809 So. 2d 1261 - State v. Reed’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Although the jurisprudence supports the proposition that specific intent can be inferred from the fact that the victim was shot at close range, that jurisprudence relies on the support of other circumstances indicating specific intent. “The jury should not be permitted to believe that just because someone is killed, the law regards it as a reasonable inference that someone intended to harm him.” State v. Davis, 411 So.2d 2, 6 (La.1982).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Carmouche · 69 So. 3d 1240 - State v. Trahan

2. “A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 976 So. 2d 268 - State v. Coleman · 856 So. 2d 166 - State v. Chesson

3. “In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that an unambiguous and clear assertion of the right to remain silent was necessary to trigger the rule that interrogation must cease upon invocation of the right. In Robertson, 712 So.2d 8 , the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent when he told the officers that he had nothing to say about the murders. Robertson never said he did not want to speak to the police at all, only that he had nothing to say. The supreme court noted: The fact defendant continued to speak to police reflected an intent to continue the exchange, thus giving effect to the "fundamental purpose of ... Miranda," which was to "assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process." Id. at 31 , citing, State v. Green, 94-887 (La.5/22/95); 655 So.2d at 280, n. 8 [quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 , 107 S.Ct. 828, 831 , 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) ]. Accordingly, we find Defendant did not specifically invoke the right to remain silent and that he voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to remain silent under the circumstances. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress the statement. This assignment is without merit.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 856 So. 2d 166 - State v. Chesson