¶1MEMORANDUM OPINION
¶2Darrel Lynn Sapp and Bonita Sue Sapp, hereinafter debtors, filed their Chapter 7 petition on September 3, 1987. On September 15, 1987, debtors filed two motions for avoidance of purported non-possessory and non-purchase money liens on their household goods under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). The liens were held by two finance companies. Avco Financial Services of Rolla, Inc. made no answer and defaulted but ITT Financial Services, hereinafter ITT, denied the allegations of debtors’ motion and claimed that the goods were not exempt and were not household goods. At the hearing, counsel for both parties announced that an eviden-tiary hearing was not necessary and that the parties had a strictly legal question to be ruled by the Court, involving a change in the law of the State of Missouri. Counsel for ITT then introduced a duly exemplified copy of House Bill 484 as Codified in Revised Statute Supplement 1987 to now be § 513.436. The entire exemplified House Bill 484 is appended to this opinion, as a substantial portion of this opinion is intelligible only after perusal of said legislation.
¶3The pertinent provision found on page 564, consists of one sentence and, in lines 1 through 5 following line 139 states:
“Section 1. No property upon which a debtor has voluntarily granted a lien shall, to the extent of the balance due on the debt secured thereby, be subject to the provisions of Chapter 513, R.S.Mo., or be exempt from attachment or execution”.
¶4Afficiandos of bankruptcy history will recall that § 522 of the 1978 Code created the so called “federal exemptions” as set out in § 522(d)(l through 11) allowing the debtor to exempt, inter alia, all household goods on the basis of not more than $200.00 per item with a cap of $4,000.00, although the aforesaid total limitation was not enacted until 1984 in the so called “consumer amendments”. While creditors in states which provided less extensive exemptions than those contained in § 522(d) were extremely unhappy at this turn of events, little did they realize that a majority of bankruptcy acts prior to the 1898 Act had provided for certain federal exemptions, albeit they were generally far less generous than those provided by state law. Congress provided a “safety valve” for the states in § 522(b)(1) and through date of November 20, 1986, thirty-six of the sovereign states had elected to “opt out” of the federal exemptions as said section provided. The State of Missouri exercised said option in 1982 and § 513.427 Mo.R.S. eliminates the federal exemptions for residents of the state. At the same time the legisla-^ ture amended § 513.430 Mo.R.S. to provide the updated quality and quantum of exemptions in personal property thereafter available to residents. The pertinent portion of § 513.430 Mo.R.S. reads as follows:
“The following property shall be exempt from attachment and execution to the extent of any person’s interest therein: (1) Household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops or musical instruments that are held primarily for personal, family or household use of such person or a dependent of such person, not to exceed one thousand dollars in value in the aggregate; ...”
¶5Thus for five years, Missouri residents have uniformly exempted one thousand dollars of household goods and furniture. In point of practice, one wonders if future sociologists will conclude that all Missouri families possessed basically the same quantum of household necessities, since their claim for exemption was so uniform.
¶6Just as uniformly as they claimed the household goods exemption, parties in Missouri filing for bankruptcy have availed themselves of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) and thus avoided all non-purchase money and non-possessory liens on the aforesaid household goods provided that the liens were created after the November, 1978, enactment date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. United States v. *547Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 103 S.Ct. 407, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982). The record of the hearings held by the Brook-ings Commission and early hearings before the House and Senate were replete with “horror stories” of finance companies forcing reaffirmations of vastly inflated debts by threats of repossession of the household goods or “sticks” of debtors who had no credit available to replace their basic living tools and who had granted liens on same previously.
¶7Congress had passed § 522(f) as the cornerstone of its avowed intent to provide indigent debtors with a fresh start, just as Congress had spelled out in § 522(d) what it considered to be the basic mínimums necessary to supply the fresh start. Nevertheless, the § 522(b) provision allowing the individual states to set their own exemptions, also has been held to allow the states to eliminate the avoidance powers under § 522(f) if that were the will of the state lawmaking body. In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (CA 6, 1983).
¶8Based on that background, the Court must construe the effect of § 513.436, Mo. R.S., effective July 15, 1987, passed by the 84th General Assembly of the State of Missouri. The Court determines that it does not change the prior status of lien avoidance.
