Milano v. Bowen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) That there is new, noncumulative evidence; (2) That the evidence is material; and (3) That there is good cause for failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 373 F. Supp. 2d 1258 - White v. Barnhart · Hyde v. Bowen

2. “We have previously recognized that good cause for failing to present evidence may exist where the evidence did not exist at the time of the administrative proceeding. See Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1192 . Here, however, the evidence was available at the administrative proceeding; it simply was not considered by the Appeals Council because it was not timely filed. We nonetheless conclude that a filing that was mailed one day after the extended time period, such as that involved in this case, satisfies the good cause requirement of § 405(g). First, the procedural default is de minimus. Ample time remained for the Appeals Council to consider and act upon the evidence which Milano had submitted. No administrative delay could possibly have resulted from Milano’s action. Second, we believe that the good cause requirement reflects a congressional determination to prevent the bad faith manipulation of the administrative process. The requirement was designed to prevent claimants from attempting to withhold evidence “with the idea of ‘obtaining another bite of the apple’ if the Secretary decides that the claimant is not disabled.” Szubak v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 745 F.2d 831, 834 (3rd Cir.1984) (citation omitted). The good cause requirement was designed to avoid the danger of “encouraging claimants to seek after-acquired evidence, and then use such evidence as an unsanctioned ‘backdoor’ means of appeal.” Id. Milano’s de minimus procedural default does not reflect any bad fai”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 373 F. Supp. 2d 1258 - White v. Barnhart

3. “The binding precedent of Cherry, 760 F.2d 1186 , mandates this conclusion. In Cherry , the claimant complained of nerves, headaches and kidney problems. The ALJ determined that, despite her exertional impairments, Cherry was capable of performing unskilled sedentary work and, thus, that she was not disabled. While Cherry’s appeal from that decision was pending before the district court, she presented new evidence to the district court and the Appeals Council consisting of a medical report and answers to interrogatories which established that she suffered from significant psychological disorders. We recognized that this report constituted new evidence, as it was the product of the only comprehensive psychological evaluation of Cherry’s mental condition. We further determined that, because this new evidence suggested the existence of non-exertional impairments, it constituted material new evidence and gave rise to a reasonable possibility that the administrative outcome would be changed. Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1193 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 373 F. Supp. 2d 1258 - White v. Barnhart