that would support a charge of vehicular homicide requires not only "criminal negligence," but also that the negligent or reckless act forming the basis of the offense must be illegal and must occur when the perpetrator is operating a vehicle or a vessel, either of which is a potentially deadly weapon. Most importantly, this negligent or reckless and illegal act committed under circumstances involving a potentially deadly weapon must be the proximate cause of the death. While the illegal act might be one of strict liability, the acts prohibited by the statute were necessarily so designated because their prohibition is vital to the public safety. Anyone operating a vehicle or a vessel is absolutely required to know and to be aware of these laws, and proof of intent is particularly difficult when applied to these laws. Furthermore, it is doubtless that a vehicle or vessel is a potentially *579 deadly weapon and requires a greater standard of care in its operation.
¶32A necessary element of this offense is that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the victim's death, and this element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the State. Thus, where the victim's actions were the cause of the death a defendant cannot be found not guilty of this offense. This causation is a factual matter to be determined by the jury after the State has submitted sufficient evidence to place the issue before the jury.
¶33The defendant's unintentional conduct falls somewhere between recklessness and criminal negligence, depending on the exact unlawful act committed. However, it should be noted that, in Alabama, "criminal negligence" has been held to require more culpability than "simple negligence." The commentary to § 13A-6-4, Ala. Code 1975, states the following concerning the degree of culpability required for "criminal negligence:"
¶34 "Under § 13A-6-4(a)(1), `criminal negligence' means more than the negligence sufficient to establish tort liability. Several pertinent statements in the commentary to § 13A-2-2 are worth repeating:
¶35 "`"Recklessly" (subdivision 3) and "criminal negligence" (subdivision 4) are more difficult. A common denominator in both is that in each instance the underlying conduct must involve a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that a result or circumstance described in the penal statute will occur or exists. The reckless offender is aware of the risk and "consciously disregards" it. On the other hand, the criminally negligent offender is not aware of the risk created ("fails to perceive") and, therefore, cannot be guilty of consciously disregarding it. Thus, his culpability, though less than that of the reckless offender, is greater than that required for ordinary tort, or civil, negligence. The "substantial and unjustifiable" character of the risk involved and the requirement of "gross deviation" from the ordinary standard of care further distinguished the criminal from the mere tortfeasor.'
¶36 "Insistence that criminal negligence be of a higher degree than is required for civil liability is consistent with the generally accepted view. See, e.g., United Statesv. Pardee, 368 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1966) (manslaughter by negligence is not made out by proof of ordinary simple negligence that would constitute civil liability. `The amount or degree or character of the negligence to be proven in a criminal case is gross negligence, to be determined on the consideration of all the facts of the particular case, and the existence of such gross negligence must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt'). Commonwealthv. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944); State v.Blankenship, 50 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. 1948); Bell v.Commonwealth, 195 S.E. 675 (Va. 1938); Annotation, 161 A.L.R. 10 (1946); Wechsler Michael, A Rationale ofthe Law of Homicide, 37 Col.L.Rev. 701, 720-722 (1937); Working papers, Study Draft of a new Federal Criminal Code, Vol. 1, pp. 125-128.
¶37 "The term `negligently,' as defined by the Model Penal Code, requires significantly more than ordinary tort negligence. . . .
¶38"`. . . .
¶39 "The Proposed Revision Texas Penal Code takes a similar position:
¶40 "`Criminal negligence requires more culpability than the present law's (simple) negligence. It is akin to the gross negligence of tort law, *580 and requires a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, the failure to perceive which constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would exercise. The fact-finder must view the circumstances from the actor's standpoint, but the standard of care is objective, that of the ordinary man. . . . The risk of death must be both substantial and unjustifiable to constitute criminal negligence, however, and not merely "apparent," . . . as under present law. . . .'
¶41Committee Comment, § 19.04."
¶42The Legislature has mandated that only when criminal negligence is aggravated does the behavior properly constitute a Class C felony mandating that level of punishment. Thus, a criminally negligent homicide under § 13A-6-4(c) is a Class A misdemeanor, unless it is aggravated by a concomitant violation of § 32-5A-191, i.e., it is a criminally negligent homicide caused by driving a motor vehicle while under the influence. In that case, the homicide properly and constitutionally becomes a Class C felony. § 13A-6-4(c). In the case of vehicular homicide, when the criminal negligence is aggravated by the commission of an illegal act while operating a vehicle or a vessel that causes the death, the act properly and constitutionally becomes a Class C felony.
¶43For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result.