¶9In reaching that conclusion the Court does not seek to revisit the past battles of whether state action (opting out) can override any provision of § 522 other than subsection (d) because it seems clear that that issue has been resolved in favor of the creditors by at least two opinions by two different circuits. See In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (CA 6, 1983) and Matter of McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (CA 5 1982). Nor does the Court seek to trek through the swamp of whether state legislation which becomes effective on July 15,1987, has the power to change the terms of a contract entered into on January 30, 1987, the date of the ITT lien, with the attendant questions of substantive, procedural or ex post facto laws. Such an analysis is both narrow and unnecessary in regard to this legislation which is so broad and far reaching. For indeed, even if the Court should reach the conclusion that the legislation could affect only bargains struck after its passage date, this would still mean that all non-possessory and non-purchase money liens granted after July 15, 1987, would still not be avoidable under this new legislation; thereby negating the Congressional intent as expressed in § 522(f) and the avowed desire to create a “fresh start”.
¶10Instead this Court chooses to base its negative conclusion to the issue it posed on a constitutional basis. Not on a federal constitutional basis, the Court hastens to add but instead on a state constitutional basis. This is emphasized because this Court has previously indicated its doubts as to the propriety of a Bankruptcy Court (or any Court, constituted as this one is) declaring any Congressional enactment to be unconstitutional. And while this Court has some reluctance to so brand the product of the infinite wisdom of the duly elected lawmakers of the State of Missouri, it reluctantly feels that it must do so in this particular instance because this particular piece of legislation will have extremely broad ramifications and will visit severe economic problems upon debtors without the financial ability to afford legal talent to carry the fight to the higher courts on an individual basis. More succinctly stated, if this Court is in error, ITT can well afford to prove that error but the Sapps cannot.
¶11Philosophical observations aside, the reason § 513.436 Mo.R.S. is unconstitutional is found in Article 3, § 23 of the Constitution of 1945 of the State of Missouri. That section reads:
“Section 23. Limitation of scope of bills — contents of title — exceptions
Section 23. No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except bills enacted under the third exception in Section 37 of this article and general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts for which moneys are appropriated”.
¶12Nor was that a new section enacted originally in 1945. It follows precisely the intent of Article 4, Section 28 of the Constitu*548tion of 1875, which in turn followed Article 4, Section 32 of the Constitution of 1865. The founding fathers of this state obviously intended that each piece of legislation passed by the state’s lawmakers would be clearly labeled, clearly understood and clearly denominated as it was introduced, debated and passed. They further intended that no one would slip into otherwise innocuous legislation items that had no bearing on the general intent of the legislation and in effect were items of private legislation that might thus slip through in the confusion that sometimes attends the closing moments of our legislative sessions. Perusal of House Bill 484 shrieks out of just such a prohibited action having occurred. The title of the act is as follows:
¶13AN ACT
¶14“To repeal sections 452.350, 452.370, 454.500 and 454.505, R.S.Mo.1986, relating to support obligations, liens and other child services, and to enact in lieu thereof six new sections relating to the same subject, with an emergency clause”.
¶15Nowhere in the title is Section 513.436 or even Chapter 513 mentioned. Any reasonable reader could only suppose that the Act pertained to child support. It is only in the 42 words of the one paragraph hooked onto the end of Section 454.505 that Chapter 513 R.S.Mo. is mentioned, and even there Section 1 follows paragraph 12 of Section 454.-505 without any break or identification. Informal investigation indicates that this section may have been added in Conference Committee at the eleventh hour at the behest of the lobby for the finance companies, all without the knowledge and comprehension of the legislators who thought they were passing an effective tool to enforce the obligations of defaulting parents for the support of their minor children. Likewise the word “liens” found in the title, by connotation, must be construed to apply to Section 454.505(4). One can only conjure up the late hour, the smoke filled room, and the ability of the lobbyist, that created this isolated section reposing in a child support bill, recalling perhaps the reflections of Frank Costello in George Y. Higgins’ book “A Choice of Enemies” as to how to label the labors of one who influences the legislative process so effectively.
¶16If it be the will of the Legislature of the State of Missouri that there be no lien avoidance on household goods or furniture or appliances, the Pine and McManus cases previously cited herein clearly allow it to do so and this Court will apply that law meticulously. However, until such will is clearly expressed in an appropriate and constitutional manner this Court would feel totally remiss in following the present thrust of ITT’s argument under the present status of Missouri law. For all of the reasons stated, the Court rules, as a conclusion of law, that Section 1 on page 15 of the Conference Committee substitute For House Bill No. 484 as Codified in Revised Supplement 1987 to now be Section 513.436 to be unconstitutional and therefore not effective to deny avoidance of the non-pos-sessory and non-purchase money lien of ITT as to the household furnishings, household goods and appliances of debtors.
