¶1S. P. Deyton died in the early part of 1871, seized *374and possessed of 200 acres of land in the county of "White. At the time of his death he owed no debts. He left a widow and six minor children. In August,. 1871, the widow applied, as the head of a family, for homestead and exemption ; which were set apart to her by the ordinary. She seems to have resided upon the homestead from the time it was set apart in 1871 until 1879, when she filed her petition to the judge of the superior court of said county, for leave to sell said land and reinvest the proceeds in other land. In this petition she represented her family to consist of herself and four minor children, and that it was impossible for her and her children to realize a support from the land; that it was very poor, and was too large and unwieldy for the use and support of the petitioner and her family.” She also represented that there were no liens upon the homestead, and no judgment creditors.
¶2On the 4th of April, 1879, the judge appointed Isaac Oakes guardian ad litem of the minor children, and required him to join in the prayer of the petitioner for the sale of the land, if in his opinion it was for the best interests of said minors. On the same day, the judge granted the order for the sale of the land, and ordered that J. P. Osborn, clerk of the superior court, be appointed receiver' in the matter, and that the sale of the homestead property take place only by his approval as to the price and terms of the sale; and that the receiver take charge of the proceeds of the sale and reinvest' the same in other lands, and for the same use and under the same limitations that the homestead property was held, looking to the interests of the cestuis que trust in purchasing other lands in lieu of the homestead.
¶3On April 10th, after this order authorizing the sale, Oakes consented to the sale as guardian ad litem of the *375minor children, and joined in the prayer of the petition for the sale of the homestead. On April 15th, the land was sold, and, a conveyance made by the widow to "William B. Bell This deed from the widow to Bell had the approval thereon of Oakes, the guardian ad litem, and Osborn, the receiver. Osborn made a report to the chancellor, in which he stated that the land had been sold to Bell for $400, that he had approved it as receiver, and that Oakes, the guardian ad litem, had also approved it, and that ho had reinvested the $400 in other lands for the same uses. This report was approved by the chancellor May 19,1880. The land which was set apart to the widow and children as a homestead by the ordinary in 1871, was valued at $1,900. It was sold under the order of the court'in 1879 for $400.
¶4Prior to March, 1886, three of the children who were minors at the time the homestead was set apart, had died, and at the March term, 1886, of White superior court, Candas Hood, formerly Deyton, and Samuel N. and Julius L. Deyton, children of S. P. Deyton, brought suit in ejectment against W. B. Bell and J. R. Glenn for the tract of land which had been set apart as a homestead, and of which their father had died seized and possessed. Upon the trial of the case, these facts and others which will be shown by the official report were submitted to the court and jury, and under the charge of the court, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs filed their bill of exceptions to the rulings and charge of the court, alleging error in several particulars. Among the errors alleged were the following: Because the court refused to charge, (1) that a widow cannot, when there are no debts, take homestead in property of her deceased husband, covering the interest of her minor children in the estate; (2) if the homestead was void, the order of the chancellor ordering *376it sold and the sale under such order are void; (3) if the minor heirs were not represented before the chancellor, when the order of sale was passed, then they are not estopped thereby from recovery. The court declined to give these requests ; and charged that the widow, as head of a family, had the right to take out the homestead upon the husband’s estate; and that if the children were represented befoi’e the chancellor by a guardian ad litem, when the court granted the order for the sale of the homestead, they were bound by the action of the court.
¶5This case was argued before us at the last term of the court, and at the present term was reargued at our request. The main point insisted upon in both arguments by the plaintiff in error was, that the homestead set apart to the widow by the ordinary in 1871 was void, because there were no debts owing by her husband at the time of his death, and therefore there was no necessity for the setting apart of a homestead; that the estate descended to the widow and the children under the statute of distribution; that the fact that there were no debts was a jurisdictional fact, and there being none, the ordinary had no jurisdiction to set apart a homestead for the widow and. her children. The decision of this case, therefore, depends upon the question of whether the ordinary had jurisdiction to set apart this homestead, on the state of facts disclosed in the record.
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¶7The fact of there being no debts, however, was not shown to the ordinary when this judgment was obtained, and it appears for the first time in her application to the judge, in 1880, to sell this land. In that application, she alleges that her husband owed no debts at the time of his death.
