Redd v. Sowders’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 federal appellate · 3 district · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.' . . . The failure of a defendant to assert his right to a speedy trial, however, does not demonstrate that there was no constitutional violation. . . . However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 'the failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.' . . . The timeliness, vigor and frequency with which the right to a speedy trial is asserted *Page 1316 are probative indications of whether a defendant was denied needed access to a speedy trial over his objection.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Holland v. State · 809 So. 2d 841 - Apicella v. State

2. “A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest wi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 431 Pa. Super. 100 - Commonwealth v. DeBlase

3. “[Pretrial delay] often means loss of job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness.... The time spent in jail is simply dead time.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Hakeem v. Beyer