¶17It is to be clearly understood that this ruling applies only to the 42 words, one sentence and one paragraph denominated Section 1 and does not apply to any other phrase, sentence, paragraph, section or portion of said legislation.
¶18The Court notes that one item of said property (the dinette set) may well be the subject of a purchase money security interest, and that two 10 speed bicycles of debtors hardly qualify for denomination as household goods or furnishings. Should ITT desire to present evidence on said issues it will be allowed to do so. Otherwise, debtors’ Motion to Avoid Lien is GRANTED.
¶20[[Image here]]
¶22[TRULY AGREED TO AND FINALLY PASSED]
¶23CONFERENCE COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR
¶24SENATE COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR
¶25HOUSE BILL NO. 484
¶2684TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
¶27AN ACT
¶28To repeal sections 452.350,452.370,454.435,454.500, and 454.505, RSMo 1986, relating to support obligations, liens and other child services, and to enact in lieu thereof six new sections relating to the same subject, with an emergency clause.
¶29Be it enacted by the General Assembly oí the State oí Missouri, as tollows:
¶30Section A. Sections 452.350, 452.370, 454.435. 454.500, 2 and 454.505, RSMo 1986, are repealed and six new sections i 3 enacted in lieu thereof, to be known as sections 452.350, 4 452.370,454.435,454.500,454.505, and 1, to read as follows: 452.350. 1. Each order for child support or maintenance
¶312 entered or modified by the court under the authority of this
¶323 chapter, or otherwise, shall include a provision notifying
¶334 the person obligated to pay such support or maintenance
¶345 that, upon application by the obligee or the Missouri
¶356 division of child support enforcement of the department of
¶367 social services, the obligor’s wages or other income shall
¶378 be subject to withholding without further notice if the
¶389 obligor becomes delinquent in maintenance or child support
¶3910 payments in an amount equal to one month’s total support
¶4011 obligation. The order shall also contain provisions noti-
¶4112 fying the obligor that:
¶4213 (1) The withholding shall be for the current month’s
¶4314 maintenance and support; and
¶4515 (2) The withholding shall include an additional amount
¶4616 equal to fifty percent of one month’s child support and
¶4717 maintenance to defray delinquent child support and main-
¶4818 tenance, which additional withholding shall continue until
¶4919 the delinquency is paid in full.
¶5020 2. The provisions of section 432.030, RSMo, to the
¶5121 contrary notwithstanding, the obligated party may execute
¶5222 a voluntary income assignment at any time, which as-
¶5323 signment shall be filed with the court and shall take effect
¶5424 after service on the employer or other payor.
¶5525 3. The circuit clerk, upon application of the obligee or
¶5626 the division of child support enforcement, shall send, by
¶5727 certified mail, return receipt requested, a written notice to
¶5828 the employer or other payor listed on the application. The
¶5929 notice shall direct the employer or other payor to withhold
¶6030 each month an amount equal to one month's child support
¶6131 and maintenance until further notice from the court, and tó
¶6232 withhold each month an additional amount equal to fifty
¶6333 percent of one month’s child support and maintenance until
¶6434 the support delinquency is paid in full. The notice shall also
¶6535 include a statement of exemptions which may apply to
¶6636 limit the portion of the obligated party’s disposable
¶6737 earnings which are subject to the withholding under federal
¶6838 or state law. The circuit clerk shall send a copy of this
¶6939 notice by regular mail to the last known address of the
¶7040 obligated party. A notice issued under this section shall be
¶7141 binding on the employer or other payor, and successor
¶7242 employers and payors, two weeks after mailing, and shalv
¶7343 continue until further order of the court. The obligated
¶7444 party may, within that two-week period, request a hearing
¶7545 on the issue of whether the withholding should take effect.
¶7646 The withholding shall not be held in abeyance pending the
¶7747 outcome of the hearing. The obligor may not obtain relief
¶79from the withholding by paying the overdue support. The
¶80only basis for contesting the withholding is a mistake of
¶81fact. For the purpose of this section, “mistake of fact” shall
¶82mean an error in the amount of arrearages or an error as to
¶83the identity of the obligor. The court shall hold its hearing,
¶84enter its order disposing of all issues disputed by the
¶85obligated party, and notify the obligated party and the
¶86employer or other payor, within forty-five days of the date
¶87on which the withholding notice was sent to the employer.
