808 So. 2d 71 - Ritchie v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Ordinarily, a prior act of sexual abuse would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b). However, in this case, the alleged prior bad act was offered for the specific purpose of proving motive. "`"Motive is defined as `an inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to do or commit the crime charged.' Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 11 , 65 So. 972, 977 (1914). Motive has been described as `that state of mind which works to "supply the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent."' [Charles Gamble, Character Evidence: A Comprehensive Approach 42 (1987).] "`"Furthermore, testimony offered for the purpose of showing motive is always admissible. McClendon v. State, 243 Ala. 218 , 8 So.2d 883 (1942). Accord, Donahoo v. State, 505 So.2d 1067 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). `"It is permissible in every criminal case to show that there was an influence, an inducement, operating on the accused, which may have led or tempted him to commit the offense." McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154 [(1878)].' Nickerson v. State, 205 Ala. 684, 685 , 88 So. 905, 907 (1921)."' " Hatcher v. State, 646 So.2d 676, 679 (Ala.1994) (emphasis added). "In determining whether evidence concerning a collateral act of sexual abuse is admissible to prove motive, we must consider the following factors: `"(1) the offense(s) charged; (2) the circumstances surrounding the offense(s) charged and the collateral offense(s); (3) the other collateral evidence offered at trial, and (4) the other purpose(s) for”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 974 So. 2d 1034 - Bedsole v. State

2. “"Although the victims in the present case were males and the victims of the prior acts were females, the acts of abuse shared many similarities. All of the victims were between eight and ten years of age. Furthermore, all of the victims testified that they were in a living room when the appellant touched them. K.D.J., J.S.S., and Z.A.S. testified that the appellant touched their genital areas, and K.D.J. and J.S.S. testified that there were other people in the same room watching television when the appellant touched them. Additionally, at the time of the offense, L.B.W., like J.S.S. and Z.A.S., lived in the same trailer park as the appellant and was at the appellant's trailer playing with his sons when the abuse occurred. Finally, L.B.W., J.S.S., and Z.A.S. all testified that they were sitting in the appellant's lap at the time the appellant touched them. Even though the prior acts of abuse were not identical to the acts of abuse in the present case, they were sufficiently similar to show that the appellant's motive for sexually abusing J.S.S. and Z.A.S. was his unnatural desire for young children. See Ex parte Register, 680 So.2d 225 (Ala.1994); Estes [v. State, 776 So.2d 206 (Ala.Crim. App.1999)]; Atkisson v. State, 640 So.2d 33 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). Therefore, the appellant's argument is without merit."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 974 So. 2d 1034 - Bedsole v. State