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81 Ala. 384

Long v. Parmer

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided December 15, 1886

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1886-12-15

Tried before the Hon. John M. Chilton. This was the statutory action in the nature of ejectment brought by the appellant, G. T.' Long, as administrator cle bonis non cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Charles I). Bush, deceased, against the appellee, Alfred Parmer, for the recovery of certain lands, of which said Charles D. Bush died seized and possessed. Charles D. Bush died in 1853, leaving a will, which was duly probated, June 13, 1853.

Relies on McArthur v. Carrie's Adm'r · Harrison v. Heflin · Matthews v. McDade

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1886-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently September 1976

12 state decisions

401886189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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SOMERVILLE, J.

¶1— The lands in controversy are shown to have been held by the defendant, and those under whom he claims, under a claim of ownership and title evidenced by ordinary deeds of conveyance, since January, 1856. This was presumptively an adverse ownership hostile to the world. The possession under these deeds is shown to have been open, notorious, and exclusive, from that time up to October the tenth, 1885, the day of bringing this suit, or for a period of time within a few months of reaching thirty years.

¶2Admitting that the order of sale would have been void for want of jurisdiction in the probate court which granted it, if it had been assailed within twenty years from the date of making it, which was in November, 1854, and admitting further, that DuBose, as Bush’s executor, had disabled himself from suing by making the alleged void sale on the principle of estoppel, so that the possession of the defendant would not be protected by the statute of limitations, which is ten years in actions of ejectment like the present, nevertheless it does not follow that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in this suit. The lapse of tzeenty years from the time of the sale and conveyance by DuBose to Crews, which was on January 24th, 1856, without suit against him by any one, and without any recognition, or admission within that period by him or his sub-vendee, of a title or interest in any one else, operated as a positive bar to any action against the defendant, upon the doctrine of prescription. And, the right of action itself existing, the want of a proper party to sue, by reason of the executor’s disability-, did not suspend the running of this bar, or overturn the presumption which follows from it — that the sale by the executor was regular, and the title of the defendant perfected by regular conveyance to the original vendee from *388whom he purchased. After the lapse of twenty years, the courts will decline to investigate or inquire into the validity of such titles, but will make all reasonable presumptions necessary to uphold them. The only fact open to inquiry, in -such ' cases, is the character of defendant’s possession, either in its original acquisition, or in its continued use, as being, on the one hand, permissive and in subordination, or, on the other, hostile and adverse. — McArthur v. Carrie, 32 Ala. 88; Harrison v. Heflin, 54 Ala. 552, 563 ; Garrett v. Garrett, 69 Ala. 429 ; Matthews v. McDade, 72 Ala. 377; Doe v. Ladd, 77 Ala. 223 ; Solomon v. Solomon, present term.

¶3The charge of the court instructing the jury to find for defendant, if they believed the evidence, was free from error, and the judgment is affirmed.

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