¶884. For each payment the employer may charge a fee not
¶89to exceed three dollars, which shall be deducted from the
¶90obligor’s moneys, income or periodic earnings, in addition
¶91to the amount deducted to meet the support or maintenance
¶92obligation subject to the limitations contained in the federal
¶93Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 USC 1673).
¶945. Upon termination of the obligor’s employment with
¶95an employer upon whom a withholding notice has been
¶96served, the employer shall so notify the court in writing.
¶97The employer shall also inform the court, in writing, as to
¶98the last known address of the obligor and the name and
¶99address of the obligor’s new employer, if known.
¶1006. Amounts withheld by the employer or other payor
¶101shall be transmitted, in accordance with the notice, within
¶102ten days of the date that such amounts were payable to the
¶103obligated party. If the employer or other payor is with-
¶104holding amounts for more than one order, the employer or
¶105other payor may combine all such withholding that are
¶106payable to the same circuit clerk and transmit them as one
¶107payment, together with a separate list identifying the cases
¶108to which they apply. An employer or other payor who fails
¶109to honor a withholding notice under this section may be
¶110held in contempt of court and is liable to the obligee for the
¶111amount that should have been withheld. Compliance by an
¶11381 employer or other payor with the withholding notice
¶11482 operates as a discharge of liability to the obligor as to that
¶11583 portion of his periodic earnings or other income so affected.
¶11684 7. As used in this section, the term “employer” includes
¶11785 the state and its political subdivisions.
¶11886 8. An employer shall not discharge or otherwise dis-
¶11987 cipline, or refuse to hire, an employee as a result of a
¶12088 withholding notice issued pursuant to this section. Any
¶12189 obligor who is aggrieved as a result of a violation of this
¶12290 subsection may bring a civil contempt proceeding against
¶12391 the employer by filing an appropriate motion in the cause
¶12492 of action from which the withholding notice issued. If the
¶12593 court finds that the employer discharged, disciplined, or
¶12694 refused to hire the obligor as a result of the withholding
¶12795 notice, the court may order the employer to reinstate or hire
¶12896 the obligor, or rescind any wrongful disciplinary action. If
¶12997 after the entry of such an order, the employer refuses
¶13098 without good cause to comply with the court’s order, or if
¶13199 the employer fails to comply with the withholding notice,
¶132100 the court may, after notice to the employer and a hearing,
¶133101 impose a fine against the employer, not to exceed five
¶134102 hundred dollars. Proceeds of any such fine shall be dis-
¶135103 tributed by the court to the county general revenue fund.
¶136104 9. A withholding entered under this section may, upon
¶137104 motion of a party and for good cause shown, be amended by
¶138106 the court. The clerk shall notify the employer of the
¶139107 amendment in the manner provided for in subsection 3 of
¶140108 this section.
¶141109 10. The court, upon the motion of obligor and for good
¶142110 cause shown, may terminate the withholding, except that
¶143111 the withholding shall not be terminated for the sole reason
¶144112 that the obligor has fully paid past due child support and
¶145113 maintenance.
¶147114 11. A withholding effected under this section shall
¶148115 have priority over any other legal process under state law
¶149116 against the same wages, except that where the other legal
¶150117 process is an order issued pursuant to this section or
¶151118 section 454.505, RSMo, the processes shall run con-
¶152119 currently, up to applicable wage withholding limitations.
¶153120 If concurrently running wage withholding processes for
¶154121 the collection of support obligations would cause the
¶155122 amounts withheld from the wages of the obligor to exceed
¶156123 applicable wage withholding limitations, the current child
¶157124 support obligation of the first served process shall be
¶158125 satisfied first, and then current child support obligations of
¶159126 subsequently served processes shall be satisfied in the
¶160127 order of service. Thereafter, delinquencies sháll be satisfied
¶161128 in the order of service of the processes, up to the applicable
¶162129 limitation.
¶163130 12. The remedy provided herein applies to child support
¶164131 and maintenance orders entered prior to August 13,1986,
¶165132 notwithstanding the absence of the notice to the obligor
¶166133 provided for in subsection 1 of this section, provided that
¶167134 prior notice from the circuit clerk to the obligor in the
¶168135 manner prescribed in subsection 5 of section 452.345 is
¶169136 given.
