Comeau v. Rupp’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 14 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “in withdrawing from the [Grant Thornton’s] litigation arsenal a defense that would normally be available. [Grant Thornton] seek[s] to impute the Rupps’ conduct to the FDIC for two reasons: (1) to set up the defense of contributory negligence to their own negligence as alleged by the FDIC, and (2) to obtain indemnity from the FDIC in the event that they are found liable to the Co-meaus. See 762 F.Supp. at 1441. In either case, the relief sought by [Grant Thornton] would come into play only upon plaintiffs initial showing of some culpable conduct on the part of [Grant Thornton]. But by imputing to FDIC the torts of RCSA’s officers, [Grant Thornton] would shift [its] liability for plaintiffs losses to the FDIC. Thus, this is not a case where a wholly innocent party will be called upon to pay for a loss caused by another. To the contrary, allowing the FDIC to disavow the wrongful acts of RCSA’s former officers prevents culpable parties from transferring liability for their tortious conduct to an entity that is indisputably without fault in bringing about RCSA’s losses: the public, in the person of the FDIC. In any event, refusing to impute to the FDIC the conduct and knowledge of RCSA’s managers does not lessen plaintiffs burden to prove that its losses were caused by [Grant Thornton’s] wrongful conduct. In other words, [Grant Thornton] may still argue that the knowledge and actions of the Co-meaus and/or Rupps, although not attributable to the RCSA, were the legal cause of plain”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Federal Deposit Insurance v. Benjes · Resolution Trust Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick

2. “Although the Accountants’ position finds some support in Ernst & Young, that ease presented facts significantly different from those before this court. Unlike the owner in Ernst & Young, the Rupps were not the sole shareholders of RCSA. The significance of this distinction was discussed in Supreme Petroleum, Inc. v. Briggs, 199 Kan, 669, 433 P.2d 373 (1967). In Briggs , the court recognized the exception to re-spondeat superior when the agent acts adversely to the principals’ interest. Id. at 675, 433 P.2d at 878 . However, the court relied upon an ‘exception to the exception,’ which nonetheless imputes the agent’s wrongful acts to the principal when the agent is the sole actor or representative of the principal. Id. at 676, 433 P.2d at 378 (quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 284, at 647). In such a ease, the sole agent may be considered the alter ego of the principal. Id. Thus, because the agent in Ernst & Young was the association’s sole owner, as well as its chairman; chief operating officer; and chief executive officer — among other positions — the agent so dominated the association that it was proper to consider his acts as .the association’s acts. 967 F.2d at 172 (expressly limiting holding to narrow facts of a ‘dominating sole owner’). By contrast, the Rupps owned only 70% of RSCA, and their involvement in RSCA, although considerable, does not lend itself as easily to the characterization of ‘dominating.’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 899 F. Supp. 1399 - PNC Bank, Kentucky, Inc. v. Housing Mortgage Corp.

3. “Any person who— [[Image here]] (2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Gohler v. Wood