Hames v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1991
Citation profile
16 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently December 2015
16 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on McClenahan v. Cooley · Hudson v. Gaitan · Ward v. University of the South · 32 Tenn. App. 648 - J. Avery Bryan, Inc. v. Hubbard · Sanders v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“... As to proximate causation, it appears that the proximate cause of the death was the bolt of lightning, as opposed to anything that the State may or may not have done. While the argument can be made that the absence of lightning proof shelters and warning devices was to some extent responsible for the death, the rule is that where two distinct causes, unrelated in operation, one of them being the “direct cause” and the other furnishing the condition by which the injury was made possible, the former alone is to be regarded as the proximate cause of the result. Ward v. University of the South, 209 Tenn. 412 , 354 S.W.2d 246, 251 (1962). Even assuming that the failure to provide shelters or utilize warning devices was negligence, such failure merely furnished the condition by which lightning could strike the decedent.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the State negligently created or maintained a dangerous condition ... and further that foreseeability of the risks and notice had been given to proper State officials at a time sufficiently prior to' the injury to enable appropriate remedial measures. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C). The statute itself provides that the State’s liability is to be predicated, upon “traditional tort.concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent per- - son’s standard of care.” T.C.A. § 9-8-307(e). For purposes of determining lia bility under the statute, the State is to be treated as a private individual. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(3), (d). Thus, for the purposes of deciding the State’s liability after removal of immunity, the statute codifies the common law obligation of owners and occupiers of land. Sanders v. State, 783 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tenn.[Ct.]App.l989). We note that any discussion of “negligently created or maintained conditions,” “reasonable care,” and “foreseeability of risks” inescapably involves traditional principles of negligence law generally, these being: (1) a duty of care owed by the Defen- . dant to the Plaintiff; (2) conduct falling below the applicable standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause. See McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn.1991).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Any misadventure or casualty is said to be caused by the act of God when it appears by the direct, immediate, and exclusive operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled or uninfluenced by the power of man and without human intervention.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.