¶170452.370. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection
¶1712 6 of section 452.325, the provisions of any decree respecting
¶1723 maintenance or support may be modified only upon a
¶1734 showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
¶1745 continuing as to make the terms unreasonable. In a
¶1756 proceeding for modification of any child support award, the
¶1767 court, in determining whether or not a substantial change
¶1778 in circumstances has occurred, shall consider all financial
¶1789 resources of both parties, including the extent to which the
¶17910 reasonable expenses of either party are, or should be,
¶18111 shared by a spouse or other person with whom he or she
¶18212 cohabits, and the earning capacity of a party who is not
¶18313 employed.
¶18414 2. Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly
¶18515 provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future statutory
¶18616 maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or
¶18717 the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.
¶18818 3. Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly
¶18919 provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child
¶19020 are terminated by emancipation of the child. The custodial
¶19121 parent shall have the duty to notify the noncustodial parent
¶19222 of the child’s emancipation and failing to do so the custodial
¶19323 parent shall be liable to the noncustodial parent for child
¶19424 support paid to the custodial parent following emancipation
¶19525 of a minor child.
¶19626 4. In any case wherein a parent has made an assignment
¶19727 of support rights to the division of family services on behalf
¶19828 of the state as a condition of eligibility for benefits under
¶19929 the aid to families with dependent children program and
¶20030 either party initiates a motion to modify the support
¶20131 obligation by reducing it, the state of Missouri shall be
¶20232 named as a party to the motion. The state shall be served
¶20333 with a copy of the motion by sending it by certified mail to
¶20434 the director of the division of child support enforcement.
¶20535 5. The circuit court shall have continuing personal
¶20636 jurisdiction over both the obligee and the obligor of a court
¶20737 order for child support or maintenance for the purpose of
¶20838 modifying such order. Both obligee and obligor shall
¶20939 notify, in writing, the circuit clerk of the court in which the
¶21040 support or maintenance order was entered of any change of
¶21141 mailing address. If a personal service of the motion cannot
¶21242 be had in this state, the circuit clerk shall send a copy of the
¶21343 motion by certified mail, restricted delivery, to the last
¶215address shown for that party in the circuit clerk’s record, rr T}<
¶216and service shall be considered complete upon mailing. ID TJ<
¶217The order may be modified* only as to support or CD TP
¶218maintenance installments which accrued subsequent to the r-Tj<
¶219date of personal service, or in the case of service by mail, 00
¶220from the date the circuit clerk sent a copy of the motion, by 03 t
¶221certified mail, to the party to be served. For the purpose of O IO
¶22242 USC 666(a)(9)(C), the circuit clerk shall be considered the lO
¶223“appropriate agent” to receive notice of the motion to N in
¶224modify for the obligee or the obligor, but only in those to in
¶225instances in which personal service could not be had in this t m
¶226state. in io
¶227454.435. 1. Each prosecuting attorney may enter into a
¶2282 cooperative agreement or may enter into a multiple county
¶2293 agreement to litigate or prosecute any action necessary to
¶2304 secure support for any person referred to such office by the
¶2315 division of child support enforcement including, but not
¶2326 limited to, reciprocal actions under this chapter, actions to
¶2337 establish and enforce obligations owed to the state under an
¶2348 assignment of support rights, actions to enforce medical
¶2359 support obligations ordered in conjunction with a child
¶23610 support obligation, actions to obtain reimbursement for the
¶23711 cost of medical care provided by the state for which an
¶23812 obligor is liable under subsection 9 of section 208.215,
¶23913 RSMo, and actions to establish the paternity of a child for
¶24014 whom support is sought. In all cases where a prosecuting
¶24115 attorney has entered into a cooperative agreement to seek
¶24216 the establishment of a support obligation, the prosecuting
¶24317 attorney shall, in addition to periodic monetary support,
¶244seek an order from the court directing the obligated parent 00
¶245to maintain medical insurance on behalf of the child for i-* CD
¶246whom support is sought, which insurance shall, in the M O
¶247opinion of the court, be sufficient to provide adequate M i—
¶24922 medical coverage; or to otherwise provide for such child’s
¶25023 necessary medical expenses.