¶8It was contended that although this fact was not known until the application to the judge of the superior court was made, yet the fact having been shown in that application, Bell, the purchaser of the land, was thereby put on notice that the judgment setting apart the homestead was void. We think we have shown that the judgment was not void for this reason. The judgment at most could only be erroneous. Where a- court has jurisdiction of the person and the subject-matter, and renders a judgment, it is valid and binding on the parties, however erroneous it may be, until set aside; and it cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding. Mayer vs. Hover, last term, 81 Ga. 308. I Herman on Estoppel, *379§366. In this case we have shown that the ordinary had jurisdiction, both of the subject-matter and the parties. Jurisdiction to grant the homestead and exemption was conferred upon him by law ; and the law also gave him jurisdiction of the parties in this ease. Moreover, the law allowed the widow, who had minor children, to apply for a homestead and exemption out of the property of her husband. When the children subsequently sued Bell for the land set apart as a homestead, Bell sought to defend his title by showing this judgment of the ordinary setting apart the liomsetead, and the judgment of the judge of the superior court allowing the widow to sell the same to him. The judgment of the ordinary was attacked, and the court overruled the objection thereto ; and we think the court was right in its ruling for the reasons above given.
¶9The case of Madden vs. Jones, 75 Ga. 680, relied upon by counsel for plaintiffs in error, differs in its facts from this case. In that case, the husband died in 1862, before the passage of the homestead and exemption laws, and the property descended to his heirs under the statute of distribution, not qualified by the homestead and exemption law of 1868-69, which we have seen gave the widow the right to have a homestead and exemption set apart for herself and minor children out of the husband’s estate, no adult heirs being interested therein.
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¶11But even if the law were otherwise, we are inclined to think that in this case the children were parties to the proceeding. The petition of this widow applies for herself and her children, and she states therein the necessity for selling the homestead, that “the land was poor and the farm had run down,” that she and her children “could not make a living on it,” that she and her children “ would suffer for food and clothing unless she were permitted to sell the land” ; and she prays that a receiver be appointed to sell the land and purchase a farm better adapted to her use and her said children’s use, etc. If they were parties plaintiff, of course no service on them was necessary. Besides, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for them, who *381joined in tliis petition for the sale of the land. We think, therefore, that the court below in the present-case was right in its ruling on this question. Linch vs. McIntyre, 78 Ga. 209.
¶12It was urged in the argument that the guardian ad litem did not accept until several days after the order for the sale was granted, and that therefore his action was void and not binding on the minors. The record show's that he did not accept the appointment of guardian ad litem until after the order of the sale was granted. The record also shows that the sale was made after he did accept, and that he assented to the sale, and in his answer recommended it. The record also shows that the receiver made a report to the judge wdro granted the order of sale, and that the judge confirmed the sale. The fact that the guardian did not accept till after the order was granted, was an irregularity which we think was cured by the subsequent order confirming the sale.
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¶14This is not the first case that has been before us in which appeals of this sort have been made. We wish to impress upon the ordinaries and chancellors of the State that when they deal with the estates of minor children, they should be particular in looking after their rights. Numerous cases come before us in which it is apparent that the rights of minors have been sadly neglected. The ordinaries and chancellors are the guardians and protectors of the minor children of the State; and when applications are made to them to sanction a change in the property of minors, bequeathed to them by their fathers, and to which thay are entitled under the law, we beg them, for the sake of the innocent and unprotected, to look into these matters as if they were their own children ; and we especially urge upon chancellors to examine closely all petitions for the sale and reinvestment of trust property and of homestead property. It is so easy for a trustee to set out in his petition the facts which in his judgment will authorize the sale of trust property bequeathed to minors, and it is just as easy for him to get a friend, who perhaps may be interested with him, appointed as guardian ad litem for the children, and have him consent on their behalf to the sale. In such cases, the chancellor, before he grants the order, should be well satisfied, not only from the answer of the guardian *383ad litem, but from personal scrutiny himself, that the property should be sold. It should not be merely a pro forma matter on his paid, but he should examine into the facts, and should only grant the order for sale when he would do so if his own children were interested. Cases come before us every year in which, under the forms of law, minors have been virtually robbed of their estates, and they have no redress; for we are compelled to decide that where a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, the judgment of that court is binding and conclusive on the parties, and cannot be attacked and set aside in a collateral proceeding. For the sake of the women and children of the State, we do hope that ordinaries and chancellors will be more particular in regard to the management of the estates of their cestuis que trust.
¶15Judgment affirmed.