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81 Cal. 236

Tyler v. Stone

California Supreme Court

Decided November 20, 1889

California Supreme Court · decided 1889-11-20

<p>Contract—Construction — Repayment of Loan. — Under a contract by the terms of which a sum of money is advanced by a person to certain stockholders in a mining corporation, in consideration of which he is to become owner of part of the stock which is to be pooled and sold for the mutual benefit of all parties, the pool to continue sixty days and the money advanced to be drawn out of the pool when that amount should be received, and paid to the party advancing the money on account of his interest in the pool, he to be repaid the money advanced in any event, he may, at the expiration of sixty days, recover all the money advanced, whether the pooling arrangement should prove successful or not.</p> <p>Parol Evidence—■ Written Contract.—Inadmissible parol evidence tending to contradict the terms of a written contract should not, when received by the court in opposition to oral testimony corresponding with the unambiguous language of the contract, be allowed to render nugatory the words of the written instrument.</p>

Decided 1889-11-20

Thornton, J., concurring.

¶1I concur in reversing the judgment and order herein, on the ground that the *239decision of the court below is not justified by the evidence. Conceding that the evidence would have been excluded on objection that it was incompetent, for the reason that it tended to change the terms of a written agreement, yet, as it went in without objection, the court below was bound to consider it and give it its due weight. I know of no rule of law which justifies any court in disregarding evidence of the character introduced in this case, because if objected to it would have been ruled out. It was before the court on the trial of this case, and demanded consideration as much as the written agreement or any other matter testified to on the trial.

¶2Further, .1 am of the opinion that plaintiff was entitled to recover the twelve hundred dollars at the end of the sixty days. The twelve hundred dollars to be paid Tyler under the express terms of the contract, “ in any event,” referred to the twelve hundred dollars mentioned first in the contract, which sum was advanced by plaintiff, and was to be paid him “in any event”; that is to say, whether or not the thirty thousand shares were sold within the sixty days, and whether the fifty cents per share got into the box or not within the aforesaid period. If there was no sale, and no money got into the box, Tyler was still to have back the sum advanced when .the sixty days had passed. This we think the fair and just construction of the contract, deducible from the words employed by the parties to express their meaning, and patent on the face of the contract.

¶3For the foregoing reasons given, I am of opinion that the judgment and order should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

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