¶25124 2. In all cases where a prosecuting attorney has entered
¶25225 into a cooperative agreement to litigate or prosecute an
¶25326 action necessary to secure child support, and an informa-
¶25427 tion is not filed or civil action commenced within sixty days
¶25528 of the receipt of the referral from the division, the division
¶25629 may demand return of the referral and the case file and the
¶25730 prosecuting attorney shallTeturn the referral and the case
¶25831 file. The division may then use any other attorney which it
¶25932 employs or with whom it has a cooperative agreement to
¶26033 establish or enforce the support obligation.
¶26134 3. For the performance of the additional duties imposed
¶26235 by this section, each prosecuting attorney in counties of the
¶26336 third and fourth class shall receive additional annual
¶26437 compensation of four thousand five hundred dollars; each
¶26538 prosecuting attorney in counties of the second class shall
¶26639 receive additional annual compensation of two thousand
¶26740 dollars; each prosecuting attorney in counties of the first
¶26841 class shall receive additional annual compensation of one
¶26942 thousand dollars; each circuit attorney in cities not con-
¶27043 tained within a county shall receive additional annual
¶27144 compensation of seven thousand five hundred dollars. The
¶27245 additional annual compensation for prosecuting attorneys
¶27346 and circuit attorneys provided for in this subsection shall
¶27447 be paid with county or city funds; provided, however, that
¶27548 the state shall reimburse the counties or cities for funds
¶27649 expended for the additional annual compensation to the
¶27750 extent that incentive payments made to a county or city by
¶27851 the department of social services pursuant to the terms of
¶27952 cooperative agreements are insufficient to pay for the
¶28053 additional annual compensation. On or before January
¶28154 fifteenth of each year, the department shall calculate the
¶283amount to each as incentive for the in
¶284preceding year. The department shall determine the m
¶285additional amount due, if any, to each county and shall pay m
¶286such additional amount from appropriations made for that m
¶287purpose. In the absence of a cooperative agreement between
¶288the prosecuting attorney and the division of child support
¶289enforcement, the additional annual compensation provided
¶290for in this section shall be paid with county or city funds
¶291entirely and not with state funds.
¶2924. As used in this section, the term “prosecuting
¶293attorney” means, with reference to any city not within a
¶294county, the circuit attorney.
¶295454.500. 1. At any time after the entry of an order under
¶2962 sections 454.470 and 454.475, the obligated parent, the
¶2973 division, or the person or agency having custody of the
¶2984 dependent child may file a motion for modification with the
¶2995 director. Such motion shall be in writing, shall set forth the
¶300reasons for modification, and shall state the address of the
¶301moving party. The motion shall be served by the moving
¶302party in the manner provided for in subsection 5 of section
¶303454.465 upon the obligated parent or the party holding the
¶304support rights, as appropriate. In addition, if the support ▼4
¶305rights are held by the division of family services on behalf H
¶306of the state, a true copy of the motion shall be mailed by the r4
¶307moving party by certified mail to the person having custody
¶308of the dependent child at the last known address of that ¶-t
¶309person. A hearing on the motion shall then be provided in H
¶310the same manner, and determinations shall be based on
¶311considerations set out in section 454.475. If the child for H
¶312whom the order applies is no longer in the custody of a H
¶313person receiving public assistance or receiving support H
¶314enforcement services from the department, or a division CM
¶315thereof, under section 454.425, the director may certify the W
¶31722 matter for hearing to the circuit court in which the order
¶31823 was filed pursuant to section 454.490 in lieu of holding a
¶31924 hearing under section 454.475. If the director certifies the
¶32025 matter for hearing to the circuit court, service of the motion
¶32126 to modify shall be had in accordance with the provisions o*
¶32227 subsection 5 of section 452.370, RSMo. If the director does
¶32328 not certify the matter for hearing to the circuit court,
¶32429 service of the motion to modify shall be considered complete
¶32530 upon personal service, or on the date of mailing, if sent by
¶32631 certified mail. For the purpose of 42 USC 666(a)(9)(C), the
¶32732 director shall be considered the “appropriate agent” to
¶32833 receive the notice of the motion to modify for the obligee or
¶32934 the obligor, but only in those instances in which the matter
¶33035 is not certified to circuit court for hearing, and only when
¶33136 service of the motion is attempted on the obligee or obligor
¶33237 by certified mail.
¶33338 2. A motion for modification made pursuant to this
¶33439 section shall not stay the director from enforcing and
¶33540 collecting upon the existing order pending the modification
¶33641 proceeding unless so ordered by the court.
