Montoya v. Barreras’s Empirical Analysis
1970
Citation profile
64 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 64 later decisions — most recently June 2017 · most notably Heath v. Parker (1980), Wilcox v. Timberon Protective Association (1990)
64 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Rowe v. May · Hoover v. Waggoman · Cowherd Development Co. v. Littick · H. J. Griffith Realty Co. v. Hobbs Houses, Inc. · Chuba v. Glasgow
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Historically, restrictive covenants have been used to assure uniformity of development and use of a residential area to give the owners of lots within such an area some degree of environmental stability. To permit individual lots within an area to be relieved of the burden of such covenants, in the absence of a clear expression in the instrument so providing, would destroy the right to rely on restrictive covenants which has traditionally been upheld by our law of real property.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“Following this granting clause, twelve paragraphs of restrictive covenants are listed, including the provision in covenant (X) that they may be changed in whole or in part. The phrase “in whole or in part” in covenant (X) clearly modifies the words “to change,” and the direct object of “to change” is the word “covenants,” not the word “lots.” Thus, the covenants may be changed in whole or in part, but we cannot construe this language as permitting any such change or changes to apply to only a portion of the lots on which the restrictions were imposed. Nor is there anything in the covenants themselves which can be construed as either expressly or impliedly modify ing or changing the granting clause itself, which expresses the intent and purpose that all of the described property is encumbered by the restrictions, whether they remain as originally stated or are subsequently changed in whole or in part. The original restrictions were clearly imposed on all of the described property, and though the restrictions themselves may be changed in whole or in part, the change or changes which might be made must affect all of the described property. Id.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Walton v. Jaskiewicz“would permit the majority of owners to remove all restrictions from their lots while leaving the burden on the lots of the minority. It would permit the majority of owners, whose lots might not be adversely affected because of their insulated location in the subdivision, to authorize offensive consequences for the minority by removing or imposing restrictions only on certain lots within the area. Because the grantor encumbered all of the property with restrictions, we cannot infer from the declaration the intention that any subsequent change or changes in the restrictions could be made applicable to only one lot or a portion of the lots in the residential subdivision.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.