State v. Elliot’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Criminal intent may be specific or general. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. LSA-R.S. 14:10(1). Proof of specific intent is required where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence. State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306, 309 (La.1982)(determining LSA-R.S. 14:34.1, second degree battery, to be a specific intent crime). The statutory definition of battery of a correctional facility employee does not include the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence. General intent requires a showing that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. LSA-R.S. 14:10(2); [ State v.] Howard, [94-0023 (La.06/03/94),] 638 So.2d [216,] at 217. In general intent crimes, criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts which would have been declared criminal. Howard, 638 So.2d at 217. The criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction for battery of a correctional facility employee is shown by the very doing of the acts which have been declared criminal in the definition of the crime.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Fowler · 945 So. 2d 865 - State v. Francois

2. “(A)(1) Battery of a correctional facility employee is a battery committed without the consent of the victim when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a correctional facility employee acting in the performance of his duty. (2) For purposes of this Section, "correctional facility employee" means any employee of any jail, prison, correctional facility, juvenile institution, temporary holding center, halfway house, or detention facility.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 994 So. 2d 154 - State v. Lowe · 945 So. 2d 865 - State v. Francois

3. “The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession, provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense, and that this Section shall not apply where the force or violence results in a homicide.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 994 So. 2d 154 - State v. Lowe