¶33742 3. Only payments accruing subsequent to the service
¶33843 of the motion for modification upon all named parties to the
¶33944 motion may be modified. When the obligated parent or the
¶34045 division is the moving party, modification may be granted
¶34146 only upon a showing of a change of circumstances so
¶34247 substantial and continuing as to make the terms unrea-
¶34348 sonable. When the person or agency having custody of the
¶34449 dependent child is the moving party, no showing of such
¶34550 changed circumstances shall be required.
¶34651 4. The circuit court may, upon such terms as may be
¶34752 just, relieve a parent from an administrative order entered
¶34853 against that parent because of mistake, inadvertence, sur-
¶34954 prise, or excusable neglect.
¶3515. No order entered pursuant to section 454.476 shall be in in
¶352modifiable under this section except that, an order entered co in
¶353under section 454.476 shall be amended by the director to t-m
¶354conform with any modification made by the court that oo m
¶355entered the court order upon which the director based his 05 'á
¶356order. o co
¶357454.505. 1. In addition to any other remedy provided by
¶358law for the enforcement of support, if an order has been
¶359entered by the -director pursuant to sections 454.460 to
¶360454.505 and an arrearage exists on the payments required,
¶361the director shall issue an order directing any employer or
¶362other payor of the parent to withhold and pay over to the
¶363department or the clerk of the circuit court in the county in
¶364which the order of the director was docketed pursuant to
¶365section 454.490, money due or to become due the obligated
¶366parent in an amount not to exceed federal wage garnishment
¶367limitations, until all arrearages under such administrative H* H*
¶368order are paid in full. Thereafter, the amount ordered to be tO
¶369paid for support shall be withheld from amounts due or H» CO
¶370becoming due the parent at each pay period. If the parent H* 4^
¶371voluntarily requests that money due or to become due him Ol
¶372be withheld and applied to the support obligation, the 05
¶373employer or other shall comply with that as
¶374if so ordered by the director. 00
¶3752. An order entered pursuant to this section shall recite CO
¶376the amount of all arrearages due and the amount required to
¶377be paid as continuing support. A copy of sections 454.460
¶378and 454.505 shall be appended to the order. A copy of such
¶379order shall be filed with the circuit court in the county in
¶380which the administrative support order was filed pursuant
¶381to section 454.490.
¶3823. An order entered pursuant to this section shall be
¶383served on the employer or other payor by certified mail,
¶38528 return receipt requested, and shall be binding on the
¶38629 employer or other payor two weeks after mailing of such
¶38730 service. A copy of the order and a notice of property exempt
¶38831 from withholding shall be mailed to the obligor at his last
¶38932 known address. The employer or other payor shall withholds
¶39033 from the earnings or other income the amount specified in
¶39134 the order, and may deduct an additional sum not to exceed
¶39235 three dollars as reimbursement for costs, except that the
¶39336 total amount withheld shall not exceed the limitations
¶39437 contained in the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
¶39538 USC 1673(b). The employer or other payor shall transmit
¶39639 the payments as directed in the order within ten days of the
¶39740 date the earnings or other income were payable to the
¶39841 obligor.
¶39942 4. If the order is served on a payor other than an
¶40043 employer, it shall be a lien against any money due or to
¶40144 become due the obligated parent which is in the possession'
¶40245 of the payor on the date of service or which may come into
¶40346 the possession of the payor after service until further order
¶40447 of the director, except for any deposits held in two or more
¶40548 names in a financial institution.
¶40649 5. The department shall notify an employer or other
¶40750 payor upon whom such an order has been directed whenever
¶40851 all arrearages have been paid in full, and whenever, for any
¶40952 other reason, the amount required to be withheld and paid
¶41053 over to the department under the order as to future pay
¶41154 periods is to be reduced or redirected. If the parent’s support
¶41255 obligation is required to be paid monthly and the parent’s^
¶41356 pay periods are at more frequent intervals, the employer or
¶41457 other payor may, at the request of the parent and with the
¶41558 consent of the director, withhold and pay over to the
¶41659 department, an equal amount at each pay period cumu-
¶41760 latively sufficient to comply with the withholding order.
¶4196. An order issued under subsection 1 of this section
¶420shall be a continuing order and shall remain in effect and be
¶421binding upon any employer or other payor upon whom it is
¶422directed until a further order of the director. Such orders
¶423shall terminate when all children for whom the support
¶424order applies are emancipated or deceased, or the support
¶42567 obligation otherwise ends, and all arrearages are paid. No
¶42668 order to withhold shall be terminated solely because the
¶427obligor has fully paid arrearages.
