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← 81 F.3d 1015 - Hill v. Jones

Hill v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

81 F.3d 1015 · 1996

Citation profile

77
cited by 77 later decisions
4
states following
March 2020
most recently cited

33 federal appellate · 4 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 77 later decisions — most recently March 2020 · most notably Moore v. Reynolds (1998), Case v. Eslinger (2009)

33 federal appellate · 4 district · 5 state decisions

3501996200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Anders v. California · Brady v. State of Maryland · Coleman v. Thompson · Wainwright v. Sykes

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 77 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Thus, the possible exception to Finley and Giarratano the Supreme Court noted in Coleman simply does not exist in this circuit: a petitioner may not rely on his collateral counsel's ineffectiveness to excuse the procedural default of a claim even when the state collateral proceeding was the petitioner's first opportunity to raise the claim.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Callins contends that his habeas attorney's alleged ineffectiveness constitutes cause. We have already rejected that argument. '[C]ounsel's ineffectiveness will constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional violation.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “To excuse a default of a guilt-phase claim under [the fundamental miscarriage of justice] standard, a petitioner must prove “a constitutional violation [that] has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” To gain review of a sentencing-phase claim based on [a fundamental miscarriage of justice], a petitioner must show that “but for constitutional error at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror could have found him eligible for the death penalty under [state] law.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.