¶4287. An order issued under subsection 1 of this section
¶429shall have priority over any other legal process under state
¶430law against the same wages, except that where the other
¶431legal process is an order issued pursuant to this section or
¶432section452.350, RSMo, the processes shall run concurrently,
¶43375 up to applicable wage withholding limitations. If con-
¶43476 currently running wage withholding processes for the
¶43577 collection of support obligations would cause the amounts
¶43678 withheld from the wages of the obligor to exceed applicable
¶43779 wage withholding limitations, the current support obli-
¶43880 gation of the first served process shall be satisfied first, and
¶43981 then current support obligations of subsequently served
¶44082 process or processes shall be satisfied in the order of
¶44183 service. Thereafter, arrearages shall be satisfied in the
¶44284 order of service of the processes, up to the applicable
¶44385 limitation.
¶44486 8. No employer or other payor who complies with an
¶44587 order entered pursuant to this section shall be liable to the
¶44688 parent, or to any other person claiming rights derived from
¶44789 the parent, for wrongful withholding. An employer or other
¶44890 payor who fails or refuses to withhold or pay the amounts
¶44991 as ordered under this section shall be liable to the party
¶45092 holding the support rights in an amount equal to the
¶45193 amount which became due the parent during the relevant
¶45294 period and which, under the order, should have been
¶45495 withheld and paid over.
¶45596 9. The remedy provided by this section shall be avail-
¶45697 able where the state or any of its political subdivisions is
¶45798 the employer or other payor of the obligated parent in the
¶45899 same manner and to the same extent as where the employe!.
¶459100 or other payor is a private party.
¶460101 10. An employer shall not discharge, or refuse to hire
¶461102 or otherwise discipline an employee as a result of an order
¶462103 to withhold and pay over certain money authorized by this
¶463104 section. If any such employee is discharged within thirty
¶464105 days of the date upon which an order to withhold and pay
¶465106 over certain money is to take effect, there shall arise a
¶466107 rebuttable presumption that such discharge was a result of
¶467108 such order. This presumption shall be overcome only by
¶468109 clear, cogent and convincing evidence produced by the
¶469110 employer that the employee was not terminated because of
¶470111 the order to withhold and pay over certain money. Thé
¶471112 director is hereby authorized to bring an action in circuit
¶472113 court to determine whether the discharge constitutes a
¶473114 violation of this subsection. If the court finds that a violation
¶474115 has occurred, the court may enter an order against the
¶475116 employer requiring reinstatement of the employee. Further,
¶476117 the court may enter judgment against the employer for the
¶477118 back wages, costs, attorney’s fees, and for the amount of
¶478119 child support which should have been withheld and paid
¶479120 over during the period of time the employee was wrongfully
¶480121 discharged.
¶481122 11. If an obligor for whom an order to withhold has beeh
¶482123 issued under subsection 1 of this section terminates his
¶483124 employment, the employer shall, within ten days of the
¶484125 termination, notify the division of the termination, shall
¶485126 provide to the division the last known address of the
¶486127 obligor, if known to the employer, and shall provide to the
¶487128 department the name and address of the obligor’s new
¶489129 employer, if known. When the department determines the
¶490130 identity of the obligor’s new employer, the director shall
¶491131 issue an order to the new employer as provided in sub-
¶492132 section 1 of this section.
¶493133 12. If an employer or other payor is withholding
¶494134 amounts for more than one order issued under subsection 1
¶495135 of this section, the employer or other payor may transmit
¶496136 all such withholdings which are to be remitted to the same
¶497137 circuit clerk as one payment together with a separate list
¶498138 identifying obligors for whom a withholding has been made
¶499139 and the amount withheld from each obligor so listed.
¶500Section 1. No property upon which a debtor has
¶5012 voluntarily granted a lien shall, to the extent of the balance
¶5023 due on the debt secured thereby, be subject to the provisions
¶5034 of chapter 513, RSMo, or be exempt from attachment or
¶5045 execution.
¶505Section B. Because immediate action is necessary to
¶5062 ensure the continuing enforcement of court-ordered en-
¶5073 forcement obligations, this act is deemed necessary for the
¶5084 immediate preservation of the public health, welfare, peace
¶5095 and safety, and is hereby declared to be an emergency act
¶5106 within the meaning of the constitution, and this act shall be
¶5117 in full force and effect upon its passage and approval.